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PR_'ACE
Section I provides a summary of the Panel's observations
and conclusions Oll the Space Shuttle Program.
Section II sun_narizes the infornmtion developed during the
Panel's inspection activities since our last report on the
Shuttle program. The criteria for inclusion of information
in this volume is its relevance for a safe and successful
mission. This section is organized in a manner that points
up the management areas and the individual elements of the
Shuttle system providing a summary of the basic management
or design approach including the most obvious limits or
hazards that are sipnificant to crew safety. It also provides
tile status of tile situation with particular attention to the
c.rrent resolutlon of those hazards.
I We hope the report will be of assistance to those in the
Shuttle Program as a checklist to assure that the right questions
centtniit_ to be asked at the right time. But tits report is also
written lot a larger readt_rship to assist them in understanding
this Coulplex program and its more salient details,
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l.O INTRODUCTION
I.I l_rpose
This section, Section I[, provides a summary of the Informatlo,_
developed during our inspection activities and in a detailed _evlew
of documentation used in the Space Shuttle program. Its intent is
to provide the reader with an idea of the data examined by the Panel
and a description of the program at this time. Another purpose is to
provide specific background information and supporting details to
augment tile data provided in "Section I - Panel's Observations and
Concluslons°" In addition this rmqterlal will be utilized by the Panel
in further reviews durlug the coming year as a baseline and reference
manua I.
1.2 Scope
_%e structure of this volnnle follows tilt'basic organization of
Section I. It extends tile coverage of tlte Shuttle elements to include
those specific subsystems considered critical to crew safety. This
volume also discusses such technical management areas as systems
inte):ration test program planning. It also covers such specific crew
S_llety areas as tile Orbiter Therraal Protection System_ safety and re-
liabillt:v efforts on so-called secondary structure, and lightning
protection. Such _I compilalion of data is necessarily a compro-
ill|He lael%vt'_'|1 del_|i_ ;III¢| |)1'evity aild this aeeonnts for the nurm,rous
li!,alreS and t,lb[es used tn this volunie.
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2.0 SHtri_LE PROGRAMM_AG_2_ENT
2.1 Technical l_ana_ement System
A management overview was provided in the Panel's annual report
dated t4arch 1974. The material provided at that time is still valid
and need not be repeated here. Our emphasis has been on those aspects
of technical management that support and control Shuttle requirements
and designp hazard identification, resolution or acceptance of rlsks_
and the safety implications of test planning. With this inn ttad the
Panel focused ou the following specific areas: (i) the review system
to establish and assure implementation of design requirements and
concepts, (2) management of the development of the Orbiter Thermal
Protection System and Space Shuttle Hain Engine Electronic Cont_oller, (3)
integration management applied to the element interfaces and the risk
management itself, and (4) special management approaches developed to
meet special program needs. To maintain the brevity of this report only
the key data developed by the Panel are presented here.
2.1.1 orbiter Thermal Protection STstem
H_uagement of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) within
the total Shuttle system fran_work must account for the ,any tech-
nical and scientific disciplines and interfaces which affect the re-
quircr._nts, design, fabrication and verification of the operational
hardware. The disciplines anti interfaces, or elements t of TPS m_nage-
men, include the following:
- 00000001-TSA07
o Disciplines
o Aerodynamics _nd Fligh I" N_chanics
o lieat Transfer and F_uid Mechanics
o Structural ._csign
o _terials
o Structural Dynamics
o Testing and Environmental Simulation
o Interfaces
o SLructures o Ground Support Equipment
o Mission Design o Prime and Subcontractors
o Mechanical Systems o NASA Element Organizations
o Thermal Control Systems o Fllght/Ground Test O. flees
o Propulsion Systems o Flight Operations
l_%us development Qf the TPS requires a multi-feceted NASA/Contractor
management and technical organization. The TPS, as a part of the
Orbiter, falls under the direction of JSC in the manner shown in
I-'i_,,urcl, "JSC TPS ,_L_na_ementOrganization" and in Figure 2m "JSC TPS
_na_cmcnt Organization Oetail." Overall management is under the
direction and control o_ the Orbiter Pro_ect Manager (Level III)
throu_',hthe Orbiter En_:ineering Of[ice. Day-to=day technical menage-
mcnt is throu_,,htwo divisions of the Engineering and Development
Directorate - Englnt_cring and Analysis Division and the Structure
,1rid H_,chnnlcs Division,
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All of these operations are integrated and directed by the TPS
Manager who is within the Structures and Mechanics Division of the
Engineering and Development Directorate. The prime contractor for the
m_ TPS is the Rockwell International Corporation who also is the prime
contractor for the Orbiter vehicle. Rockwell International hasp in
turn_ subcontracted the development and production of the TPS tiles
to the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company_ Space Systems Division at
Sunnyvale_ California. NASA has_ at the same tim_ arranged with- their own Ames Research Center and Langley R search Center for tech-
nlcal support.
The NASA roles in TPS development are shown below:
o Johnson Space Center
o Requirements definition
o Management of the Prime Contractor
o Integration of Technology
o Testing and Assessment of the System
o Overall Test Program Management
o Test Facility Developmvnt
o Ames Research Center and Langley Research Center
o Development of New Technology (including Material
Characterization)
o Development of Test _,,cility
o Technical Review and Consultation
o Testing nnd Evaluation
4
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'the C_mtractor roles have been described as follows:
o l_ockwell International
0 I)osigll of the TPS high end low temperature systems
o Conduct of all thermostructurul srmlyses on Orbiter
o Per[orm TPS subsystem qualificat_on testing
o Provide detail drawings and other required documentation
(pcocurement specification defining performance re-
quirements, statement of work defining tasksj de-
fine quantity and schedule, and s,-bcontractor change
notices)
o Administer Subcontractor and materials procurement
o Conduct of periodi,_ review._ to assure proper conduct
of TPS program
o bc_it_e and implement installation and maintenance
operations_ i1_cluding refurbishment and rep_aeemant
at launch site
o Lockheed Htssiles and Space Co.
o Develop and optimize coated tiles
o Provitle nmterial property data on tile= and coating
o Ik'monstrate compatibility between tiles a_tdcoating
o Fabricate_ _wceptancc test and deliver subsystem elements
q_le Preliminary Ik'sl:;nReviews conducted to date on Orbiters lOl
.,id I0_ a,d the Spaet, Shuttle System have not fully covered the
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orbiter TPS. A detailed review is expected in mid-year i975 to assess
whether the TPS design and implementation meets Shuttle requirements.
2.1.2 Space Shuttle Main Engine C_ntroller
The BSME Controller for each engine in conJuncrion with the
i £11ght control system monitors and controls the three Main Engines
during the ascent portion of the Shuttle mission. The Controller
also develops data on engine parameters that are used during the
ground servicing cycle. The Controller depends on comparatively new
technology and has a varied development history starting with the
Viking program. As the result a management system has had to be
developed commensurate wlth the technica_ disciplines, Shuttle inter-
£aces, product quality assurance requirements and attendant management
visibility needcd to meet the demands placed upon this critical sub-system.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is responsible for the de=
sign and development of the Space Shuttle Haln Engine. The Rocketdyne
Division of the Rockwell International is the
Corporation prime con °
tractor for the $SME and they in turn have a subcontract with _loneywell,
Inc. for the design, fabrication, and validation of the SSME-Controller.To summarize brlefly, management and hardware development history
of the Controller has not been a smooth road. Approach to the de-
sign itself was not conventional and therefore a large hlstory/data
base did not exist. As a rmtter of fact the packaging concept and
6
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tts_,el plat_,d-wlr,*ilte;._rycontributed n great deal to the initial
man_1_;cmeutaed t_,chnieal problems. 'the challenge was to develop a
man:L_,vlmulte_m nnd estal)llsh a management system to ensure an e/feetlvt,
,'qq_rom.hto development and prodncihilit:y and to control and rtsolve
l_roblcms on a tln_,ly basls.
'through tilediligent efforts of NASA, the Rocketdyne Division
o[ Rockwell Internal ional and the lloneywell_ Inc. organizsgions, the
SSbn_-Controller program now appea_s to be "on the track" at this t£meD
and the management and general controller activities are said to be
"tracking close to plan, with encouraging resolts."
During this period o_ the Controllerfs evolutlon, the Panel
centered ou the following three questions:
(a) ll_ve the management lessons learned on Viking been
systematically reviewed and the appropriate ones incorporated in the
_1_mgcment system for the Shuttle SS_ Controller? This was based on
the cotltinuit_l,,emphasis by NASA's senior management, as well as the
Pant'l, that lessons learned [rom prior programs be applied to on-golng
pro?,rams as appropriate.
(b) Will the plated-wlre memory concept support the re-
qulrcmeuts and s¢'hcdult,o[ the SSb_Z and Shuttle program? This was
})_ist,d o. thu keowh_db,_, that su¢,h technology represented a new and
_sseutially hi}.,h-risktecheology.
(¢) Based o,_ the past history of computer development pro=
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Hr_ms and the known schedule and cost problems that had arllen on
this program, what arc the fundamental challvngee and ability of
the NASA/Contractor team to resolve them in an orderly and timely
fashion7
Specific co_ents on these areas examined by the Panel are pro-
vided below and support the previous statements concerning the SSME-
Controller status at this time.
While the Panel found no single reporting format available which
systematically stated the significant lessons and their disposition
on the Shuttle program, the i_ney%_ll Program _nager had his staff
review the minutes and audits from the numerous Viking reviews and
identify specific actions that could impact their operations on
Shuttle. They then documented why those problems would not occur on
their Shuttle project. To further enhance the management control of
the program, the Program _nager defined a detailed work breakdown
system and negotiated work/budge_ contracts w_th each major component
supervisor. A problem control and resolution system was established
which assigns action officers to each problem and monitors the solution
as well as its timeliness. Additional technical and middle level
supervision was added to the project. These people were drawn from
the Martin Marietta Company and the Collins Radio Company.
Based on tlle Panel's experience with Apollo and Skylab, the con-
flgoratlon management system appears 8ul:flciently dlaciplined _or con-
!
,| H iiH i i mm
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The accomplishments of the SSME-Controller team during the past
year have been eignlficant but much has yet to be done. Close monitoring
by NASA/Contractor team must be continued to aasure on-time delivery
of properly operating units to support the SSME engine test program
and other major orbiter/system tests prior to the first orbital test
flight.
Two significant problems remain at this time - Master Inter-
connect Board wire routing/shielding in the memory area in which noise
is being coupled into the memory sense lines due to wire routing and
inadequate shielding and intermittent parity errors. These problems
are discussed in more detail in later sections of this report.
Technical man.'gement of the SSME-Controller softwar......._.___ehadsome
of the same problems as found in the Controller hardwar..____.__eprogram.
Verification testing revealed numerous errors. As a result an assess-
ment team, composed of non-Shuttle segments of the Honeywell organi-
zation, Rocketdyne, and NASA personnel was instituted. The following
actions were taken as a result of the team's review:
(a) Software efforts were strengthened by adding technical
personnel at Honeywell along with organizational changes _t both
Rocketdyne and Honeywell.
(b) Software was simplified and deliveries were phased to
meet minimum Integrated System Test Bed (ISTB) test program needs.
(c) Technical management changes were made so that software
i0
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is debugged prior to release for verification runs, Daily schedules
and audits are used to assure knowledgeable management control. "Mem-
ory scrub groups" at }loneywell and Rocketdyne have been established to
,. update and assure software compatibility. Such changes have enhanced
the i[oneywvll planning efforts and contribute to a proper balance be-
tween those personnel developing the software itself and those doing
the software verification.
2.i.2 Inte_ratlon blana_ement
One key to the proper allocation of resources to the _ota[ Space
Shuttle program is the adequacy of the Space Shuttle element inte-
gration effort. This is an activity conducted by the JSC program
office with tltedirect support of the Rockwell International Corpof
D
atiou_ Space Division. All other NASA Centers and Prime Contractors
involved in the Shuttle pro_ram contributc as appropriate. The ultimate
responsibility [or integrating the total Shuttle program is NASA's, but
much of the crucial work to assure the success of this effort is accom-
D
el[shed by the System Contractor, Rockwell International. Consequently,
the Panel asked (I) what are roles of each, (2) what tasks are being done
by eat'ita.d what work areas are not receivin}',sulflclent emphasis, (3)
: ar_, there ¢ou).ruent expectations amen}; the many elements of the program
rc)',_u'dingsystem Integration_ and (4) what is tlledegree of communlcatiou
those involved and mana_,,emellt'ssellsltlvity to the problems Inherant
i u t lie cOnt it_ttin)', Jut e_;rat ion e [tort ?
11
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In its Annual Report for 1973 the Panel discussed this area and
received a response aft shown in SectJon 7.3 of this volume. This
dealt with the results of Rockwe11's effort to separate their inte-
gration task from the Orbiter task_ and with the increase in tasks
asslgned to Rockwell International as tile "System Contractor."
2.1.3.1 NAS_.__&A
The Space Shuttle program organi:;ation canters its integration
effort in the Systems Integration Office within the Space Shuttle
Program Manager's office at JSC. This is the Level 11 operation and
is also the "lead center" on the program. The responsibilities of
this Systems Integration Office are:
(a) Review_ control and manage the systems Integratlon
activities for the Shuttle program.
(b) Manage the design, development, test and engineering
for the Shuttle carrier aircraft project.
The functions carried out by this office are shown in Table I.
"Detailed Program Inter-relationships" are spelled out in the current
issue of Volume 11 of the JSC 07700 l,evel II program definition and
requirements documents.
The JSC Systems Integratlon Office has on-elLa representatives
from blarsllall Space Flight Ct,nter, Office el At, ronautics and Space
Technology (NASA lleadquartcrs), JSC's Eeginet.rin_; and Development t
Division_ Shuttle Carrier Aircrait I'ro.]cct Of[Ice, and tilt! Kcenedy
12
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Space Center. There are three major sub-groups in this offlce - Systems
Engineerings Technical Integrstionp and TesL and Ground Operations.
These functions at JSC are staffea b_ approximately I00 Civil Service
people (35 JSC program office, 15 co-located from KSC and 14SFCD 50 En-
gtneertl_g and Development).
_e necessary coordination in support of the specific tasks to
achieve true Shuttle system integratlon uses many of the methods
developed on Apollo and Skylab programs. Inform1 and formal channels
are used freely, but controlled by the program and element project
managers. The more formalized review system Is a definite part of
the Integration effort as always and is discussed in a later section
o£ this report.
Of particular significance are the more than 30 formalized panels
and working groups working on a day-to-day basis. They encompass all
programmatic areas and are composed of NASA, contractor, and USAF
personnel. The Panels are established as a continuous entity to cover
specific technical and technical management regimes, Working groups
are established to mec_ a speciflc technical task that requires timely
resolution and which is terminated once that problem is resolved. A
llst of the Panels and Working Groups is provided in Table II.
p. Areas of coordlnatlon/Integratlon, Lhat fall between the Panel
type operation and the revi_: system_ are the System Intcgratlon Re-
views (SIR's) and the Computer System InteRratlon Reviews (CSIR's).
t
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Their purpose is to reviewp control, and manage the systems inte-
gratlo_ activities. These activities include (I) integration con-
tractor system tasks, (2) element contractor system tasks, and
(3) NASA system tasks which are conducted at both Headquarters and
Centers.
Approximately every three weeks this group meets, basically
through tele-conferonce methods, to take up the many systems' pzoblems
given to them for their resolution. As stated at a recent Preliminary
Design Review ... "Where more clout is needed to achieve resolution of
baseline data it goes to the Systems Integration Review Panel (SIR)."
Here is an example of the material handled by the SIR. A question was
raised during the Shuttle Systems Preliminary Design Review (March 1975)
concerning the lack of data to assure that the proper hardware and
proper facilities are available to conduct development and verification
of the ascent flight control system. Rockwell was directed to prepare
a presentation to SIR with recommendations on meeting the required depth
of documentation in the Master Verificati_: Plan, _'olume II - "Combined
Elements Verification - Ascent Flight Co_trol."
Another example of integrated technical management is shown in
the KSC/b_FC "Memorandum of Understanding For Shuttle External Tank
and Solid Rocket Booster Support Eluipment." This document is in-
cluded in Section 7.4 of this volume.
2.1.3.2 S_stem Contrnctor
14
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System Integration and Shuttle Orbiter efforts are both conducted
under the same NASA contract number. However i separate cost D budgntj
schedulesj and work authorizations are used. Both the Shuttle Orbiter
and Shuttle System Integration Program Managers (they are Rockwell
International Space Division Vice-Presldents) report to the Space
Division President; thus both have equal stature and authority. The
System Contractor's rolep as described to the Panel, is quite broad.
It is spread over four increments of time:
(a) Initlal increment covers the period during which basic
requirements must be adequately defined and the design approach mature
enough to proceed with detailed design, i.e., through completion o£ the
Shuttle System Preliminary Design Review.
Co) Record period proceeds from the end of the above in-
crement through the Critical Design Review and the completion of the
design, development, test and engineering effort. This increment
extends through the first year or so of flight to assure that the
Shuttle system is safe, reliable, and capable of meeting the oper-
ational missions.
(c) Third increment includes production and upgrade/retrofit
of vehicles for operational use.
(d) Fourth increment is the operational phase.
Rockwell International has the equivalent of approximately 420
persons on their system integration effort. There are some 8 dedicated
m_ 15
m
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i full-tlme staff people in the Shuttle Integration Office and 35 per-
sons located on the staff of the Vice-Presldent for Engineering
(functional support) dedicated to the integration effort. The re-
maining personnel are putting effort into integration a_ required
along with their basic work on the Shuttle Orbiter contract. On the
whole, then, personnel are essentially borrowed from functional
organizations as required. Rockwell supports JSC, Level II, oper-
ations in meny areas as shown by task assignments in Table llI.
Some of the more significant areas being worked on include
integrated vehicle analyses such as:
(a) Induced environment definition
(b) Ascent performance optimization
(c) POGO test and analysis
(d) Element separation requirements
(e) Ice-frost prevention
(f) EMC/Lightning protection analysis and requirements
(g) Sneak circuit analysis
_) They also work on the integrated schematics which pro-
vide end-to-end visibility of the functional relationships of all
components in a system, and as such provide evidence of integration
of all subsystems m e.g. electrical, electronic, fluid, mechanical,
etc.
An area of particular interest to the Panel was the system safety
16
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activities conducted by the System Contractor. These include safety
requirements, program/project reviews, system-level trades, system-
level hazard analyses, and test/operatlons safety. One of the many
examples of their work provided to the Panel was the development of
a flre/toxlcity protection plan and its application across the
Shuttle program. The single source document for the Orbiter is
SD 74-SH-0223. It was prepared for the designer to use as the medium
for achievement of fire/toxicity safety. This document was forwarded
to the other element contractors as an example of inputs requested
for development of total Shuttle requirements.
Based on the n_terial presented and the discussions conducted
during the period of examination, it appears to the Panel that the
Rockwell International Space Division has more of a support role to
JSC than an independent system integration role. Rockwell International
is satisfied with this role. This is not unlike the experience of the
Integration contractor on the Skylab program some years back. On the
whole this resulted in an operational mode where the contractor had the
opportunity to effectively highlight integration problems but not the
responsibility of controlling the activities of other contractors.
There has been an obvious effort to separate the Integration and Orbiter
ei forts at Rockwell International and yet retain the valuable abilities
being applied to the Orbiter for use on the integration effort. Ad-
vantages are as obvious as the drawbacks e.g., assurance of a knowledge-
17
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able but independent check and balance, There appears to be no real
problemq in making this arrangement work to the advantage of the total
program, but sustained attention should be paid to making sure that
it does so.
D 2.1.4 Special Management Items.
In any program o£ this size there are bound to be exceptions to
the rule in management technlqu_s because of exceptional conditions
o£ one kind or another. The Solid Rocket Booster project differs £rom
the other Shuttle elements in that MSFC itself is the prime contractor
rather than an industrial contractor. Marshall has contracted for the
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) with the Thiokol Corporation (Wasatch Division)
while maintaining its In-house responsibilities for the design of the
total SP3 snd the assembly of the total SRB. The major question asked
by the Panel with regard to the technical management of the Solid Rocket
Booster was "Where would the check and balance function come from that
nornmlly exists between NASA Centers and their prime contractors?"
The SRB Project Manager is responsible to the MSFC Shuttle Projects
Manager and is subject to the Level II integration controls exerted by
JSC as the overal_ Shuttle manager. Program requirement doctuuents and
-I reporting systems placed upon organization Just as they
are the SRB
are on any prinm contractor except that NASA does not have the inter=
mediate step of contracting documentation. On the whole there appears
to be at least as great a control and checks and balances on the SRB
18
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effort conducted by Marshall as on any other Shuttle element. This
is supported by the existence of a special SRB Review Office within
the JSC Program Office and the strict adherence to configuration
management systems by the MSFC personnel.
The NASA Shuttle Organization conducted a Program Requirements
Review during the latter part of 1974 designed to realign the Shuttle
program with the available budgets and desired scheduling of actlv-
Itles to meet the needs of the design D development, test and evalu-
ation program. The events in this activity included:
(a) Definition of possible candidates to be delayedj
modified, consolidated or deleted. Candidate items involved pro-
ductlon, spares, ground support equipment, facilities, test program,
operational program, technical management detailsj training and
simulation work.
Co) Thorough review of all the possibilities and their
impacts and value (cost effectiveness). These deemed most worth-
while were pre_ented to NASA _nagement and they decided whether
to accept, rejcctj or hold these possibilities open for later review.
Twenty-elght items were selected and are being implemented. The
Panel's interest centered on any safety impacts caused hy these pro-
gram changes. Typical of the Panel's concern were in (I) deletion
of the runway barrier at KSC, (2) the large nmnbcr of adjustments
made to the test program (about 39% of the total) particularly those
19
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dealing with vibration and structural testing_ and (3) reduction
in ground support equipmeut particularly at the flight test sites.
Program management has assured the Panel thaL each change re-
ceived will continue to receive a safety review to ascertain any
adverse impacts and to bring them to the attention of the program
management. The Panel intends to continue to examine this area to
assure compliance with NASA Shuttle Hana_ement's intent.
The Orbiter/System Integration contractorgs organlzatlou in-
cludes a staff member covering the Shuttle/USAF B-1 Interface. He
reports directly to the President of Rockwell_s Space Division. This
coverage is useful to both the Shuttle and B-1 programs because of the
transfer of both technological and management know-how. As an example,
the basic landlng gear system design for the Orbiter takes advantage of
that developed for the B-I. The Shuttle aft thrust structure is
made of titanium/boron epoxy reinforcement end the payload doors use
graphite epoxy honeycomb. These are extensions of the B-I develop-
merits.
2.2 Organization
The previous Panel Annual Report described the organization and
general management system which has not changed to any great degree
since then. Significant changes have been noted in Section 2.1.2
'_ "Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller." Personnel changes were made at
i=: the Rocketdyne Division. As noted in Section 2.1.4 "Special Management
\
'i
J
i Items" during the DDTbE phase of the Shuttle program D the MarshallSpace Flight Center has been assigned the responsibility for the
integration management of the SR_. It is planned to contract-out
for the uP_ assembly contractor in Fiscal Year 1977. This assembly
__ contractor will then have the prime contractor's role and responsi-
bilities for the total assembly o£ the SRB, It is expected that
this contractor will be located as near as practical to the launch
site operation_l base.
The contractor team is being augmented as required to meet the
_turlng design and fabrication posture of the Shuttle elements. The
principal contractors and subcontrBctors are listed in Section 7. 5
of thls volume.
The Panel visited NASA Centers and a ntunber of contractors dur-
ing the period since the last Panel report and for the first time
examined the KSC role in the Shuttlc program. Because the KSC role
for Shuttle differs from that on Apollo, Skylab_ ASTP and unmanned
space systems, it is discussed here. On previous programs KSC re-
ceived, assembled, checked out and launched the vehicles by providing
basic facilities and support equipment such as the Vehicle Assembly
Building, launch control center, launch pads, checkout areas, and
launch support ground equipment such as the propellant loading systems,
gas systems and environmental control systems. 'i_e KSC role in Shuttle
is more complex.
21
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KSC ham responslbilILles for recelving inspection and control,
assembly, checkout, and launch on _huttle am on previoum programs.
However, in addition they will have .respons1=billty for recovery and
retrieval operations for Lhe Orbiter and the Solid Rocket bosters.
This is completely new.
Ground operations similar to previous programs include the sus-
taining engineering effort, logistics and malntalnablllty. However,
the "turnaround" operations to prepare the Orbiters for flight is
again completely new.
Basic facilities built for prior manned and unmanned programs
will be used with appropriate r_odiflcation. In additlon_ the follow-
ing new facilities and assoclated ground support equipment will be
required: runway and taxi areas, Orbiter Processing Facility, a
highly automated launch processing system to preclude _rrors and
speed up the turnaround time, and payload preparation areas.
KSC will also provide support to the NASA Flight Research Center
and later on to the Air Force's Western Test Range operation.
As presented to the Panel at the time of its inspection trip to
KSC, the KSC Shuttle organization has been fully defined to meet know_
program requirements and the management control systems have been
developed and arc being implemented, KSC manages its Shuttle work
force through t_mnpowcr work packages which identify discreet work
nctlvltles in terms oi! produt,t and required rmlnpower. These serve as
22
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{_onLl_a_Ls _)eLw_en ¢)i)er_lLin}_ {,l¢!melltSp [)roJe¢'l. JiS?tllagers al_(I i:he (]enLKtr
'|'hemn.ny orKanlzat J.ons Involved J.ilthe d_.,_i_,,ns dew_Iopmt_nt
,,,, [ahricaLion_ and testing of the ,_|ntLt[_,vlemcuts and the combined
system appear to be ill place al_Ld iltaZllled in _1 tl_ulner coiiTilensura[_e
with the cost, schedule and pcrfornmnce requirements and expectations.
_l_ose changes in organization necessitated by program maturity and
directed changes will be e×amincd as required to assure that there
is no detrimental impact on ground and flight safety.
2.3 Review S_stem
The Shuttle proKram review system is a dircct descendent of those
systems used on Apollo, Skylab .*d ASTP programs. To hold down costs
there is an increasing use of the teleconference method of conduct-
ing meetings and reviews.
In reality the Shuttle program review is a continuous process
occurring on a daily, weekly and monthly basis at all levels of the
m program from the drafting boards to the program .mnagement. Period-
ically a major managemcut cent:tel [unckJon is inserted into the system
in the form of a detaih,d fozlualizcd rtwiew. L11esc provide a means
k of determining program l_rogress, prol)lems, problem resolution, and
approving the current pt't))_ram postnrt_ as a sort,hi basis for continuing
to the next program mlh!slol_,_.
'[_hereview system ¢_n be _,xamiucd from the point of view of the
23
O0000001-TSB14
total NASA Shuttle Program down through each succeeding level of
management and/or hardware. Within the overall review system there
are so many different vehicles used to conduct reviews that it is
possible here to examine only those which the Panel has had the most
direct dealings: Systems Requirements Revlewj Prelimlnary Design
R_views0 and special revlew_. The many other on-golng reviews include
the Element Quarterly Technical Revlewsp Systems Integration Review
(Pane1-SIR), weekly and biweekly configuration control boards at each
level of the program (some of these are referred to as the CCB_ PRCB,
etc.), and Orbiter Management Review (OMR). These illustrate the de-
tailed management oriented review system.
As noted above the Panel's major interest was associated with
those program activities that assure that requirements are properly
implemented and that the hardware/software is certified as having
been designed and built to the correct and safest possible configuration.
Background on these reviews follows:
(a) Purpose of the Program Requirements Review (PRR) was
to review and define in detail the management techniques_ procedures,
agreements, etc. to be utilized by all the Shuttle program participants
and the program technical requirements. This review was completed
]
in November 1972. 1
_) The System Requirements Review (SRR) updated the pro-
gram and system requirements to be utilized by the contractors. Such
24
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requirements were documenLed as the NASA Level II baseline and placed
under configuration change control. Prior to t|_e SRR the Interface
Control Documentation (ICI)) responsibilities were defined as were
the schedules for ICD templet|on to support the program. This review
was completed in August 1973.
(c) Preliminary Design Reviews (el)R) covered indlvldua[
ShuCtle program elements as well as the overall system. 1_ese are
technlcal reviews of die basic deslgu approach to assure compaCibillty
with the technical requircraents and the produclhility of the design
approach. The PDR_s result in the appropriate authorization to the
contractor aad in-house or_;anizations to proceed with further design
in accordance with the reviewed desi_o approachp Interface require-
Incnts_ commonality itemsp etc._ _lud _ll*proval or npdate of the Level III
baseline documelitat loll. 1_1e depth o[ these reviews can be decerned
trom the "Space Shuttle Systems i'relhntnary Ik, s iyn Review Plan" in-
cluded ill Settle| 7.o of this report. 'lqtt'se reviews were completed
as (ollows:
o Space Shut tle Approach and IAu_dil_gTest NOV. 1974
o Space Shuttle System Mar. 1975
o Orbiter No. 1 (also calh.d 101) Feb. 1974
o Orbiter No. 2 (also called 107) Feb. 1975
O Spat'v Slltlll[e _'[_litl I:.l|}_,tlle Sept. 1972
o l".xt erlbtll Tank Sept . 1974
1
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o Solid Rocket Booster Nov. 1974
o Launch Processing System (Scheduled) Aug. 1975
Several aspects of the Preliminary Design Reviews are of interest
because they show the PDR as a real-life, real-time menagement control
device as a part of the "building block" approach used in arriving at
an operational system within budget and schedule. Each Element (Orbiter,
SS_, etc.) Preliminary Design Review was built on a series of prior
reviews which generally included Project Manager's reviews, weekly meet-
ings and program/project periodic reviews used for visibility and con-
trol of the project. The "building block" approach resulted in the
Shuttle Systems PDR being built on the individual Element PDRis.
All these formal reviews utilize the Review Item Disposition (RID)
activity to point up discrepancies. Thus they are indicative of the
scope of the PDR's as well as the latitude provided to the '_orklng troops"
to have their input kno_m and discussed at r_nagement levels. This is
elaborated on in Section 7.0 wherein the review operation is described.
The RID descrlbe_ significant discrepancies and inconsistencies as well
as distinct problem areas determined by anyone on the project/program.
_e PDR process usually consists of I0 days or two weeks of full scale
team reviews o[ appropriate data and dlscussions during which RIDS are
written. The RIDS arc then provided to a screening group, followed
by a pre-board, ending up at the Iormal board, Orbiter 102 PDR re-
suited in 978 RIDS and the Systems PDR produced 1,204 RIDS. lkte to
25
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the large number only the n_st significant ones ceuld be presented te
the formal board. However_ the individual Team Leaders fer each of
the approximately twelve teams of the PDR repert to the Formal Board
on the team activity and major areas of concern.
There are always some areas which cannot be fully covered during
the PDR due tea lack of information. These areas require and receive
the necessary emphasis to achieve e sufficient degree of technical
and documentary depth so that they may be reviewed within a reasonable
length of time after the PDR.
The Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystem_ Thermal Control Subsystemp
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem and Range Safety Avionics
are so_ subsystems which will be so handled in the August/September 1975
time-frame. In the same vein_ lack of de[initien of the Orbital Flight
Test Program prevented evaluation of the system design against the mission
requirements so that it teo will be covered at a latcc date.
_terial covered and that which has yet to be examined as a part
of the PDR process again shows the need te look at the Shuttle review
system as a centinuum which supports the program and project managers'
needs for design/hardware assttrauce.
At a later date each ef the elements and the system will be sub-
jected to a Critical I_slgn Review (CDR) te determine the compllance
et the completed design with the technical requirements ef the NASA
baseline. 'l_e CDR should result in authori;_atien to the contractors
27
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to proceed with he release o£ detail design to manufaetu_Ing_ the
approval of test procedures_ and the appropriate revision or update
of the Level Ill baseline documentation. The Critical Design Reviews
begin in the early Spring of 1976.
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3.O SIHI_'rLE PROCRAH .ELEMENTS
3.1 Orbiter Prelect
Because of the large number of Shuttle elements and components,
Panel efforts have been conce,_tcated on those areas which most impact
crew safety a_d nvxnagcment control of the program elements, The in-
tent in this report is to focus on the subsystems critical to crew
safety and to provide data for an understanding of risk assessments.
A special section is given over to the Orbiter Thermal Protection
System because the Panel feels It is one of the most significant
systems which, if n_t properly and adequately designed, fabricated
and meintaincdj would pose a real crew hazard as well as a Shuttle
system operational problem.
However, there are differences between the first two orbiters
which should be identified to understand what follows. The first
Orbiter, Number I01, will initially be configured as a Lest vehicle
for the Approach and Landing Test (ALT) Program. It will then be re-
worked to the operational confignration, I_ic second Orbiter, Number i02_
will be built in the orbital [light ¢on[iguratio1_. Thus there are some
items unique to the I01 and there are other items which appear on I02 for
the first time. _tany of lhesc tiff[creates result [rum the needs foJ:
[llght test iostrumelltatLol_ at low speeds and low altitudes o-t 10l
versns high speeds and hi_,h orbLtal altltlldes on I02. There are also
di_lere_ces because o[ the di|ter_,_t n_tural and i_duced envirocu_ental
eliects. For example_ on (h_' 101 veh_clt' therc is no 'l_err_.l Protection
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I System (TPS), little if any internal insulation t and no main pro-
pulsion system (SS_'s). There is an instrumentation boom at the nose
and ejection seats.
3.1.1 Subsystems Critical to Crew Safety
For the purposes of this report the Orbiter system is divided
i'_ into the following subsystems:
(a) Structures - this includes the fuselage i wings,
empennage, crew module, purge, vent, drain, payload doors, thermal
protection system (TPS), and the internal insulation.
_) Propulsion - includes the reaction control system t
orbital maneuvering system_ auxiliary propulsion system and the inter-
face between the Orbiter and the Space Shuttle _in Engines.
(e) Avionics - includes guidance, navigationj flight con-
trol, communications and tracking, display and control instrumentation_
data processing and software, electrical power distribution and control.
(d) Crew Station - includes all those items, such as fuel
cells, batteries, and rotating equipment used to store and generate
electrical power. This does not include those items used for distrl-
butlon and control of the generated power.
(e) Environmental 2ontrol and Life Support - these include
the atmospheric revlt:.llzation subsystem, active thermal control,
_ryogenics, airlock support and waste management.
(f) _chanical - includes landing and deceleration gear,
30
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separatlonp actuation devices, payload retention and deployment, hy-
draulics, and pyrotechnics.
All of these systems and their components may be construed as
affecting crew safety.
The Panel chose to focus first on (i) systems extending the
technlcal and fabrication state-of-the-art in the literal sense or
in its application, (2) systems which prior program "lessons" have
indicated as areas of concern, (3) areas which the Panel members con-
sidered most vulnerable to "human error' in defining requlre,_-nts,
designing and fabricating, and (4) areas which cannot be adequately
tested or validated on the ground.
Using the above criteria, the following subsystems received par-
ticular attention from the Panel:
3.l.l.l Doors and Vents
3.1.i.2 Thermal Protection System
3.1.i.3 Propulsion
3.1.I.4 Avionics
3.i.i.5 Electrical Power System
These are discussed in terms of systems design and current develop-
ment status.
Additional subsyste_s of particular significance for crew safety
include:
3.1.1.6 Crew Compartment
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3.1.1.7 Hydraulics
3.1.1.8 Separation D_chanisme
3.1.1,9 Structures
Here the comments are more limited for the reasons indicated in each
section.
Orbiter weight control has been a major management objective.
Currently_ the estimeted weight is abou _, 2000 pounds below the tar-
,_ get of 132K. Reviews continue to find ways to take weight out of
existing designs or to find new ways to keep the weight down. Since
i
:_ weight control is an important driver_ the Panel in its review of
these subsystems has been sensitive to any impact on safety.
3.1.1.1 Doors and Vents
Doors and vents on the Orbiter vehicle must operate reliably to
maintain the vehicle's integrity for flight during ascent and reentry_
and to avoid risk to the crew.
Because of their significance tot crew safety_ the following
--, doors were included in the Panel's reviews:
i (a) MPS/T-O Umbilical Attachment Door. This door was re-
cently deleted as a result of the latest aerotherod)_amic analyses.
Viy,ure 3 and 4 depict the "before" and "after" configuration.
_) Reaction Control System (RCS) Forward Thruster Doors.
'[_lt'se ha',':, also bt't'll deleted as a result of recent studies. Figure 5
depicts this chatwe.
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(c) Startracker Door.
(d) ET/Orbltcr Closeout Doors. There are two - left and
right side.
(e) Air Data System Probe Doors. There are two - left
and right hand.
(f> Landing Gear Doors. There are three sets of fairing
doors - one for the nose wheel and one each for the left and right
rmln wheel system.
(g) Personnel Hatches. There are three.
_) Rendezvous Sensor. Currently no infor_stlon is avail-
able on this item.
(i) Payload Bay Doors. There are two 60-foot long doors.
(j) Payload Preflight Umbilical Door.
(k) Vent Doors. These are discussed under the vent system.
In addition there are doors on the Orbier lOl for use during the
Approach and Landing Tests on the first vertical flight vehicle _02
that are not found on the later operational vehicles.
System Desi_1_
l_ring ascent_ door position is a function of required operation.
For example_ the startraeker door is closed during asce[_t whLle the
External Tank/Orblter closeout doors are open until the ET is Jettisoned.
Regardless o[ the particular function of individual Orbiter doors_ they
all have to be closed and secured prior to untry.
33
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The Pan,l reviewed the basis for confidence in the mechanical
design. The doors themselves are considered as structural items_ and
thus arc to be designed to preclude failure by use of adequate design
safety factors. Recent aerothermodynamic analyses have led to a re-
assessment of Orbiter doors resulting in the deletion of the Launch
Umbilical Door and RCS Forward Thruster l_ors. The remaining Star-
tracker Door and some vent doors are actuated and latched by electric
motors driving linkages through gear boxes and mechanical sequencers.
The ET/Orbiter eloseout doors and Air Data Probe Doors are actuated
and latched by power drive units consisting of two electric motors
driving linkages through a gear box,
'Hlere are personnel hatches at three locations in the Orbiter
Orbital flight configuration: (l) crew module Ingeess/egress hatch,
(2) airlock hatch, and (3) airlock/payload bay hatch. The crew module
ingress/egress hatch is a circular |latch with double walls. The hatch
outer surface is covered with TPS and seals at the Orbiter outer mold
line. The hatch inner surface provides a redundant pressure seal to
the crew module pressure vessel. 'rilehatch pressure seals may be
checked for leakage by pressurizing the volume between the seals.
'lltisleak check capability exists during launch preparations or in-
flight_ utilizing CSE or flight equipment. _tounted in the center of the
ingress/egress hatch is a 10-inch diameter window used for crew obser-
vations of _xtt,rual conditions and for tilept,rformance of experiments.
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Control of the hatch is mnnual, utilizing a rotary actuator which may
be driven from either side of the hatch and Apollo CM-type hatch
latches. The airlock hatch is a circular hatch which seals at the
airlock entry tunnel separating the crew n_dule from the interior
of the airloek. The hatch is closed and latched for Orbiter launch,
opened shortly after orbital injection to allow access to the air-
lock interior, and also is cycled during extra-vehicular activity.
The hatch pressure seals also may be checked for leakage by pressur-
izing the volume between the seals. This l_ak check capability and
hatch control is the same as for the ingress/egress hatch. The air-
lock/payload bay hatch is also a circular hatch which seals at the air-
lock exit tunnel. Hatch pressure seal check and hatch control again
is slmilar to the ingress/egress hatch configuration. There are two
payload bay doors with an actuation system for each 60-foot half door.
The Payload Bay door actuation mechanism has not been finalized as
yet but the following subsystem description can be provided at this tirae.
The output motion for door movement is taken off the second ring gear
of compound planetary gear boxes. There are six gear boxes along
each powe_ path and these are connected by torque tubes to each other
and to a main reduction gear box. The main gear is driven by the out-
put of a double differential connecting three electric motors. This
arrangement allows system operation for any two motor fafluresj any one
motor failure combined with one electric system failure, or any two
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electrical system failures. A mechanical diseonnt,ct of the _tor
drive unit is provided and the door actuator gear boxes are de-
signed so they will back drive. _lls will allow the (;BE to open or
close the doors.
The Purge, Vent and Drain Subsystem Is composed of five elements:
(I) structural compartment vent, (2) structural compartment: ground
purge_ (3) structural compartment draln_ (4) window cavity condition-
Ingj and (5) hazardous gas detection. The individual systems are not
discussed here since the major focus is on the safety impacts associated
with these systems. The vent ports insure no violation of the delta
pressure limitations of the primary structure and therefore are of
primary significance for crew safety. It is the proper mechanical
operation of these doors that is crltical_ not the structural integrity
of the doors themselves.
There are some eighteen of these vent doors along with the asso-
ciated electro-mechanlcal and mechanical operational devices to n_ve
them as required. The other purge, vent and drain units present con-
siderably less risk to the crew. However_ malfunctions could lead
to mission abort.
'rilestructural compartment ground purge provisions are composed
oi! a GSE-supplicd flow of alr/GN2/GlleP _lich is distributed through
an onboard duct network to all reqlllred structural compartments. 'lhe
structural compsrtmeet drain provisions art_ eolaposed oll piping and
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dlscnllnects which I _ICtl.nF lo};t.lJl_,rwilh yt'o|lud Sllpport t,qufpl_ut t
llllOi.llliZl_the acelullU_ItlClllol _loisluro within lhe Orbil_,r stru¢!turlll
Colnpilrtlllents. 'llke(!olle_HilOll l)olllltlal'l,ii_)loctH-ed lhat offt,ctive
draining Is Jeasl.hh, wilh lh.. orb! It._:In t,llh,,r lho horlzolltal or
vertical atlllud¢,. '['hewlndow c_IVJly COlld[tiOllJllK ]_rovislons allow
t|l¢_ _ntrodo(!l]Jon ol a j'.L',unld-SUlbl)L:h'ddry nJll'o_(*n ptlr_e into the
itmer and outer window cav[tles dnrinK lU'(,lligh( s(,rvlcitlg of the
Orbiter. During the approach and laodhw, llfghl tests and boost to
orbit, the gas in the window cavities .is vented lhrough lines to
overboard. While in orbit they arL_ centinuously venting lhe space.
l)uring the curry phase ambient atmosphere flows into the cavities.
Appropriate valves act to limit the dc].ta pressure across the window
panes in tile event of filter or line clogging. The hazardous gas
detectlon provisions utilize a combination of flight hardware and GSE
to detect the presen_'e and monilor the colwu.ntration of hazardous
gases durin},, prela,mch aud pos u- landitl_; operal ions •
Current Status
Door designs_ as described to thv l'anui_ are such that the door
'm itself and the mechanical linkages and gear bo×ts are considered the
same as primary structnre_ i.t,., they are dt_sigoed with sufficient
structural safety illarl,_Ju to t)l't, chldt , lailuFt' %ln,lt_r any knowll OU
¢:
_' Stlspet't:t!d load couditioll.
[ The door operat i ll_; IIIt't'll,llli ;illlS ,ll't' (lllil ,' VOIIIII[t,X alld I here are
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continuing efforts under way to simplify these mechanisms.
In the main the doors are contiguous with =he Orbiter Thermal
Protection System (TPS) and as such interact from the aerothermodynamlc
standpoint with the function of the TPB.
Rigging of the external doors is difficult and _,_st ha done in
the "blind" in many cases. As a result it is difficult to prove that
door latches latch and lock properly and the chance for human error
is present to a de_ree that may requi_e more than average detailed oper-
ational and inspection controls_ or verification procedures. _e Panel
will review this area ss the program evolves.
The ET/Orblter Separation Cluster Plate Doors end Startracker
Door continue to be the subJec_ of studies to determine whether the
doors and their associated mechanisms could be eliminated, recon-
figured, simplified, or reduced in size thereby reducing or elimi-
nating the crew safety risks associated with improper door operation.
The results of these studies will be the subject of further Panel
review.
The External Tank/Orblter Cluster Plate Doors are now about
46" x 62" (actually some 2354 sq. in.) rather than the original 72" x 84"
size. The maximu_ exterior surface temperature of the door when closed
during reentry is about 1500° F. It is estimated that without the
door local temperatures would bc 1.5 to 2.5 times as high due to flow
dlst,_banccs. These doors are open during launch and ascent until ET
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separation and i£ would appear that ae extensive test program to assure
proper operation ill tile post-launch ¢,llVirOnilil,llt is warranted.
The .qtartraekor door sli_e is flictated by tracker view angles
and the requirement for dayllghl: tracking° Tracker-llnea of 81gh£
are made ui_re difficult by tile [iilckuess ol tile Orbiter TPS material
surrounding the window itself. _L_xlmum tetuperaturea near the Star-
tracker door are expected to be about 825 ° F. The door mechanism
and the alternatives are still under evaluation.
Venting analyses have been conducted to determine the effect
on the Orbiter vehicle of Intert_al compartment pressures due to
openlnll tile vent doors ;it different altitudes during reentry. At
the time tile active vent doors are closed, prior to reentry, the
pressure in all of the vented compattmeuts is approximately zeta.
The Orbiter enters the atmosphere with Llle doors closed until the
"hot" part ol th_ doscout is comphqod. '111cvt,nt doors are then
opened at about 70,000 - 80,000 fcL,t and ten,tin open until the OrbiLer
is on tile i;round. | l I tht_ opollhly, of the doors is delayed to a lower
altttnde l excessive d[I It, t'ontial proSStlrt, s could dt.velup across some of
tlw coiilp_lrtilk.iltS. Analysi.;; llidJvatvs Illlil it l.lkvs _lboul i5 seconds
tO opt'il tlit_ vent doors, tlil Ih." oliii.l" ii_lnd ilia.so vi'Di doors which
, open leo _ootl lilay llroduct, pYoll]t,lliS due I o tilt" [llipinl;t, mt_nt of hot
pl_lslucl oil slructiiral uituiibvr._. 'lilt, _il'l ivt' voiil systClll 8eli!t'tioll wits
l, xti, tlsivcl, y rltvit, wi,d dlhl ;illllrov<'d by _1 iltulllliq ill cetlirdl'tor and NASA
i
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organizetlonal elements, including the Shuttle System Program Manager.
The Orbiter vent system appears to have been sized and analyzed for
nominal ascent and reentcy trajectories, and r_ detailed analysis
has been made to assure adequate operation of this system during abort
or vehicle malfunction conditions. Venting analyses for these con-
ditions are not currently underway, but should be available some-
time after July 1976.
Two failure modes of the vent system that have been under study
because of significance to crew safety are the failure of the OMS
pod vent and wing vents to open. JSC venting analysis shwaad =hat
the fuselage can tolerate a single system fallurep but the wings and
Ob_ pod would fall structurally. The time co troubleshoot such a
failure is very short (in seconds) and therefore backup procedures
cannot meet the need.
The present Orbiter bnsellne with regard to Orbiter doors and
their functions/crlticality are shown in Table IV .
3.1.1.2 .Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystem
S_stems Desisns
The Thermal Protection Subsystem (TPS) consists of the equip-
ment used to insulate against the external aerothermodynamic or in-
duced heating effects on the Orbiter vehicle. The Thermal Control
Subsystem (_;S) maintains appropriate Orbiter thernml condltlons.
_le Panel has examined the TPS in detail and considers it one of the
most significant subsystems on the vehicle. _lile not ,mch attention
4O
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has been Riven the TCS, It will be oxamined more closely during the
coming year.
The TPS consists of those materials applied to fixed and move-
able surfaces to protect the underlying; alumintml structure and heat
sensitive equipment. The TPS has undergone an evolution in design.
Changes have occurred in tile materi_ls; coatings s and configuration.
The system will be reviewed in a PDR this sunmler.
TPS design for operational vehicles (Orbiter I03+_ Subs) includes
five different thermal coverings rather than the current design using
three types:
(a) Lew temperature reusable insulation
(b) High temperature reusable insulation
(c) Reinforced carbon-carbon nose caps
(d) (New) Nomex "E" Celt with coating of white silicone oxide
(e) (New) bare surlaces with coatintt Lot emissivity/absorptlvlty
Current configurarions are sho_,n_ in I.'i);ures () to 8
Studies have boon underway to "ry and simplify and reduce the
cost and weight el tile 'lllern_ll Protection Subsystem. Both JSC and
Rockwt, ll have been heavily involved ill tilt, so activities.
The modifications botwet,u Last stmmter and the spring of 1975
are due to _1 Cllgln}',e ill :ra.!c'ctory which resulted in lower tempcratures_
lower Ileiltin}t ralt':l a.td a bt, t let tilt, tit'si_:lll based on a more sophk_ti-
eaied thermal analysis oI tilt' t ih' ioitlt itr,.,[,_.
I 41
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Areas that have received increasing attention are the aero-surface
thermal seals: elevons_ rudder/speed brakes, and body flap. These
seals must (l) provide thermal protection for the aluminum structure
to a maximum of 350° F._ (2) restrict flow of air and/or plasma from
the high to low pressure areasp to allow aerodynamic control of the
vehicle, and (3) have lO0-misslon life capability in operational vehicles.
Wing elavon seals must provide sealing between the:
(a) Eleven to fuselage
(b) Eleven wing (top and bottom)
(c) Elevon-to-e Iovon
(d) Eleven wing tip
These are complex seal arrangements and have not yet been fully de-
tailed and analyzed.
The vortical tall seal is a conical tube running the length of
the rudder as sho_ in Figure _ 'filebody flap seal concept is
sho_ In Figure iO
_noug the objectives in developiny, tile installation procedures
are finding wa_s to minimize the number o[ tiles and shapes and to
simplify the mailltenauce removal or repair of tiles. Because oi the
difficulty iu maintalniny precise airframe substrate surface tolerancesp
as well as tile installatioi_ heighl t.lerances_ Rockwell Space Division
has developed the "buildln_-block" approa_'h tot installlny, tile on the
so-called "' , "at'[t_|),_' i|r,'a.q COlllprts_|l_; _lbotll 80 percent ul the Orbiter.
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In this approach standard tiles are used in large areas. Special
rows of closeout tiles are added to fill in the gaps between adjacent
areas.
The remainder of the tiles will have to bc shaped and fitted for
such multiple curvature situations and penetrations through the TPS
subsyst:em as :
(a) _e line between the RCC installations and adjacent
tile installations.
(b) Windshield
(c) Forward fuselage hoist point
(d) Actuator access doors
(e) Rear access panels near OMS pod
(f) Structure cavity vents
(g) RCS thruster package doors and opening
_) Nose gear doors and main gear dooes
A part of the installation procedure includes the pre-fit of
tiles on the vehicle sur[ace with a |land sanding o[ the Io-Ter tile
surface to _k_tch the inner l_Id-line o[ th,'OrbiLer and ha._d sanding
of the upper surface to n_tch the required outer mold line dimensions
in order to control the "step" that exists between tiles. 1_is is
shown in Figure ]l an indirates the n_iximtu_allowable tolerance to
preclude "[ouling" the alrstream flow over tht,vehicle surface. Thus
a tllt'-to-tile step of +0.030" Io -0.050" i_ all:>wable in rm_st in-
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_ stances, and a tile gap of 0.050" nominal is allowed.
Current Status
i TPS concerns and issues that have been resolved and those still
challenging the designer_ which have been of specific interest to the
Panel during i_s reviews of this subsytem t can he summarized as fo ows:
(a) Experience working with the reusable surface insulation
i (RSI) or tiles shows it has low resistance to ground handling damage.
It has the capacity to sustain damage without catastrophic failure
during exposure to induced environment, Installation costs and time
requirements are sensitive to the gap and step criteria, tile con-
figuration and installation techniques.
(b) The low temperature tiles appear now to provide more pro-
tection than needed D based both on the change in trajectory and the
results from recent tests and analyses. This over-protection is also
a result of the minimum tile thickness of 0.2 inches. This thickness
is derived from the structural properties of the tile and its tendency
to crack when any thinner than that. As a result, the use of Nomex "E"
felt with a white oxide coating has been tested and found practical as
2
a replacement for some 3,275 ft. of surface which achieves a maximum
temperature at the outer mold-line of 700 ° F. or less. Informution
to date shows the Nome× felt to be acceptable for I00 mission use for
temperatures up to 600 ° F. and very possible to 700 ° F. There are some
2,00(I plus tt. _ of the area meetit_g the 600 degree requirement. There
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are even areas on the top of the Orbiter that could be flown without
any TFS at all. Arc Jet testing conducted in early fall and winter
indicated that the Nomex and coating remain elastic and waterproof
for 100 mission cycles at 600° F. and for at least 50 cycles at 700 °
F. A further investigation was initiated 25 January 1975 to resolve
sons of the remaining challenges. These include the extent of degra-
dation of the coating with exposure to ultraviolet radiation, partic-
ulary degradation of the thermal radiative properties of absorbtivity
and era_isslvity and perhaps elasticity. Although there are no par-
ticular structural or /Ibroacoustic concerns, there is the current un-
known of what contamination does to the coating. The program also
needs more information on the capability of Nomex to handle temperature
dispersions, particularly those over the designed-_or values. Rockwell
has demonstrated the manufacturing and installation ability of the
Nomex felt and indicates a weight savings on the order of 500 pounds
if used on the 2000 to 3000 square feet of surface area currently cited.
The Panel has also been monitoring the studies to assess the
hazards from: (i) ET insulation ablation products deposition on Orbiter
glass surfaces and TPS, ano (2) ict, and frost breaking away from the
ET and striking the Orbiter TPS. Tests and analyses have been con-
ducted to assessthe ET/Orbiter il_teraction. As a result it was con-
firmed that the abalation products will not flow over the windshields
or the top observation wladows and does not materially affect the TPS
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absorptivity and emissivity or its ability to adequately protect the
alumlnum structure. The possibility of TPS damage resultinB from
ice and/or frost forming on the ET and then breaking away during
and prior to the ascent portion of the mission is still an open
item receiving attention. When th_s is completed, if in fact a
m problem exlsts_ protection will have to be afforded the TPS during
the boost phase. Tests to date are not conclusive. 14_del tests indi-
cate that ice will not form but frost will.
Natural environment factors such as rain, hail, llgh..'Ing, and bird
impact have been studied relative to their effect on the TP_. To
assess rain erosion, precipitation models for KSC and Vandenberg AFB
have been developed based on NASA and Air Force data. These models
as augmented by tests and analyses indicate the following probabilities
D
of encountering critical rains during ascent and descent at both
launch/landing sites:
Fli_ht Per One Fli_ht Per 100 Fli_hts
_F KSC Ascent 0.31% 26.7%
KSC Descent 0.013% 1.26%
I VAFB Ascent 0.04% 3.9%
VAFB Descent 0.0011% 0.ii%
-- If required, such data may be de -loped for Edwards AFB. During
ascent, launch constraints can reduce the rain erosion problem, Cap-ability [or manettverln_ durin_ _centry to avoid rain is quite limited.
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As a result erosion has to be accepted and the TPS refurbished as
required during the maintenance and turnaround period. Such erosion
is not considered a crew hazard as such.
As for ice impact and hail tests have shown that the tile does not
exhibit significant resistance to ice impact damage. Atmospheric ice
is encountered at altitudes below about 50_000 feet. Hail may occur
only within or below thunderstorm cells and is observed very infre-
quently at the surface at both KSC and Vandenberg AFB. Higher fre-
quencies occur at altitude. Studies indicate that the probability of
encountering hall during ascent is about 0.0075% and during descent
about 0.015% on an annual basis. Since hail is a thunderstorm phenomena_
the probability of hail encountering hal1 during launch may be reduced
to essentially zero by constraining launches. During horizontal flight
the ability to perform flight maneuvers are negllble and flight through
area thunderstorms cannot be avoided. Hail would not be catastrophic
but would certainly require significant refurbishment after landing.
Bird impact date from both civilian and military sources have
been analyzed with respect to the Orbiter flight trajectories and
expected frontal area subjected to bird strikes. Specific attention
was given to the windows as the most significant area of concern and
the TPS as secondary. Because the probability ol a bird strike is
extremely low, the program has deemed it pr_ictical to accept such low
probability risk.
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TPS t_ obviously subject to "people" or handling damage. There-
fore those personnel coming in contact with the Orbiter must be
trained and constantly be reminded of the fragile nature of the
tiles. Where possible, the ground support equipment should be de-
signed and used in a manner which minimizes any inadvertent damage
to the TPS.
Lightning effects on the TPS are continuing to be studied to
assess the adverse effects_ determine how they can be eliminated or
minimized and to define neeeqsary constraints. The current baseline
has not designed the TPS for a lightning strike. Without any avoid-
ance measures the probability of a lightning strike would be about
0.O08Z for all altitudes up to 50,000 feet for launches from KSC.
The probability of a strike at Vandenberg AFB would be consider-
ably lass, based on lightning occurrence there. _elective time of
launch can reduce the probability of a strike by at least an order of
magnitude.
Solid Rocket Booster separation motors in their original con-
figuration would have impacted the TPS when fired. As a result of
these analyses the forward SRB separation motors were relocated 120
inches forward. Their thrust was increased from eight units of 12,000
pound thrust to four units of 20,000 pound thrust. The firing time
was also reduced from two seconds to a period of not more than 0.75
sccolld.
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Tile installation is sensitive to structural buckling cause.d |ly
thermal stresses along the Inrward fuselage_ told-fuselage and a few
panels on the upper and lower surfaces of the wings, orbiter speclfi-
cation requirements are that there be no buckling below I157. of limit
load on ascent and 100% of limit load on descent. As an example D in
the mid-fuselage and wing areas the initial design assumed stringers
!
| provided adequate stiffness and spacing to preclude buckle until limit
load was reached. Subsequent analysis and testing showed that buckling
D
occurred considerably below the design load. _ne cause was the trans-
verse skin eo,npression stresses induced by combined thermal and mechan-
ical loads. Such buckling disturbs, if not breaks, the TPS subsystem.
The current approach to resolving this problem is to conduct tests to
structural ultimate strength and determine ability of the TPS sub-
system to accommodate the buckling; without failure. Then the program
will be in a position to defint stlf[ening modifications and retest of
TPS installations.
Another area of concern was the effect of the salt air environ-
ment on the chemical stability of the tilt, coatings at the elevated
temperatures anticipatcJ in ascent and retntry. As a result of this
concern, a test pro,gram was conductcd at JS(: in the 1.5 megawatt arc
Jet tunnel facility to evaluate tileeilects el the salt contamination
on the reuse capability el tilehlgb temperatnrt, lllermal protection
m_aterial. T_'st results imllcat_, that s;zlt acc_lmtlations representativc_
49
00000001-TSD12
of up _o ten years of launch pad onviranmetJtal exposure, have no ad-
verse effects on the reuse capability of the IIRSI aud _ts coating for
approximately 100 missions,
The high temperature (greaLcr than 2300 ° F.) thermal protection
material is made o£ reinforced carbon-carbon material. This material
consists of pyrolized carbon fibers in a pyrolized carbon matrix with
a silicon_ carbide coating. Extensive development testing and analyses
are still in process to determine actual performance charac=erlstlcs
and to confirm the RCC configuration as designed, as well as alter-
nate designs which may be used as the final analyses co_verge on the
final design. A design review for this area Is scheduled for the
summer of 1975. Two major problems with the RCC material are (1) sub-
surface oxidation, and (2) Inter-laminar failure occurring within the
pyrolyzed matrix itself. Sub-surface oxidation results in mass loss
which is a function of mission environment pressure and temperature.
For example, tests are presently being conducted to determine how
best to meet the particularly severe environment where the shock wave
off the nose el the Orbiter intersects the wings. The inter-lamlnar
failure problem is one of material processing and now appears to be
resolved.
The TPS test program includes (l) material eharactecizatlon) (2) [
design development testing, and (3) design verification. Tht. results
of the test program to da_e can be su,m_arized as _ollows:
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Oil ll,ulnah]_ Hllt'fllcl' J IISilJ.;Ik J(_n (t| ]J'S) heir( _ JM'C'll [ _'sl ('d
J()r H;It] ]llJlICJc_l[:l'(I II pr()l_4'rl:ie_ _lll(] [[1(','1¢! ((','i[ i/('std[_i rife lit, lilt _,
ev/lltlllle(I J'¢*l/ del.eFiStl_|lll, , ;lily [lllOl'e [ eli( I'('([ll| rt,lll4'lll tl ]OF ill/l[_!rl,q]
ch;t rat.' tze L'iza t ion.
(b) i_{,illiOrc(,d ¢_ll'bOll-{*_lrl)l)ll It_:l{ I)FO}'_l'illll iH ;Ippr(]xJlll_ll(*ly
2!1'Z eollli)[ete w{IJl seJl(,lhl[ed ('olllplcl i,ltl i I1 ]"¢'l)rLt411:y ] {J_().
(el Se_l[s ttSl'd ell liE)viii[t, SIII'Id¢'CS _IFe il_ tile V,'Ey eil['[y
SLIIKeS or material t'll_lvauterizal loll leSl ill).,.
(d) Design developlnvlIt Lest Jllg covers those tests coil-
dueled to confirm analytical methods, suppocl oi design coliLi);uration
sub, el ions, and est;Iblish w.rl l_[vdtiotl test nlelhods, jeer example,
a 0.30-senle model wind tunnel test is in process ;it A.les Research
Center to nteasure effects ell TP,q oll low-speed aerodynamics. Some 120
tests are to be performed on tills model ill the low-speed 40 x 80 foot
wind tunnel. Lost tilL' tests, slL'ueturzl] te,4ls, t_Itigue tests, tluttL'r
t_'sLs and liyhLllio), tests haw, been, dlld COllt [flue (o |)e_ conducted.
Aerodynamic heating ill the _.aps 1)etwel,ll lhe _iliull 'i'P,_tiles is
receivilW ;Ittent_oll Ihrou_',h tests lo assure thai these phenolneLla
are correctly modeled ill Lhe ;lllillVSes Ilsed (0 delillt! the.' configllriltion
ol th_ TPS.
Ill silll_llilry t Ihc Orbiter '['l','; J:i ;I ditlJ¢[lll ;llld lx, nlple× svslem
(O desi);u iIlldlllldl.l'!ii;llld. _Olli' lilt' ].t'SS, Iht' ,m;ll\,ses and lestill_;
t'Olhltli'lt'd to d;lie JtldJvilte lJlilt lib' dt'sJl;h ;llld olaf, I'll( it)llill eOlllph!x-
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itles are yielding to the planned development effort. The remaining
concerns or challenges include the following:
(a) Improved RCC coating to increase material lifetime.
_) Decision on use of Nomex felt in lleu of thin tiles.
(e) Thermal protection of penetrations (aero8urface seals
ant movable doors)
(d) TPS sensitivity to structural buckling.
_) Tile-to-tile high tolerance to preclude "tripping" or
disturbing the airstream.
(f) TPS inspection, maintenance, and handling.
(g) tO0 mission reusability.
3.1.1.3 Propulsion Systems
System Design
This section deals with four separate power systems: (I) Aux-
iliary Power Unit, (2) Forward and Aft, (3) Reaction Control, and (4)
Oribtal Maneuvering Subsystem. The main propulsion system for the i
i
i
Sh_ittle integrated system is covered under Section 6.6 of this report. J
The portion contained in the Orbiter vehicle, the three main engines,
is covered in Section 3.2.
The Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem consists of three independent
APU's, each having pressurized fuel storage and dlst_ibutlon, an APU,
lube oil coolingp and exhaust, venf: and drain provisions. Each APU
provides mechanical shaft power to one main hydraulic pump of the
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Orbiter Vehicle Hydraulic Power System. At least two APU-hydraulie
systems must be operational to assure safe return ot the crew and
vehicle. Operational flight control requirements for the Orbiter
for the approach and landing phase can be met with any one of the three
APU systems failed. With two systems failed, the remaining system
with overspeed cannot meet all operational requirements and may notp
therefore, be capable of returning the crew and vehicle safely under
all mission design conditions.
The forward RCS provides precise attitude control and three-axis
translation during separation from the External Tank_ orbit insertion_
and orbital phases of the flight. The aft RCS doe_ all of these same
functions in conjunction with the forward RCS and also provides thrust
for the reentry phase of the mission. The forward RCS has eleven pri-
mary and two vernier thrusters mounted under doors and six thrusters
mounted exposed. The doors remain closed and latched during boost and
reentry phases and are deployed and locked in place for ET separation,
orbit insertion and orbital phases. L"_neaft RCS is composed of twelve
primary thrusters and two vernier thrusters located on either side of
the aft Orbiter fuselage for a total of 24 primary and 4 vernier units.
The primary RCS engine specification requires the engine to in-
corporate a burn-through detector to sense an incipient thrust chamber
burn-through a,d to provide an appropriate signal to be used by engine
shutdo_1. This is a diffieul( item to develop and qualify and may also
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cause operational problems due to false shutdown. It is now con*
sldered that burn-through is not one of the primary failure modes.
The contractor was asked to process a Master Change Reeord (request),
MCR, to delete the burn-through detector per the 102 PDR (February 1975).
The Orbital Maneuvering System (OH.S) provides the propulsive thrust
necessary to perform the followlng maneuvers: (I) final velocity in-
crement for orbit insertion, (2) orbit circularlzation, (3) orbit transfer,
(4) rendezvous_ and (5) de-orbit. Although one OMS engine could be used
for these operations, reliability considerations dictate that the loss
of an OMS engine is cause for abort.
The OMS has single failure points in the pressurization and pro-
pellant feed areas and the failure mode would be rupture and excessive
leakage. Any excessive pod differential pressure could result in
structure and TPS damage preventing safe reentry. The OMS is fall
safe otherwise, except for such catastrophic events as engine or pro-
pellant explosion.
Current Status
There are numerous mechanical connections used on the forward
and aft RCS in lieu o_ welded connections. This approach permits
removal and inst_ll_tion of equipment in minimum time while minimizing
contamination hazard to the remaining portion o[ the system. Where
possible the [|ttlngs and seals being used were already qualified in
thc same application in Apollo and Skylab programs. After reconnect
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all mechanical connections will be pressurized to system pressure
with helium and externally leak-tested to system requirements.
NASA and contractor have agreed to inaintaln tight surveill_nce
of mechanical connections (fittings) to assure both the number and
possibility of leakage are minimized.
Verification of component propellant compatibility of OMS/RCS
hardware is under review. Based on the demonstrated Apollo CSM
experience, the current requirement is that components be constructed
of materials with demonstrated propellant compatibility. However, sub-
system design features and operational methods, as well as program
funding limitations precludes compatibility testing at the component level
of the OMS high pressure helium isolation valve_ helium pressure regu-
lator, low pressure vapor isolation valve, and the tank pressure re-
lief valve.
In the RCS the plan is to authorize only those materials in the
helium system _ere there is proven compatibility with the propellants.
The data and analysis will be accomplished during the development and
qualilicatiou programs. Because of the propellant system components
total exposure to liquids, a quali[icatlon compatibility test will be
conducted at the subcontractor level.
Deletion el the vibro-acoustic test of the forward fuselage has
meant cancellatio, of the vibration test el the forward RCS module.
llowever, tile I_eed for system certilicstion el the R('S prior to first
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vertlcle flight has not been eliminated, so a reassessment of means and
techniques is underway to provide th_ required certification data base.
Plans are to review aft pod vibro-acoustic tests, system similarity
and analytic techniques to see if aft pod data can be extrapolated for
application to the forward RCS module. In addition, alternate forward
module test plans and schedules are being studied to determine a cost
effective vibration test for the forward module only. Resolution of
these alternatives and a reeon_nendation is due around I July 1975.
3.1.1.4 Avionic_.______%s
Systems Design
The avionics subsystems provides cormnands, guidance and navigation
and controls communications, computations, displays and controls, instru-
mentation_ and electrical power distribution and control for the Orbiter,
external tank and the solid rocket booster. The avionics are configured
to facilitate checkcut0 access, and replacement with minimal distur-
bance to other subsystems. Equipment locations are shown in Figure 12
Computations or data processing is accomplished through the use of
five digital computers. Three are dedicated to the guidance and navi-
gation function, t_e can be used for either guidance and navigation
or payload and performance monitoring,and one i_ dedicated to payload
and performance monitoring. Software or computer programs are integral
to this data processing and control system since these five general
purpose _'omputers are the same mode. [t is the resident software that
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determines the computer function.
Verification of the avionics/software systems as an independent
and integral part of the Orbiter/Shuttle system is accomplished through
the following test programs:
(a) Software Development Laboratory program to verify the
flight data on flight computers.
(b) Avionics Development Laboratory program to verify "single
string" and redundant hardware system operation and the hardware/soft-
ware compatibility.
(c) Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) program
to verify redundant hardware system operation for Orbital Flight Test
as well as the hardware/software compatibility for OFT.
(d) Simulations to verify flight crew operations of vehicle
and the guidance and navigation performance accuracy in a manner similar
to simulations for prior manned spaceflight operations.
(e) Approach and Landing Test (ALT) program using Orbiter
iOl will be used to verify the aerodynamic capability of the Orbiter,
the aerodynamic guidance and navigation performance, aerodynamic
system integrated operation and the aerodynamic dependent software.
(f) Orbital Test Flight program to verify the total mission
vehicle capability with avionics and associated software.
Orbiter 102 will have the following avionics elements not on
Orbiter I01
57
00000001-TSE06
(a) Startracker/Light Shield
(b) Those portions of the flight control system that in-
volve the Reaction Control System, Orbital Maneuvering System_ Thrust
Vector Control for the SSME's.
I (c) SSME interface unit portion the system for processingof
engine data.
(d) Many items of the cormaunications and tracking systemD
i e.g., KU band radar, payload interrogator, signal processes, portions
ms of the S-band, etc.
Current Status
The relationship of avionics to the flight and ground crew safety
is multifaceted, since every action and reaction during the mission
is controlled to some extent by the avionics system. The Panel has,
tberefore_ had to be selective. We have chosen to review three areas
most significant to crew safety: (i) Orbiter/SS_-Controller inter-
iacep (2) ALT/OFT flight control modes, and (3) abort operations.
A review by the Panel was to determine if there are potentially
critical failures across the Orblter/SS_ interface, and_ if so_ to
understand those steps being taken to minimize or eliminate such elects.
_erc hazards are not eliminated we wanted to assure that the assess-
ment of the risk and the rationale tor accepting it had been given
£ appropriate manogement attention.
Operational and checkout commands and engine tlight data are
±.!
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supplied via the electrical interface connectors, _t the engine-
supplied electrical interface connuct panel. Conm_ands consist of
engine start, shutdown, thrust level changes, checkout, and sequence
checks. Engine flight data transmitted to the vehicle consist of
information necessary for malfunction display, fault isolation,
maintenance recording, trend analysis, performance monitoring and
checkout. Three parallel redundant connectors provide a reliable path
for the Orbiter to engine commands. Further a minimum of two of the thre
commands must be received before the engine response will be initiated.
Two of these connectors are also employed to transmit the engine flight
data back to the Orbiter. Failure to provide correct command during
ascent or to transmit engine performas_ce back to the Orbiter do not
appear to be a direct threat to the crew safety since the engine will
continue to operate on the last correct command received.
Flight control utilizes automatic commands determined by the guid-
ance and navigation subsystem manual conmmnds provided by the crew s
vehicle motion sensed by the sensors, logic decisions processed by
the control laws, and those forces produced by actuation of the aero-
dynamic surfaces TVC's, RCS_ etc. to perform stabilization and con-
trol. The control laws are software. The flight control requirements
for each mission phase (ascent, on-orbit, reentry, and atmospheric)
are specified in terms of control mode elements. These mode elements
or control modes arc the building blocks which can be used in combl-
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nations to provide the actual operational control modes. During
ascent through the SRB staging the nominal baseline has been de-
fined as automatic mode. While there is manual redundancy it will
not be used unless there is a significant benefit. After that
portion of the ascent period, the flight control ,nodes can be (1)
manual direct, (2) manual command augmentation, (3) hold, (4) select,
and (5) automatic. These are defined in Table V One of the areas
being worked by the program that will be examined by the Panel is the
identification of OFT launch failures which require manual guidance
and control. Another area is the aerodynamic tolerance effects on
response and stability of the flight control/structures design cap-
ability. Structural constraints have been reflected back in a manner
which indicates a need to restrict the angle of attack and side-slip
variations to a minimum consistent with ability to provide for high
' aerodynamic load relief. Systems studies have indicated that these
constraints are only marginally reached with nominal system para-
I
meters. Flight control margins are tight and vehicle dynamics are[
pushing the margins (plus/minus tolerances or limitations on system
mm
[m input/output lag, accelerations, roll rates_ etc.). The first stage
ascent is the period of greatest concern from the standpoint of com-
puter cycle time. There is a possibility that sample frequency re-
i quirements may increase. If so, this would further aggravate the
computer timlni_ problem,
4
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The role of the avionics system in abort operations is par-
ticularly significant because of the need for large quantities of in-
_rm_tion concerning the vehicle and Its performance as well as the
need for fast reaction to on-golng events. Confidence in the design
capability of the Orbiter vehicle and its avionics subsystem to per-
form the once-around-orbit_ return-to-landlng-site or any other abort
mode is being examined on a continuous basis as the design matures
and the system capabilities are further designed. The Panel will
examine this area in more detail as the concepts and design mature.
A back-up flight contrcl system is being installed in Orbiter
i01 only to provide protection against generic software problems
or problems with the complex hardware_ crew interfaces_ and mechani-
zation. No new hardware is anticipated. This approach should pro-
vide an additional measure of safety during the early flights of the
ALT program.
This concern with overloading Lhe computer capability in the
Orbiter is real. It has been stated that at this time the word
requirements are in the range of: ALT 2700-2800 words_ OFT on-Orbit
2000-5000 words and entry 5000-6000 words (on orbit and entry are
additive). The main drivers on the computer and the flight control
requirements are speed and memory.
A number of [light control support tasks are being carried out
by NASA Centers. _hrshall is working on:
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(a) Ascent flight dynamics and control.
(b) FCS requirements and constralots.
(c) fllgbc dynamlcs/stability performance.
(d) Body-mounted sensor complement and locations.
(e) Digital sampling/filterlng and quantlzation.
Langley is working on:
(a) Entry guidance and control.
(b) Independent evaluation of flight crew role in con-
trolling Shuttle.
(c) Orbiter G&C entry design verification.
The Flight Research Center is working on:
(a) Entry aerodynamic flight control, developing an F-8
digital fly-by-wire program for DPS and flight control redundancy
management and flight control system design.
A number of avionics elements hnve not been placed on contract
as yet or design has not evolved sufficiently _o review it. The
Integrated Electronics Assembly is not yet on contract. Many of the
operational communications and tracking hardware will not be con-
tracted for until 1976-77 period. 1_is also holds true for display
al_d contrt_l equipment for 102. 'l_ose areas, with safety implications,
will bc reviewed by the Panel _t the appropriate time.
3.1.1.5 l.'lectricalPower Subsystem
Systems Desi_n
!P
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The electrical power subsystem generates the electrical power
and 18 active throughout the vertical flight test program and oper-
ational flight and during ground operations when grc.nd support equip-
ment t.8 not connected.
i This electrical power subsystem ls comprised of H_e power re-
actant supply and distribution and three fuel cell power-plants. The
electrical power subsystem is shown sehenmticaily in Figure 13
During peak and average power loads, all three fuel cells and buses
are used; during minimum power loads_ only two ruel cells are used
but they are interconnected to the three buses. The thlrd fuel cell
is shut down but can be reconnected within 15 minu_e_ to support
higher loads. Excess heat from the fuel cells is transferred to the
Freon cooling loop throu!lh heat _xchangers.
Most of the active elements of the electrical power system have
been designed to sustain two failures and remain operationally safe_
in other words fail-operationally then fail-safe. The power reactant
supply and distribution tanks, electrical power subsystem plumblng_
and passive elements have been designed to provide fail-safe oper-
ation after a single failure by means of redundant subsystem flow
paths which are physically separated. A single product water-llne
is provided to the envlro_nental control and life support subsystem
since fail-safe water requiren_ents are provided with the environ-
mental control nnd life suppnrt subsystem.
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'11,eoperational u.e of fuel cells for manned space flight evolved
during the Ceralnl, Apollo, and Skylab programs. The Space Shuttio
fuel cells will bc serviced bq_ween flights and reflnwn until each
one has accumulated some 5000 hours of online s(_rvlce.
Inter£aces of the electrieal power subsystem with other subsystems,
such as the avionics for control_ and environmental control and life
support subsystem_ have not as yet been examined to any degree by the
Panel. The Panel's major conee_,s here will deal with (I) crew hazards
resulting from subsystem failures, e.g.p loss of power to critical
functions, (2) fire hazards resulting from short circuits or other
failure modes, and (3) system design to prevent or inhibit deleterious
events from propagating.
Current Status
Based on latest available data_ it was noted that the current
power requirements exceed the electrical power subsystem capability.
The present electrical po_'er requirement of 2006 KWH exceeds the
ib09 KWII capability for the Orbiter 102. Mission energy require-
meuts [or seven days exceed the baselinL' cryogenic storage capability,
i.e., tank sized for 1530 KWH. Activities underway are normal for
this type o£ concern at this sta_e o£ vehicle devdlopment. '[q1_"pro-
gram is scrubbiug electrical loads and equipment dnty cycles to
elim_n_Ite unnecessary power loadin),_s. Houthly electrical power status
r_,Dorts are uow heing issued 'o assure h_h level eotttraetor aud NASA
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viffJbJ, lJty and r_l_l |inlod volH. l.'ol.
Alsoj bal.l[_d Oll tho pLJ..r oxpvl'Jtmv4, _I lho P;llloi I pll]_'LJUllillr
|ntorvfft i_ llucuffed on lh[' vl*,vlrlc_il, power ss,_bsy!]l¢!lll f]nld tubing
rolnll_(!l;itln_l ,qnl_l till' fluid |Jne insllllllJOll. 'l'ho_lo two al.'l_as llt'_._
shown _chomat|eaily wJ.th brivl doscripti,;o lltalerJ/ll, ill l"Jgures ]4
_lnd l!) A LeSt pl_ngl'alll iS hclnv devuiolu'd to pruvide illblllJ, iltJOll I
packaging, vent ing and i.nstalkal ion design d;l[ a I or ill] i IIsDl-llted
fluhl lines, particularly polyurethane loam Insnlalions and TG-15U00.
3.1.1.0 Crew Compartment Pressu_rlzation antl Toxic Gas Control
The pressurized crew compartment has a volume of approximately
3 3
70 m or 2300 ft. , and contains three ivvels. ]lle upper section,
or flight deck, the mid-sL,¢tion ¢ontaininy an airlock, avionics and
living aroa, and the lower suction containinv the environmental con-
trol equipment.
An atmospheric revi.talizalion pressure control system provides
the crew compartment and habitable payload modules with a two-gas
atmosphere of nitrogen and o×y_.en. It also provides tile oxygea to
tile emergeoevbreathing subsystem and airlock support subsystemj and
provides tlitrogen fur pressuri/.atiou ol tile potable and waste water
Lanks. Table VI is a recap ol tilt, [UllCt iOllS and purtTor,'lanCe require-
merits ot this subsystem. Also_ the aLmospheric reviLalizatioll loop
¢ircnlates and liitt'l:S tahiti air, ¢olllrols tilt' atlllospht, te CO2 level,
providt,_; tenlerattlrt, t'OlllloI_ and t't'lllOVt'S l_Hcnt awl 5t'llSill].t! In!at
O5
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through the humidity eonlrol heat e×changer.
+
Cabin pressure is normally matutal.ned at 14.7-0.2 psla_ but
in the event of excessive cabin leakage an 8-+0.2 psia regulator is
used. Sufficient make-up gas is available for 165 mlnutes pressure
maintenance at this 8.0 psla value_ assuming leakage equivalent to a
0.45 inch diameter hole. The atmosphere venting control provides for
the relieving of excessive crew compartment pressure differentials
whether negative or positive. 'Hlis is a part of the pressure con-
trol system. The pressurization syqtem is not designed to handle a
second failure after 8 psia cabin condition exists. The crew will be
on oxygen nmsks during emergency cabin pressure maintenm_ce of 8 paia.
Smoke detector units located in the avionics' bay_ require refurb-
ishment evcry 2400 hours of operation.
Orbilcr lOl's pressuri.:ed compartment has passed its qualification
tests.
_.1.1.7 Ilydraulic Subs),s tem
Ilydraulic subsystem provides power to actuate the aerodynamic
lli}lht control sttrtaces_ main enyine };imbals_ main and nose landing
gear, Iaaitl landing,, gear brakes_ th,' main enbine valve controls and
nose ',¢he_,] stecrin_'..
Ilydraulic power iN provided by three independent, fifty percent
power systems th_lt provide "he r,',]illred de),,ree of redltndancy, The
I'at_,,J Wits told t'lla_ thi,_ _ll_i_l'O_lc I' ttlil_illliges wei_|li_ power extr_lction}
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_lnd _lysLem eomph, xJty ;ttld enlph_lst/.o_ ba]anced design bolweell systellh_.
A noll|btcr of eOIllpOllC_'l](.S l).avo becli stal_dard|z.ed tht'Oll_h comlnotl_l].iLy pro*
ct_durt_ thlt8 L-edtle|llg the ¢ostp dow, lopmellt t ime_ _llld leftist it' supporl.
'L'hts subsy._lon| is ;let ire dtlrillg ].iLLo|| t ascent and oEblta], ill-
sertion, it provides for concurt't.,nt operation of t'uddel:_ nml.n engl.no
thrust vector control and m(lin engine valves. Tile sttbsystonl :'s passive
in orbit except for a low pressttre_ electrically driven pump in t'ach sub-
system. Tile pump provides circulation to assure thot'mal collditioning.
Activation of tile subsystem is prior to deorbit burn and operates
through rcentt'y and lalldill_',. '].qlenlaitl pumps are driven by hydra;:ine
I lie1 auxiliary power units.
Each hydraulic system tit ili.!es a 03 i',pm variable displacement
pum|_,powert, d by an itldivitlual auxiliar)., i_owt, l" ultit, all el ..4hlt'll colt-
tributes to lilt" rethtlldilllCy el hydt'aulic power sources. Assignment el
IIMCI iOltS to oilch .qyvltem i:_ bil,,it,tl tilden opt [lUlllll ]_ower _.'xtl';Ict fOIl 4111d
distribtttiolt_ lll;ixilmltu tli_,.ht s:ltetv_ lind nlinimum wt, ight without segve-
}t.illion of Iliy, ht ¢o11(l'ol _llld i,lilltv [llllt'liOllS.
The hydrilulic subsystem t'qttil_!Uellt is t.tmlpatiblt' with fluid spool-
lie;ilion blll-1l-St.'8?. Its bulk fluid It'ml_eriltul'e is mililllilillt, d below
._],)o I'. by .t hydl'aUliC tlltid/water boi[t,l" lie;it t'xt'haitt',ct'.
"rht, hydr_lu|ic tlisll'ibtltiotl :_yslt'm _'Ollsisls el ttlbio}x ;ll|d tiltlllgt_
I;Ibl'it'_llcd Ii'Oln l il_lllillnl. Apl_vOXilll;ltCly cilxhlv percent el tilt, tubilll',
t'Ollltt'Cl iOllS ill't' el lilt' I_t'rlll_lllt'lll %¢t,|,lt,tl IVl_t,. _lillhllnnl tilt' el sel_iIvilblt'
_7
00000001-TSF02
i
fittings improves the system integrity. Flared tube fittings nee
not used. Metal lines, designed to flex, are used in lleu of hoses,
where possible, to reduce maintenance and improve safety.
Metallic,non-elastomeric and elastomeric seals are used as best
suited for individual applications. Because of the upper temperature
limit of 275° F., elastomeric seals can be used where they offer
advantages over other sealing techniques. Experience with aircraft
hydxaulic systems has also demonstrated that satisfactory system
operation can be achieved with non-elastomeric and metallic seals.
A hydraulic subsystem working pressure of 3,000 psi was selected
on the basis of minimum cost, minimum risk and better stiffness quality.
The system is capable of operating when subjected to normal g_ zero g,
and hard vacuum encountered in orbit.
The three fifty percent system configuration (tail-safe) was
selected in preference to an original design at four fifty percent
(fail-operational/fail-sa_e) configuration as a result of an exten-
sive study of historical failure data of hydraulic components, the
limited operational exposure time during ascent (abort decision time) and,
of course, weight and cost savings.
From the point of view of reliability, the system r_quirsments
state that the hydraulic subsystem shall provide safe flight and
landing in the event of any singh, failure which causes loss of one
hydraulic string (Jail-sale). "_le avionics/hydraulic interface is
68
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required to have a deat_;n that is tv,o lailure tolerant (l_lLl-ope_.-
alional/lail-s_lfe). The subsyslem also has a maintenance requiremcm
that it be consistent with tile turn_round operation and be capable
ot beLng maintained in the horizontal as well as vertical posit on.
,_erosurfaee controls operated by the hydranlLc system are shovm in
I:lgure 16.
The hydraulic subsystem inlerfaces wi.th the fol].owLng space
orbiter snbaystema:
(a) FIight control surfaces - elevons, rudder, speed brake,
and body flap.
(b'_ l'[aiu en_,ine thrust vector control.
(c_ Utility loads.
(d') Steering,., and landi_g gear brakes.
(e) ._.giotlics - displays aml controls, and f]i,e, ht control
elect rollics,
:kctu_tto1".g used ill the tli_,ht control subsystems (elevons_ main
pt'opttlsion s_.,stt,nl Ihrn:_t vector cotHro]s _|lld ]_llldin_., _,e_ll'] h_ve bee_
_lppl'oved by Rock_,,ell il_tern_lli.otl,l|, ,qp_lce IHvisiotl, as acceptable risks
b,lsed itpon the very Io',,' i_robabilitv ot rllpttlre or ntechanic+l], bindi',;}',
iIIotles ,_1 I_lihlt'e.
h_li|..' I|W I_;In,.,] h_l_ ii_t h.ld lit*.' o[_l'Jolltltllit_' t_'J l't,v|_._w thl. s ilre_|
II1 dl'ptl|, tile IOIlI_*IViII}', lilieS[ iOl|!_ _¢011|_1,ll_p_',lt" ;ll,pl'opt'i,Lle b_l,'_ed ou
6_
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(a) To _hat extent are failure isolation techniques, such
as hydraulic fuses, hydraulic circuit breakers, and return line cheek
valves used to isolate a failed component.
(b) It has been a general rule that whenever hydraulic
power is necessary for critical safety items, two independent sub-.
[ systems are used. Why is this not the case for the Orbiter?
!
i (c) Is there assurance that su_£iclent fluid cooling is
J available to maintain compatible fluid and seal temperatures?
(d) What parameters relating to actuator failure modes and
llfe expectancy are being measured on the approach end landing test
vehic_e and on the Orbiter used for the first vertical flights? Does
a mathematical model exist so that these measurements can be related
to the design and component test data to further enhance hardware
verification?
(e) What failure modes o_ the hydraulic subsystem resulL
in the lass of the Orbiter - either directly or through the [ailure
of a second system impacted by the failnre of the first system?
(f) What is the method of validating these systems to
achieve the necessary confidence Ln the design selected by NASA/Rock-
well International, In other words, If the testing is not beyond the
true expected conditions, bow valid is the risk acceptance logic?
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(g) _lat specific hardware management controls are placed
oil the designers and manufacturers other than the prima Orb£ter sub-
contractor?
3.1.1.8 Orbiter Separation Systems
The separation of the Orbiter from the External Tank involves
three separation systems: (I) forward structural attach, (2) aft
structural attach, and (3) Orbiter/ET umbilical plate separation_
including the electrical umbilical separation. See Figure 17 .
Separation from the carrier aircraft (Boeing 747) involves for-
ward and aft structural separation areas that are different from the
Orbiter/External Tank arrangement, but the method of separation is
esseutially the same. See Figure 18.
The for'ward structural attach/separation configuration consists
of a dual piston pressure actuated frangible attach bolt coupled with
a standard nut. Each piston ca. fracture the bolt at the Orbiter
Thermlal Protection Subsystem moldlino utilizing pressure generated by
one el two Apollo-type pressure cartrid_,cs. Subst'quent to separation.
tllrce centering plungors/sprilL_s aligu tile bolt separation plane with
the' Orbiter TPS reel:line by rotating tilt, retained portion of the bolt
wit|tin tile Orhitcr. No close-out door is required sinct' the stub bolt
and_,herical bearing arc csset_tailiv flush with lilt, TPS moldlino.
'l'llo alt _t rtlt'tttrltl at la_,b/st, p_trdt ion COlXli_,uration conNists el
two (right and It'll sidt') dual defoliator tratl_,_ible lutts coupled with
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two eorrespot¢t_ng attach bolts, Each bolt has u retraction epring
which, after nut fragmentation, retracts the bolt into the ET hemi-
sphere so there will be no interference in the separation sequence.
On the Orbiter side, the dual Apollo-type detonators are enclosed in
a cover assembly whose function is to contain nut fragment$ and hot
gas generated by _he operation of the detonacors_ either of which
_1 will fracture the nut.
i The Orbiter/ET umbilical piar_ separation configuration eonsiste
j of two assemblies (right and Left side). Each assembly contains
W_ three dual detonator frangible nut/bolt combinations which hold the
i Orbiter and ET umbilical plates together during nmted flight. Each
bolt has a retraction spring which, after release of the nut, re-
tracts the bolt to the ET side of the interface. On _he Orbiter side,
each frangible nut with its Apollo-type detonators is enclosed in a
debris container. Each Orbiter umbilical place has three retractors
_ _ich, after release of the three frangible nut/bolt combinations_
retract the plate approximately two and one-half inches. Retraction
motion does a number at things: (1) dieconnectS the Orblter/ET elec-
trical umbilical in the first half inch of travel, (2) releases the
trapped fluids between the Orbiter attd the ET oxygen and hydrogen
shutofl valves, and (3) serves as a backup for closing the oxygen and
=_ hydrogen shutoff wllves. Each Orbiter tmlbilical philo has three
_t st;ibiLztng bttngecs to hohl it in position alter separation.
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The questions that would seem most appropriate at this time
are
(a) During separation of the Orbiter and External Tank,
propellants are released from the feedlines0 With hot surfaces, hot
wires and so on, what is the potential hazard of the oxygen and hydro-
gen be/ng ignited?
(b) What is the adequacy of the separation system and the
operational procedures to assure a safe physical separation of the
Orbiter and External Tank under nominal and non-nominal flight con-
ditions? For instance, all separation modes normally require the
use of the forward Orbiter RCS operation_ assurance that the sep-
aration of each of the three points to be separated are done within
the required time period. At what point during thrusting by pro-
pulsion units of the total Shuttle system can separation occur?
(e) What is the ha;:ard ok the Orbiter and External Tank
recoatacting after separation?
(d_ What is the ability Io n_aintain the oxygen valves
and hydrogen valve in the open position up to separation and the
ability to assure closure after separation?
(e) What is IIle basis lot confidence that there is no
potential han_',-upprobh'm at the all stru,:tural separation inter-
face alter the attachmeut bolt is retracted?
(l) Since umbilical door reh';Ise is accomplished through
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the use of a spring-loaded latch on the External Tank, what is the
hazard from door, door hinge, or latch failure?
3.1.1.9 Structures
The Panel has not examined the basic Orbiter structure in any
detail but has opted to look at those items from the standpoint of
the test program used to validate the structure. The TPS and doors
are covered under separate sections of this report. Another view of
the Orbiter structure is obtained from an evaluation of the interface
between the Orbiter and the External Tank and the Orbiter interface
with the D_in Engine. Added to this is the examination of the abort
operations' area which includes an understanding of the ability to
meet intact abort modes requirements.
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3.2 Space Shutt]e blain Enfiine
The Orbiter Main Propulsion Subsystem consists of the Space Shuttle
bkain Engines (SSME), chc External Tank (ET) which stores and supplies
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen for the SSb_'s, and a system of valves,
t plumbing, pumps, etc. located in the Orbiter which deliver the pro-
pellants to the engines.
I
The three main engines are started during the countdown. When
!
i they attain a ninety percent thrust level, the Solid Rocket blotors are
b ignited and liftoff is achieved. During the burn of the engines_ they
are throttled as required to limit vehicle acceleration to 3g. Gim-
baling of the main engines provides steering during ascent in con-
Junction with Solid Rocket Booster t,rust vector control. The SSME's
burn for about eight minutes, Fi'nalboost into orbit is provided by
the Orbital btaneuverlng Subsystem (OMS). Each of the three main
engines is approximately fourteen feet long with a nozzle about eight
teet in diameter. The engine's produce a nominal sea-level thrust of
375,000 pounds each and a vacuum thrust of 475,000 pounds. _ley are
throttleable over a thrust rangc ol fifty percent to one-hundred and
nine percent of the nominal thrust level.
Orbiter interfaces are basic_tily of three types - fluid, electrical,
and structural. The fleid connect:io1_s consist of tilen_lin propellant
lint+s which transmit liquid Ilydrogcl_ _lnd oxyt,cn and tht, tluid connections
located _lt tht _ inter|act, conllt_ct l,_lnel mouvltt, d on tile vt, hicle. '_lese
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provide fluids to and llrom the individual engines as follows:
(a) Ilydraulic supply to and from the engine.
(b) Nitrogen purge (ground) to the engine.
(c) Helium supply to the engine,
(d) Fuel and oxidizer bleed from the englne.
(e) (_seous fuel and oxidizer (pressurant) from the engine.
The propellant fluid connections at the interconnect panel con-
sist of bolted swivel flanges, All remaining fluid connections are
attached with bolted flanges except for the hydraulic system which
uses self-sealing qulck disconnects. Flexlbility for these Joints
are provided with fle>: hoses on the engine side of the inLet-face.
Electrical interface between the engines and the Orbiter are
made at the electrical connect interface panel located on each engine.
These interfaces consist of tllc following:
(a) Single 28 vdc po,ler connector.
(b) Two 115/208 va¢ power connectors.
(c) Three communication and data transmission connectors.
AC power of 115/206 volt, 400ilz, 3-phase, ib supplied to the engine
controller and the controller conditions "he power to the require-
ments of tilevarious engine actuation and instrumt_ntation subsystems.
'rile28 vde is provided to operate both the SSME controller heaters
at_d a redundant coil on t,ach en£1ne's emer_-ency pneumatic shutdow_ con-
trol sol_qlold wilve _dli_h is llorJmillyopen. Engine shotdo_ cannot
76
00000001-TSF11
occur whell the crew activates the engine limit control to inhibit
engine shutdown. Operational and checkout coaunaodn and ctlgine flight
data are supplied via tile electrical illlerface t!ollaectors a|: Ihd
,,D enb, tne-supplled eleetrital interface connect pan,,1. Cow,semis coo-
t .qi_ O_3 eoIgint_ start I qhu.down I thru_ IS level C|l;Inlv, esl checkouz m _lntl
i sequence checks. Engine flight data to _he vehicle consist of lnfor-
D
raation necessary for malfunction display, fault isolation, maintenance
recording, trend analysis, performance monitoring and checkout. Three
parallel redundant connectors provide a path for the Orbiter-to-engine
commands. A minirmnm of two of the three commands most be received
before the engine response can be initiated. Two of these connectors
are also employed to transmit the engine flight data back to the
Orbiter. The aft Orbiter thrust structure, the third interfacc_ is
built up with a titanium/boron epoxy material. Another interface is
the honeycomb-base aluminum heat shield with insulation to protect the
SSHE from thermal inputs.
Integrated tcstiog of sulsystems is a critical milestone in tilt,
SSHE program. It will be conducted at the National Space Technology
1,aboratories (NSTI,) iu blississippi. 11_c [irst engine firing at rated
power level will takt, place ill NS'Iq, on a moditied Apollo l irin_, test
stated in the winter Cf 1975. 'II_is will bl! tallowed by the lirst
throttling test over tilt' ratt, d power level t',_n_,t'. Tilt' Integrated
System Test Bed (ISTB) will dt, tllonstrale tilt' dt'si_;nl8 _, .lily tO hantl_e
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the high pressures and repeatable operations required of it, I.'I}e
ISTB engine configuration varies m)mewhat from the flight-type
engine in the following ar,-,as: there is no LOX tank pressurization
heat e_tchanger, changes in material (high pressure fuel line, small
fluid lines, powerhead ducts, arid modilJit, d insul,ltJon), _111¢1the
electronic controller assembly is not a flight type unit but is a
bench test unit built in racks. The ISIs has progressed as follows:
Assembl) temple ted 3/13/75
Checkout completed 3/21/75
ISTB shipped 3/25/75
ISTB at NSTL 3/28/75
ISTB installed at NSTL 4/7/75
Test Readiness Review 5/7/75
ISTB first firing June 1975
There is no gitub_111ng plannt,d during the ISTB program.
3.2.2 Subsystems Critical to Crew Safety
For the purposes of this report s the Space Shuttle blain Engine
as a system is divided Late tht' following subsystems:
(a) Combustion devices
(b) Tnrbu-machine ry
(c) l_neunu| tics
(d) Propt, I last valves
(¢"_ }lvdraulics
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(t) C_)nl;rt_l It' r
(g) I_,nt t_,rn
(]l) Ell'etrlt_al harnt!nn¢n
(i) it_._t rumvnt at h_n
(._) lllteFttOl|lletts _llitl SSb|l.;/tlrbJl_,F Inlerlzlc:es
(k) _;|mba [
As with tile Ot'biteF eleme|lt ol the Space Shuttle progrant_ tile
Panel t-ecognized that any one t_r a tomb|nation of Ihese subsystems
and their components may be considered as affecting crew safety, but
from the point of view oI tht, Panel it was necessary to deceminc
which of these should be tocused on thtring the review period. _e
basis of this focus was(l) ,m subsystems and/or components extend-
ing the technical (material_ fabrication, etc.) state-el-the-art in
the literal sense or In the opplical ton_ (2) those subsysteras and/or
components which prior progFanl "lt, ssons" heel. Jlldicated as areas ot
concern_ (3) areas which the Patlt.1 men|beFs t'onsideFed most vult%eFable
to "human _rror_" and f'_) areas which can atlect cre_ sdtety but which
cannot or will not have been adequately tested oF validated prior to
first flight. With these criteria in mind the Panel examined the
following subsystems in some detail:
3.2.2.1 EnpJtlt, I._Iectroufc t:ontrollcr Assembly
].2.2.2 Mail% combust |Oil ch_ltllbel?
3.2 • 2. _ Ill );h Prt, ssltl't' ['Ill*hi)- Pump!i
t 7q
O0000001-TSF14
3.2.2.4 Ileat Exchanger
3.2.2.5 Hot Gas Manifold
The Controller is significant for crew safety because of its
responsibility for detecting, monitoring, and controlling engine
failure, thrust aud propellant mixture ration_ and engine starts
and shutdowns and engine gimbaling.
The manifold_ exchanger and chamber are of particular signifi-
cance because they have complex welds and are subject to hydrogen
embrittlement during operation. Material safety factors may be re-
duced through flow erosion or fabrication problems. Finally_ it is
difficult to inspect the finished item.
Also, the Panel reviewed the following areas to assure that risk
assessment was receiving appropriate attention:
3.2.2.6 POGO
3.2.2.7 Ground Operations and CSE
3.2.2.8 Hydraulic Fluid
3.2.2.9 Lightning Effects
POGO results from dynamic coupling of the structure, propulsion_
and flight control subsystems durin_ all phases of powered flight
under all possible payload variations. Thus PO_;O suppression hard-
ware has had to be designed to eliminate _oupling attd the resultant
structural instnbilities.
(;round operations and ground _upport equipment are being developed
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to discover failures and predict malfunctions before they occur.
The Panel had asked the Program to review its use of "red oil"
hydraulic fluid and consider alternative hydraulic fluids that are
more fire resistant. The Program has made a change and the Panel
reviewed the new choice.
Lightning was a concern because of its impact on such subsystems
as the Controller.
3.2.2.1 SSME Controller (Electronic Controller Assembly)
The SSME utilizes a full-authority digital electronic control
with hydraulic servo-aetuated valves. The Controller operates in
conjunction with engine sensors, valvesj aetuatorsj spark ignltors_
harnesses, and an operational computer program (software) to pro-
vide a sell-contained system for:
(a) Closed loop engine control.
(b) On-board engine checkout.
(c) Ensine limit monitoring.
(d) Engine start readiness verlflcation.
(e) Engine start and shutdown sequencing.
(f) Engine maiutculance data aeqtlisitlon.
'rileengine/controller Innctloaal relationships are shown in
Figure ]9 . '[_e controlh, r electronics arran).,cment is shown in
Flgurt, ?0 . In that Salm, I I);ur*" is showl_ Iht' responsibility of the
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two llom,ywel I Or}:11llizat ioilS.
Gh_aeLeristlt's o[ the (:ontro[_er Or. itlterest are:
(a) Overall dimensions ........... 23.5" x 14.5'Ix 17"
(b) Weight ....................... 197 pounds
(C) Input power .................. 472 watts LO (_36 :;arts
(d) Convective cooling ........... (primary mode)
(e) Temperature envirollment ...... oper.'Itional -30 ° to + 95 O F.
Non-operational - 200 O to + 200 O F.
(f) Vibratiou environment ........ sil_e 24 gls peak
random 22.5 g's root mean square
(g) IIn|t is mounted on enginv using a three-point hard-mount.
"[_le elec[_icit[ 1,lar_les,q itB._ellt[llie8 b_tweet_ _he Qng[ne it%terrace _%_1,
the tkmtrolh, r are ol two types - conventional alld llexible armored.
t!oltventioltdl hilrlleSS is used where redtllld;lllt e[ecI rical lonctions art •
c;irried [lhrotlg1,t .qeplll';t[e CoIlllector,q :lnd will. be lp1,1y._ically rollted
iltdcpelh|t'll[ Ol t';Ivh other. I:h,xibh. _lrtllored harlless is LISet| where
l*t, dUtldallt electrical Illltc[lOlt._ callaO[ be p1,1ysieally routed se|la_"_l[vl_,.
P;HleI's lull i:ll Rvview
i't'tt_r to revie%41,t_}', the Cotltt't_ler pro)_,r_tl_tj the Pal_t!1, l'eq%leSted
Sl_t'cil it" i+lllt)t'lll_ltioII ;I.'4 llilvk)+,I'Otlltd dalll on [lliti criti.c;11, hardwal'e.
I']lV dot-tlnlt'll[s reqtlt,qled wt'rv (1,) rt, ltaldlity nllal','sis alld It, st data
tit,it dovuuwuted th,,' t',w, tt'ol.l.er t'ot_t Lvv.ratiot_ aud its proI¢'t'led abi!+ity
Ill HIII'[_OI'[ IIli.4++lioII ol, b'cl ivv:., G') ptt'diL tiOII illlillV,_t'S lt)l" lilt' vX-
++2
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I
peeled mean-klme-between [allure rates and the basis upon which such
predictions were made, (3) trade-oit studies between the Controller
using plated-wlre type _mories and a design usin_ the latest of the
more traditional type Lores, "l_is material was received and re-
viewed by the Panel and stalf. Typical data included in the response
is shown in TablesVli to IX .
The Panel then undertook a series of inspections.
Status of the Controller program in the early summer of 2974
looked llkc this:
i (a) Design verification tests were completed on the input
electronics, output electronics and the computer interface electronics.
l_e digital computer processor logic was proved through the use of a
Honeywell ]iDC-bOI computer unit and on the engineering and bunch test
SSF_ controller assembli,_s, l_le digital computer memory design, in-
eluding the use of plated-wire, was proven _hrou_,h testing t_t a "half-
stack" unit. The hal|-staek test was a test using a rack-mounted
integrated memory assembly. 'll|e tbntroller power supply was under-
gels.; expedited documeuta¢iou (specifications, etc.), procurement,
and labrication. At the same Iime power snpply breadboard tests
showed Ihat thcrt, weft, nunlt'rotls pl'OlllelllS with the desi_n. Some el
the probleu_s associated with the subsystcm/circuit/componelxt items
were power supply VOlt/I};¢' _]t'lt)W Illillilmllll _lllt_%411_llt', OtllpU[ ripple, ;llld
Idihlrt, _.t [n%,t,r[t,r [ l'_lllSJS[Ol+_ III_IN(CF [lllerCt)llnt'¢'l boilrt t, |)ills _ll)d
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sockets pull_ng out, deflectiug or not matching. SM-I (sLruetural
model) vibration testing had frye:fled foam ret¢,ntlon and seal problems.
There were parts _ problems witll inteyrated circuits and connecters.
It_tegratiug the dil;Ital computer nuit components was a problem as was
the Integration of the total Controller. Noise in the memory and
parity errors in the computer unit also were concerns at that time.
I
Thermal design of the package was verified by ana[ysls and tests
)
I the structural model (SMol), which was of exactly
on not i course,
| like the flight design. However, given ti_eexcellent corr_latlon be-
tween analysis and test results aud the piece part temperatures and
cor.duction rates to the case, there was sufficient n_qrgln remaining
in the design to allow for produc/iou process variables and for some
modilicat ions.
Vibratiou tests were couduelL,d with the SM-I unit which verified
that tl_c general packaging concept would rm.,el tl_e requiremel_ts. Prob-
lems surlaced witl_ regard to |1_' _-_ts_' alumitluJlt seal wl_icll leaked,
cxcessive resonances in some of tileparts, and tilt,retention o[ Lhe
half-stack c_lrd and loam assemblies. Solutious !or these mecllanical
problems were idellt J.lied but [llClher testiug was uec_'ssary to prove
(licit lilt' solutions would actttally work. ]'_11vifotlllletlta] test [or salt t
hl, ttllJ, dJty, etc. were' to be ct,ndut't_,d. ]'_,s[_',n vt, rilicat ion test it'.g lot
wirt, b,ards, _llld Itt_lStt'l" it_tert'ot_t_,,tt boat'd,,_.
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A necessary adjunct to the development of the (k_ntroller hard-
ware and software arc the many teat items and facllitfcs which prove
design and fabrication concepts and validate the prototype and flight
hardware. The software verlflcat[on facility was operational, the
design for the cotmmlnd and data st,palator design complete, and hard-
ware test equipment of many types were built and in use. Such test
equipment as "automatic wiring board test stations"_ "power Supply
Conditioner Test Unit," and "blemory System Exercise'" were proceeding
satisfactorily.
Software design was demonstrated on the Controller engineering
model and the bench test units. The electrical interface between
the e,lgine and the Orbiter was verified as was the ability of the soft-
ware to conduct engine start, mainstage control, and engine shutdown.
At that time the computer acceptance test program design was com-
plete and 95% debugged, Ihe Controller acceptance test program basc-
linL. design was complete but nut debugged, and the operational pro-
gram design was complete with 50% of it coded and debugged.
There was adequate experience with the development of the plated-
wire memory _u warrant confidence in the technology. IIowever, there
did not appear to be an understandfn,q ol the fundamental physics to
assure that surprises could be _u_tieipated and a timely course of
r-'soh|tion decided upon and imph'mented. II addilionai surprises did
occur, they probably eonh| be solved by trial iuld error, }',Ices sn[I [-
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cleat time, hut such ,_urprlses would probably impact the then very
tight schedule requirements, At that time the half-stack test of
the rack mounted integrated memory system nnd the stroclura] therr_ll
verification program were completed. Fabrication improvement was
• indicated by the acceptance trend of plated-wire assemblies.
I_hile there was no single reporting format available which
: systematically stated the significant lessons learned from the Viking
sb
program and their disposition _ith regard to the Shuttle program| the
new program raanager had his staff review the minutes and audits from
numerous Viking reviews and identify specific actions. As a result of
this review, design changes were incorporated into the Digital Computer
Unit. Daily production schedule reviews were instituted with closed
loop corrective actioil and Iollow-up for all problems defined. The
process spccilic_ltioilS and the t r;linin_, program lot the productioil
_lnd [OSl'cction workcrs wt, rc stI'cill',lht, ncd. _kll_£lgt'lncnt ¢ll_d slipt,rvJsol'y
lt'vt'lS IIKIde it their bltsiiless to |l;IVl' nlore contact with the tot¢ll
i VJkln_',;Ind Shut tit' personnel. Viking audit disciplines 6,ere in*
corporatvd int,_ tilt, tloneywcll basic management ¢lntl technical system.
I'urrell t Stllt us
,qillce its initial revie,,, ill tilt, sutlm_er ol 1974, the Pancl has
t'N,Imtdet{ Lilt' ,qS_|]: oild its t'ontreller in September 1974, ,ltnlullry 1975,
;illd April 197q. 'lilt' t'urrenl t'ontrolh, l" status ,is set, n Irom [};i, se rt,-
vtt'ws lookn likt' tills:
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(a) S_I-1 (structural model) thermal an,I vibration teats
have been completed and the structural _u'+d thermal _(¢h _adeLs have
been verified,
(b) The breadboard coutrollt.rs BT-1 and I..'M-1 have been in
use and the Gontroller iunct ions such as start-up and shut-do_ have
been demonstrated.
(c) The co,_mnd and data simulators have been used ex-
I
t._nslvely as have the Controller checkout consoles and laboratory
I model computer used in the integration of the Controller subassemblies.
I
(d) The digital computer unit number SN-I has been com-
pleted and integrated in the first prototype congroller, PP-I.
This unit, however, has experienced iotemittent parity errors which
are under study at this time. All of the C_ntroller functions of the
PP-I have been exercised and some out*of-specificatlon conditions |lave
been surfaced which also ._re being examined for proper resolution.
(e) _e guality of the workmg_nship and inspection system
hzLs been improw, d. with the, result that the reJcetiou rates for such
things as plated-wire memory boards has been reduced Io a very
acceptable level.
(I) The BT-1 nnit_ 1o be nsed with the SSHE lntegratt'd
System Te,_t Bt.d /,'st prot,.ram, was successlully dlt.L'ked iu tk*rch 1975
and has bet'n delivered to NSTI !or installalion il_to the ISTB fa-
cility. SSFIE to Orb/re'/+ iluvrldce doc..,m.,tat [¢.t_ (It I/ 13bllhO00) has
87
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heen iasued and i.sunder ,qtandard control of the configuration control
system and the interface working _,roup,
(g) Operational philosophy for "out of limit:" signals has
bet,n defined and agreed to as shown by the current design. This
design provides for engine senso.._._r_ to be out-of-limlts three
consecutive check periods before the input is "declared" failed, which
is called a "three strike" concept. A part of this system provides
for rechecking critical parameters immediately during the same major
status loop check. A major status loop check takes about twenty mil
seconds. Less time critical parameters are rechecked during the next
two major sense-reporting cycles. At the same time the out-of-llmlts
data are not used hy the engine coutro[ system at that time, For In-
ternal Controller parameters the "two-strike" concept is used in which
two consecutive out=of-llmit conditions must exist before that item is
declared '[ailed." Short term anomalies will not cause pre-r_ature
loss of redundancy, e.g., shifting to _he second computer section of
the Controller or engine shutdown°
(h_ "_e power supply units for use in the PP-I and PP-2
Controllers have been completed and tested satisfactorily. Design
verification tests have been ¢olldtlcted_ resulting illit low degree of
el,._clromagr.,'tit' interference beyond specklica|:ion limits. 'this does
i:- nol appear to be a major problem.
(i) blabt_'r |nt'et'eonlll'et I_ollrds_ bcc_ltlse ot their compl_,xity_
i
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have posed itumcroua production problems, Four h,ive been built for
use in the PP-I anti PP-2 unttH hi addition 1:o tilt, development unitH.
To date the deve).opment tests have been completed. H_ll|ufacturlng pro-
co:ises aloBg with alignment fixtures and inscrtion tools have been
established. The design verification test hardware is being built.
A problem still to be resolved [s the noise being coupled into the
I
I memory sense Itncs due to wire routing and inadequate shielding.
_ Hodifieations are being incorporated to add sense-line-shielding on
the Master Interconnect Board and to reroute control sense lines.
Additional improvements are being evaluated in ease they are needed
in the wiring approach to the memory area of the board.
(j) Four memory systt'ms |lave been built ior tile PP-1 and
PP-2 Controller units and twelve half-stacks have been built and
tested. Several hours el memory operation have been accomplished at
tilt" di_it_|l computer unit level. Thct'e have been iBtcrmittent parity
errors, and a noise problem has been identified in integrated testing
el tile t'ontroller. In addition to the [i×es to the Haster Interconnect
t_oard, changes to increase the memory plane shielding anti plated-wire
ontptlt ilre bt, in_, 8tndit,d in order to int'rease tile signal to noise
ratios. To put the parity error problem in perspective, the extent i
1el the testing on the two memory channels shonld be considered. (_hannel
"A" operated over the temperature ran},e at the digital computer level
Ior fight hours with only n single occurrence el parity error. Channel
89
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"B" hml error-free operation over t;ho t'etnpernturo range Ior some 54 hcmrs
at the memory system level of |.tlst;lllot loll, and approxil_*tely 100 hours
of operation at room temperature with comp_iratlvoly few |nte_tlttetlt
parity errors at tile Dlgit_ll Computer Unit level.
(k) *Nw basle software eh, moms and/or routines are as
:ollows :
Executive
Ground checkout
Self-test
Start preparat ton
Power range control
Vehicle conmmnds
Limit monitoring
Sellsor pro_'e ss illg
t)tt t pitt txlotli for i ng
Failure respol_se
PoSt shu Cd owll
COllstrailXLS oil the software progrzlms ;ire the memory size el lop38/'
words and the Controller major cycle t illle el 20 milliseconds. In
DecelRber L974 Lilt, Ult!ntory cdil*lt;J.i WitS exceeded. As a result there
is all ellort ;tL tills Lime to redttce Lilt' word requirement by proper
,';,_ltw.lt'e pro}.rdi!mlin_ /lilt[ Of SOllle redtlctiotl ill rcquirelllelltS. At this
illtt' Lilt, eulpllllsJs is on meetin}, tile S,';HI; Inteyrated ,qul)systelll Test
00
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]h'd pro_r_im. _l,'f]tlot¢_d tha{ _:onsiderab[o ¢,|Jo[?l I|ts_bt,¢uJplac_,d on
providing the proper soJtwarv. For example, lI._ eotllrav[o_ t,st_tbli_hud
a shill operati_n, Schedules are al_o established and pro_ress i_
recta'wed on a daily basls. "bk'mory scrub groups" have beeu established
I
at Honeywell, Rocketdyne aml NASA.
3.2.2,2 Combu_tlon.[_vices
Systems l)csi_n
The function of the b_lu Combustion Chamber is to contain and
direct th_ forces of combustion generated by the burning of the pro-
pellants. The hot gases arc accelerated to sonic velocity at the
throat and supcrsonlcally expanded to an area ratio of 5:1 at the
interface with the engine main noz::[e. The _lin Combustion t,1_amber
consists of a structural outer jacket_ rcgeneratively cooled liner, and
inlet antl outlet manilolds, l_wo thrust vector control struts are
attached to it as are mounts tot the engine electronic controller
assembly. 'l_e bk_in Combustion Chamber fabrication problvms or con-
cerns arc similar to those described [or tilt, hot-Fas manifohl unit.
In addition tilt' cooling o! this t'tlnlbnstion chamber requires a rate of
heat removal three times higher than any previous liquid fueled engine,
l(.)() btu/tt2/scc. The auml_t,r o! welds used ill prodtlt'ing tilt, chamber
are about 11.2 O| which lO are eLectrou l_e_%lllwelds.
(itrrent Status
._|[ll eng,,le t'O;ll|)ltSlt_ll dev|t't,s II_l\'t, h_td f;lbl'it'attt_n probl:nls dur-
9]
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iIIp the'|)7 dPvo]oplilt'lli pelci.ld. _,k, iL_ t:,;lllilstrlt l(_t) t:Ii;imher :Irlci i_¢;;_.!).o
I:lhl'lr:ll Ii|n hll_l Ih,pll i'Olllp'[plpd I11 :lllpll_l:l _Jl IIl_ _ IllleF, l:ill_'d ',_ytllOlll
+l'*'_ll Ih'd p£Ol,[;llll h;ll?dWllUl', j.ll+'[llll|.ll_ lllW¢'t'._i_llll, IWOoI-I+'_IL Iltl_ Ill [.[_
I1111_'I{ Ihe l"Illl'd-p¢l_l+l" I.eVl. I op_!lFlll (IW. coqdjl [t_nn, I_l: ;Iboltl hS(){) phi,
'[_le ;Itl}',llli'lllOd ,_p;Hrk i}',lillpl: II:l++ il_,t'l) dPllhHItl( I';llt'd _ll¢¢e_Hl:ulJ.y_ Jl|-
C[IhlJ.lt_ il IllJl) _t'CoIhl _'llll ;|t ItllJ p, lWel" [t,v¢,l, t'Olldl( lOllll. ._llb_ft';Ih*
'lxo,h'l t+l lilt' matu Injectt_r (40_lff)tt poLmd Ihl'u+l tulll ) h;I._ been ch'luoll-
+lr_lled. Ilot I:il;e to_lB h+lve boell condllct_!d o1_ the o×itl[zer prt'-
btlt'llt'_ ;ind tilt, ttlO_ pl+ebui'lit, l'_ :_hich all appeal" to meet p_,FlOrlll_lll+'u
requJ, l/OlllelltS. I"I.OW indll¢_,d vibr;It[on w_s holed ill _on|{' OI Lh_'se
tesls_ but thL_ ;Ippitl'_'lH ly has heel_ l:emedi_'d. 'l]le ],()X tilnk pressuri-
.:at ion he,It exchangu'r_ ].oc;H¢,d in ih_' I,OX ._ide o1: tilt, hot _,a.s IllilllJ-
Iold a,.Iselubly_ i_ _1 criti¢ill Jl:_,lll il_ Ihe en_,ine comhu._l Jell _y,_t_'ll|.
I'll_. pl'e_ellt lit, ill exch;llIF, t'l" desl._:l_ L't,qltir_,_ ci_;id Ill_lntll_l_'tut'illt: _lnd ill-
spa'el _,.)_{ co,iLl'el {Ind vt, l'il[_';ll ion t t,_! [1|1; Io _ls_tll'e _11_ ;I('cepLilbl_e ulliL.
t_ockeldv_e lee[s Ih;ll Ibis can be accompl[sllt, d.
t..!. 2. I 'l'ul'bonl_lchin_,s
S)'s t eros Du s i_l_
I_1_' hi_;h-pl't, ssllre Illel I_t'|>opunlp l'eceives fuel ll.'onl tile low-
pr_':;sure luol puml_ ;_nd boost_ the' pre:_,_;ur_ ' to lilt, lt,vol, t'eqllJ.l'_'d IOF (h_.'
pt't'-hlltll_'t'._. I'h_" [ll_'l i,_ thl'll di:_¢h;It'_',t'd thi'ou!',|l thl' hi!',h-pl't'._.*lllt'e
tub'] I,ul_p dJ_;¢hdr!'.t' dll_l to lib' Ill;lill II_'l v_llv_'. l]lJs tllFbOplllllp _'Oll-
_i:_l,_; el ;I Ihte_'-!;ld!:c t'_,l_lYllll_,.G] pUlllp GrJvt' bY ¢1 two-,*_lil,g., I'_!;l_'l|,,,ll
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Im:i)int,. Ihlrllut pl.'_)pt']]ltlll ('(HidJ. l[_)ilJll_4t Ih_, ]Jl(oll iloFt]. JH c)().qi'd
;_I;,)tllid IhI' plllll l) HiiziJip J)L"t'VOlZlJlig I,li 2 I|],HII Ih)wIll}: Jlilo IIiP IllI:bJll_'
_ll'l,/I lllt,I {)ILl [|ll',)tt}'.|I (he')|t)l't'Jl_ Itl;iliJ 1()](I I,) IhL' Ill_tJl% IlI_'_'llal'. At
I'lZ}_]llt' _{i._lt'l} (hi' ]Ji(oII fZz,_I] J_I zh'tZt_tl('d by tilq' pLttttp ])Ft'liHtil:(' Lit
;t i)tilllp ll])¢'('d OI .'li)])t'O,_J.lllZtlL_].'/ _()()() L'i%ltl. I)lllill)', lil_lillBIdp,_' IJ£iilg_
the' I)ttlllp I;¢'_1_'(,_ It% l lll.'ol (] hi}', ¢'Otll)llLilld,_ i)_/ chzltl}',illl' , dlsch_u'g_, pru:umrc
_|l)d j j.owl'_l( L*. 'L_IL' 1.] | I "1)1 j 8I%'1]. l_L':;_'_ll _t "_'/h_'ll (|l_.' plttllp pl'L'H:{llt't' dL'-
¢'1.'I,_In('_tO _l ._])L'e'd OI 7000 |_plII.
'Jlw hLj,h-pr_,,_,nur_. ONidJ.;!e'l." ILtL'bol)lttll l) r_,_.'_,ivz,._ o_:J.dJz_.l." iFoln Lhe'
_Lo_¢ pt'¢,,_;,_Zlt'L' pttnlp _llld boo,';t__ Ihc pl?t'.';_;tlFC L_ .I .';tit Ilt'(cllt 1L!V¢']. (O
pL'OV|dL' _l¢|¢qLl_llk' I10',,/-L',:IL,.' [Itld pyL'_St.II'_' [o (h,' Iht'llSI ch_Ulll)or IIlld I|l_,'
prtq]*llyll¢.'L'_. I-:l"_)',ilt_! ._I_IL'I _l_.'liV_llu,.'4 I|IL' I'_.Utlp ilIlcz'lllcdj_ll_' :4_'Ld. pLlrgu"
Ihzil providers till j11_).'_ _)_11.'1"_[¢!1" I)_,'lck4t'L'll Ih_' Pump dild tAirbj.ll_' dllylllg
opt'rat _o11,
(_LIL"L'L'll | _L_IILIS
bl_ll_'I'[_ll pr_.'._k'tl(¢d tl> thl, PdlIL_L intli_-at(,S thai the' (ti_'bine |'IO,(X].L'
castings and tnt'b]l_, strut iorgillgB at'outed the. 1k_l.'bi_" l'_;wc b_m t|'_"
Itl_l]o[" pl'oblL_nl _{1:Lia_. 'Lilt, J_l%il. ]_(11 Vu'tldor t4_IS IIll_tb_L' (O t'_tS[ [hi'
IIO.!.:lL'.'_ dill' IO _ilrink[q:L'_ I_|l_L|l]L'z' It) |i]] ttlt)]_l._ _llId t'l'[zil[C IlI_I(_L'i_l_
pL'ol) LL'ul,'_. ro L'L":OLV_' tht' lluoblu'tl/ qLlik'kLy_ tl _'|I4Ltl}'.u' Ill \'t.'ll¢{OlL','i Wti,q
Ul:ld_'ill ,lilly P')74 _llltl Iltl.'.*[t.,,i Wt'17t' _ttt't't'!i_JLl|L_' L_l_il II,_ill}; ZI I1L'W
Illltt_*ri_tL (INCO 71.U.C [nsl_,a,l ol _1AI{-I_I-J4I,). 1l lllLll('d Otll (ll_tl the'
Lilt' It)r (lit. 71H.t type llt).;,'|t' I-_IHLJlII', w_l:_ [n._dcqlmic. I_'ol.'k I_tl}; Lt*-
m
!
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sumed on the use of the original material and it was found that the
ncw supplier was in fact able to produce successful nozzles with
MAR-M-246 material that now appear to meet the turbine nozzle require-
ments. These nozzle castings are still receiving MSFC's attention to
assure adequate hardware is available for the early engines in the SSME
program. The turbine inlet struts had some material problems regard-
ing acceptable axial strength of the forgings. This problem has been
resolved and the forglngs are adequate to meet program needs.
3.2,2.4 Heat Exchanger
System Design
The heat exchanger provides oxidizer gas pressurant for vehicle
LOX tank pressurization. This heat exchanger is a multipath, single-
pass D cross-flow device installed in the LOX side of the hot-gas mani-
fold at the hlgh-pressure oxidizer turbopump turbine exhaust. The
supports for the heat exchanger tubes are mounted to the liner wall so
as to allow small movements during expansion and contraction of the
tubes. The tubes enter and leave the hot-gas manifold through flared
projections of the manifold liner. The flared projections provide stag-
nant gas pockets for reduction of thermal stresses at the tube-to-oxygen
manifold attach welds. The heat exchanger is depicted schematically in
Figure 21 The major concern here is with the heat exchanger coil
material and its abllity to be assembled and then to remain virtually
leakproof during its operational llfe. For instance, a leak could
! ,
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Ppe_itt ign_Ltable mixtures of oxygen and fuel-rlch hot gas to onLer
tilt' oxyge_t sttpply lille or allow oxidizer Lore the hot gas tt_nffold with
i lgltIL[Otl ¢ha{- _otIIc[ _|ISO d:tSl_tgc_ lilt _ttlJftt'et_t civil of" Ih_' liner _tnd man|*
fold wall.
{;urrcnL SLatlIS
'l._le detslgll add ;lfflriu[aC|llri|]} _, approach be_.l|g used to redtleo the
i possibility of this Imzard include a numbt, r of actions.
D Ao ultimate factor of safety el 1,75 is used rather than the
usual 1.4. Where tatlgue li[e of 240 cycles nor_tlly is required t
this has been increased to 1450 cycles tot bifurcation Joints_ to
I 4500 cycles lot weld ]oilers, aud to 2b,O00 cycles [or parent metal.
Design verttication structural tests wfl]. include I¢,lkage checks,
vibration, prool |lresstlrt, cy¢les_ uitt_ttc pressure t autl low cycle
laL lgu_2 t*2st s.
Qtlallty colllrol ou _.olltl_ollt, llts will ust, ultr_tsoni.c, penetrant _litd
x-ray, _l|]t] ht21iu|}| h, ak tt,,_ls (1 X lt) -0 St't'/St!C ill limit pressures).
'L_lt" |Is|It,1 qug'.'4lit}llt,t] Iht' list' t)l il [L'llkzlt*,t? l'iltt, O} [t,,q,q I.hzlll [ X IO "t_
SL'L'/Mec at [ilttlL prt,.qBltres 1lot ing Ihdi this |t, ok_ltie rnte itppt,_ired
t_gt'esB[vt • lit t|ett'nllhl[lly till' ;tct't'lltability o] Ihe lit,ill t,xl'h;In)_t,r,
'I]lLs t,_ IIci|_ rt, t,V_l[Ltt|tt,d _lt this t lull,.
A tltot|i[ic_tt[Otl beltl_ t'ollSl, dt, YL'_l Ill the I.OX prt,,q,qltr_kllt t'otltro_
system Ichit'h wottId |tltt't'cotlllt'cI ill,' lit'lit cy, t.'h;_llp, t'r t|t,qc|litrp, e It|'t-
Htt't'ilm ot Iht' Ot'llfter tIov/ t'ol_It'o[ ,qVStl'111 t tvhit'h would Lnsurt, valve
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luIL'! pre_aure belug _tbow, tilt,h,_I.-_a# l_U_liold prenBur_,.
3.2.2.5 [_nL told
S¥# I t'tn I_' _gn
']Iz*'* ho[-gz|.q m_Inilolzl 8*,rv¢,.__)H Lh¢' _l£uvlzll'zll nuvlt'|hq ol lhz,
_,,t_ghl*, _11_d provides gas pnas_gt" tl_t er¢oul_¢,¢[ Loll !or th,, prt, burncrs,
high-pr*,ssurv Iurbopulnps_ and tht, mnill inJvctor. Ilydrogvn-rich hot
gas OzydrogCl_ aud oxyg_zQ I'lows Lhrough this r_It_£lold atld t:h_'11 into
lily I_lisl inJvvlOr. (g_oling o! Iht, hol-g418 mnnifold is ;zci, omplish_,d by
l:siltgdouble wall con(ruct lou (a sl ruetural o_ter wall al_d az_ in1_vr
lind, r). Tlzt.q providet_ zl ll,'_w path for hydrogen gzz8 coolant L'X|l¢ltlnt. ill_l
Ironz t|zv h_w-prvssttrt, hydro),,vI_ t_trbillt,. Thi,_ ¢otIllgurlltlo11 fsoIIzt¢8
I|It, siru¢lur_11 wall Iro111 the hot )'.a._v._ llowi1_g wit|ziz_ t|zt, |Imz, r |i1_vr.
C_tt're|_t SI_II u8
l'lll.qllIll'dW_ll't'l.q l_lbl.'i*'ill*'dw|lh t'Olllpl*'xw*'Id wllli'hh_,q l'¢'q111rt'dfoil-
,qld_,r_d_h,lu-proces,_rt,work HI the labrlvalloll lOvallO1_. Crlllcal Io
;it,|llt,Villg._ll¢¢t,,,l.qllllwi,Ll l.q lht, A|i_;IlIIII._II|i_l Iht" .lollll.q;llldlh_,
lll_lll,'|dl.8 lind |_l'O_,'_._8,ql'Ndvvvlopvd lot Huvh i.,'l_tls,l'_Ol_i_i• iII[}_IIiIi_,,11(
l',du_l,,qthe, st r*,s,__.'olt¢Cllll'ill|oll,q_II'i_IdlS¢Olll [lltltlit'8 l'h_llll.,ll'lllill,_'
cau._' l,rol,lvms ill w_'ids, ALl lll_lltil_,lltl,_,II'_ dllil|_.','_,_llIof wl, ld
_Idl,ql111_'v. I'o t_ir(ll_'r r_'di1¢_, i1_du¢_'d 8IL'L'H@L'H_ |_l'_'atl'_lilltlZ)', Hltd Jill
part l_-itl,ill'lVat hl_',h pl',,,q,_ilr_,_;l.ltpto l_tlO0p.q| Iii p_trt ol the' i'll)',l,lt_.'_
lt'ad:_ to lh_' l,O:_,_lhili.x'ol IIWI,I| _211l|"l.'|ll|¢'IIP.'II|probh,UlS. '|11_'
O6
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r|h_.,1.,llbiLi[V _I ¢r_1¢k.-1. w_Irp_1_,e told alrUCtllr_1! lailu1"qa obvL_'_ly _IIIe¢1
t4ltltidowtt_ _llh[ ill ¢'xlI'L'ntt' L'_ttit'.'4 pOI_'ttli_tL _ti( ¢OiltpC_'tln¢,nl IlL'L, Or" _'._-
p10_101_. II_l_L'tl 01_ lib' umlL'rlal provid_'d to the' Ihln_,]_ NASA ,Itld il,'¢
_'Otlt l'_|L'lOf _lt'_' _t',_/,ll'_' OI Ih¢,,',l¢' I_L'_|II¢'IIt_ ,lltd_.'OItLJIIlU¢' tO p],_ll,'¢_ V¢'l'y
|ll'¢lvy L'mI)|I_IH[,'40l_ c'[[ratll_tt |1_}_ the" IIlbt'i¢_tl _¢tl1 {tl_¢l IIl_i[L'_'[d[ I_robh,lti_
,|thl 01_ Ih¢' l_','4l I'_l'O}_,l'dUl to v_il|d_l¢' Ih_' d_'tlJ}',lt ,ll_d II|_tlltl[zlt,'lltL'[ll_
pI"O¢¢' _l,_¢'_ •
Thl' PttOb IL,m
PO(_I,] iL4 II_,'_( Olt].y ZItl ,_SH|': p_'_,l|ll_Jll| |11,1_ ,|L._O Illl, l,_[. I'_," Vt¢'Wl'_.l [r¢_lll
,I "SVSI¢'m8 u sl_ltldPo[lll. 'l']1_' discussiolI h_'l'_' dcal.r wtiIl the |mrdwltl'e
_IH _'111_'_1_t ],_, de_i,glled ,111d ,IH at tach_,d to lh¢' SS['|I'_x th_,m_t_,J,v¢,_.
•_V.'4IqIIiH |ttlI_,t'_l|JOtl ,IHp_'_'l,'4 _It'¢' ¢OV_'t'1"d i11 I;IOt'C dcI_lil iI_ _¢'_'iiOI_ I_
OI Ihts VO[uIII_', "[_t_" P_III_'|_s cOl_c_'t*11 with POL'.O clt_'¢l._ _',o¢'_ b,tCk Io
,q_IIt11"u V |,lu11¢h w'lli_'h',_ iii Ilh' Apollo l_1o_,,r,tul. [,lo,,II ],il],'_,_I' I p11111|_-
led I'OCk_'t v_'iticles have h.ld 111od_'I,II_' Io A_,vt, t'_, lo11_ilild[llZ1], os_'i|I,II io11,,¢
c_1_.i,,¢_,dbv |4,_,'.O it1.,li,tbiIity. ,¢.u_'h o,'¢¢ill,tt IOI'. ¢'.11'. I'I,,'4LL].I iu .111 _'llV[i'otl-
tlt¢'tt( _'V_'L'¢' ¢'ItOil_,h Io c,Iits_' _li'It¢IIlI',II d.t111iI_',i, _It_d ,ili_'I _'I'_'w_ l_h_',,¢|o -
|o_',|_'_I].I'¢. |'Ot;O is ,I c[o:_¢,d-loop p|1_'l'.Om_'11on ittvolvil'_g l|1.1iJ-l_,ed-,_vst_,lll
pi't,,_,rut'_, o_cill,II ions whi_'h l_'_ulI in ¢'11_:ilh' I|_,ri1_l p_,t'ti11-bal io11_ ,11_,I
,gIl'uclu1:,1[ 111oIIOllS. l'lh'_' in_I',' b_, visL1.11, i._',l ,IS b_,}'.iu1"_i1_y, wilh HI_iII
'¢t,hi_'h' ,icc_'[_'l'.II iou!_ lh,II p1odt1_-_, v,11"i.lt |on_ in prop_,i [_11tI pt_'SSllt_'
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and flow rates D which in turn cause thrust variations, r_ lulling in
increasing vehicle oscillations.
Elements of the Space Shuttle Vehicle system involved in POt;O
_lre:
(a) Long liquid oxygen supply llne.
(b) Asymmetric Shuttle structure and thrust vector couples,
and coupling of flight control and POGO Instabilities.
(c) Main propulsion system (SSNEts, ET, etc.) which oper-
ates from llftoff to orbit with extreme changes in vehicle structural
characteristics and turbo-pump inlet pressures.
(d) Space Shuttle's main engines themselves_ with their
I.OX and LH2 high and low pressure dual pump systems.
The depth of NASA and contractor efforts to assure that POGO
does not become a Shuttle operatlonal problem can be seen in planning,
documentation, testing, and analytical work bcin_ pcrfotaned to re-
solve this concern, ql_ls includes the "POliO Prevention Plan" JCS 08130,
dated .lanu_lry b, 1975, as well as studies to determine the need for
POt;O suppression, and to odd tilt, suppression system. Such groups _|s the
POGO integration P;nlel and tilt, indcpendel_! H.qFC POt;O atlalysis tt_anl I
have been working this challenge.
Suppressor design requirements have been delincd its follows:
(a) l.ocation as cl'._sc as pr_lct ical to _ho Ill_h Pressure
(_xygcD Turbo-pump.
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0>) Volume about O.b cubic feet or t_quivalent with +Ibil-
i|_ to Int'ce_fl_ to moro thiItl o11o cttbie t'ool |I I¢,sl |'`ro_l_+tm [I_t|[-
¢_IIe_ Ihis to bL, necesHilry.
(¢) 1++Inlplng of tluld suk'ges (t'reque1_cy of pulst, s_ over a
bt'o_Id fr'`,que1_cy r_11_,; Lno1_ti111¢q los,,| Ih_tlX I.I _ .*iq,¢ /LI_ .
(d_ Mtnluvi! 1"hiId prossure-drop tu lhe suppressor.
¢omparlsoi_ betweelt the, S_iturn V _lltd Spa¢.', Shuttle enBttlell'luld
syst¢,ms i,q ,_lhowI1 in Figtlr¢' :):_ . The POt:O ._upprt, ssion system £11_d its
compot_onts _ire _homl ill |:i_,,ure8_i_ ilnd _4
qurre1_t S S_l.tus
lytici11 program in hein,_', pursued to utlder,,+iand the phe1'`oBtellot_ _llld its
[t11_.].[_.'_lliOtl_.' |l_.'st'`l_pres.,1or|lltsht,_.,ttbaHellt'_ed. At'.e.'<tenstw,p,round-
|Iditu,,d l'`P+,'_l'(Ittt LN I'_¢,iI+IK +,'Olhhl+.'l<+'d tO ',,'¢+l'tly the' ++1<',_(_,'11. Ext¢'I'U,I|V¢' th"<+'
|IHH beetl tltdlde ot ,_£ittt[" I t|+It_t it'` dc,_|_',ttin,e, t|lt' test |+ro,_;t'+im. "r,,sts are
p heLIX t conducted at _|SI,'C, Martin t+|,+tl'[¢tt_'` t!o1_tl+,t1'`y} RocketdX.ttc _ _111t|NS'L'I,
,_tte,_. 1'he |Oc_ltion+ type, Hi:t, 3Its| |1h, t'tzttl¢¢' ol tilt, |+t'opose_{ svsl_,ltt
|l_IVt' |+|'Oil _tl'l'|Vt'd _tI _Ittt'l' _I [hol'oll,_,,h dt'N[++J'` tl',hlt,-ot t H['`I,._'o+\I'`+'`|)'N|,_
Ot +thOrI HttttaI ion,_ attd t|l¢|t" |mp;l¢I oil the de_i+,n ot the POrtO HXl]+|'`I'I'H-
H_I" |I_IV_' IO |_.' _l¢¢01llptiH|led t_ ;t_+_lt'¢ ' m,_._(t'`tttm ,_ll_,l'.'. lhtl thl' p'`'ool-
ot-th_'-l+llddlt'`F _'+11' o`'`1_,' 1+¢' lOtln_l dtlt'it'`F Ili,e, hl te_I,'+ '`11h|er ,I¢I11_1[ ell-
V | t'¢'_111}lt'lllN •
It appear,_ theft t|h' liqtlid 11vd1"o+',_'1_ do¢,s llOl t+onlt'il+utt, to _I'`'`';
qq
llll
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degree to the PO{;O problem_ _nd there Is no apparent nt,ed :or a
suppression device in the liquid hydrogen fuel system. Preliminary
oxaminations indicate that the Solid Rocket Motors do nat contribute
to any degree to the POt_O problem, bur the analysis is continuinR.
3.2.2.7 Ground Operations and Grouted Support
SSbiE's are designed for automatic checkout and fault isolation,
use of "line replaceable units" with Rood accessibility and long lifep
and to accommodate the so-called "condition monitored 't concept. This
concept has as its objective the ability to discover failures before
they occur, using nondestructive evaluation raechods, and to eliminate
premature maintenance,
SSblE cot_troller assembly has auton_cic checkout capabilities for
self-test and fault isolation to the line replaceable unit level.
Working ill conjunction _,ith )',round equipment, it conducts the follow-
il_g tests:
(a) Pileun_t tic
(b) Actuator
(c) Sensor
(d) Flight readiness testa
(e) Redut_dancy verilication
Panel interest will contlm_e in this area to assure that _'.round
operat ions _lnd eqttLpmcl',t do not adversely al?lect tile ell_,,ines alto
associated hardware dtlrillg Ill_l_llLellallct' ;ind prt, pac_lt iot_ IoF _lttnclt.
I00
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_l_e following _;SF. status was presented to the Paltel rt, eencly:
(a) 2?acre are no significant t;SE probleme known at this time.
(b) While economic problems have resulted Ln quantitative
reductions of GSE, there have been nu quantitative cutbacks khat would
affect safety.
(c) Major GSE unlts have completed design verificacion
testing.
(d) Majority of GSE components are new in service,
3.2.2.8 Hydrauli.c Fluid
Introduction of the bilL-H-83282 hydraulic oil in piece of the
urlginal "red oil" has been madt_ at all locations working on the
-- SSHE: NSTLj HSFC_ Hydraulic Research ('ompal_y_ and ;It+ Rocketdyno.
Tu date there appear to to be no [unctiunal problems associated with
the use of this fluldj at_d laboratory zests continue to be conducted
tu assure that the fluid when in operational ust, will mcc! requirements
under all induced euvirunmet;ts.
• 9 '>3 ..... 9 Lightning Pruteetiun
:_ The requirement currently on contract [ur lightning protection is
HIL-B-5087B t /_Ln_dment 2, .41 August L970_ "Bonding, Electrical am|
Lighttlhlg P_'i)tt't'[iOI1 Itlr /_(,ros[)dL,t, S_,s(L,[II, li LiSt' ill {h_S 8(ill|dil|'d i,_
I_ currently ullder rt, vit,w_ with thc probi_bilitv ihill it will bc rcpLlced
i by the NASA |_ublit'at toll ,I.ql'. 07l, ll_, _ it ,qhtllilt, l,|_:htniul: Prol_,¢lioll
I_ritt, rilt. ;_ Asst, ss_lt.llt,_i ilrc |}t'illg Ill|lilt' durillg the l,lily Ltl7b ([ule-lriltllt"
k
-t
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with regard to lightning field amperage components, direct strike
capabillty_ launch constrnints s ¢_tble shielding requlre_ents and cost
and weight impacts. Results of these llssessments will be examined by
the Panel during upcoming reviews. Lightning protection for the
i Shuttle as a system is discussed in more detail in Section (_ eL
this report,
!
|
I
!
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3.3 External Tank Protect
l_e External Tank is a part of the main propulsion sy,_tem, along
with the main engines and interconnecting portions of the Orbiter
vehicle.
In this section the discussion will be devoted expressly to the
external tank and peripherally to those significant interfaces with
the Orbiter and Solid Rocket Booster that affect crew safety.
The External tank is the only element of the Shuttle system
that Is discarded after depletion of its oxidizer and fuel resources.
Because it is expendable 2 great emphasis has been placed on low cost
production of this tank. The external tank is being designed, developed
and manufactured by the Martin Harletta Corporation at the Government-
owned Michottd Assembly Facility in Louisiana.
The External Tank consists oi three major components: (I) a
liquid oxygen tank, (2) an trier-tank, and (3) a liquid hydrogen tank.
It is of aluminum construction utilizing a spray-on foam insulation
and spray-on ablator for thermal protection. A cou[i,_;uration is
shown in Figure 25 In September 1974 a Preliminary Design Review
of the Lank was conducted; the Critical Dcsi_;u Review is schedult'd
[or the fall of 1975. Fabrication and assembly el the LOX and liquid
hydrogen tanks for the structural test article will bcyiu iu the
summer ot 1975.
3.3.1 Subsystems ¢;ritical t 0 Crew S;Efet_"
m
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The tank can be divided tnLo L||(_ following subsystems:
(a) Structures
(b) Propulsion and mechanical
(c) Electrical
(d) Separation and dispersion
(e) Thermal Protection Subsystem
(f) Ground support equipment and logistics
Particular attention was given by the Panel to those components
or situations most critical to ,.row safety. These were chosen on
i the basis of the criteria used on other elements of the program -potential problems u il zing experience on prior programs and com-
ponents that could critically degrade the perfornmnce of the Orbiter
or SRB if they were imprope=ly designed, could not be tested or ana-
-! lyzed to the degree necessary for confidence in them, or [ailed to
operate during critical mission sequences. To illustrate_ tilePanei
in its review o[ structures gave particular attenLion to fracture co,a-
trol. A review of the propulsion system focused on the antl-geysering
system. Review of the electrical system focused on controlled use of
teflon wiring as well as on lightning protection.
Weight control is as important a management concern on the
External Tank as on the other elements o[ tileShuttle program. The
next control weight has been set at 72_3b0 pounds. With a current
eSt imated weight ol 71_445 pound#, tltemargin is 915 pounds. There-
104
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l!ore_ tilePanel Is sen_.Itive :o the,Impact of weight control u,,
decisions a[feeting c£ew safety.
3.3.1.1. Structugea
System Des l_n
The structure must retain tilt. liquid oxygen and hydrogen within
their respective tanks and must serve as tile structural backbone of
the launch and ascent Shuttle vehicle as well. _taterlal provided to
tile Panel indicates that tile design and eonsLruction of the structural
portions of the External Tank follow the large Saturn tank and Titan
tank methodsp as well as the use of current sophisticated design tools
developed by NASA (NASTRAN).
In light of prior program experlence_ tllePanel reviewed the
actions taken by NASA arm contractor management to insure that the
initiation or propogation of cracks or eracklike defects in the
External Tank will not cause structt.ral failures or unacceptable
leaks.
Current Status
Fracture control plans have been developed to cover the phases
of design, fabrication, test, environmental control, inspection_
maintenance, repair, and acceptance procedures. A Fracture Control
Board has been established to assure the plans are implemented, rile
straight polarLty Tit; wehling prt)et's8 llas t)eeB selected. Vendors [or
critical Iornled parts_ sttt'h _ls /lores aBd caps_ have also been selected.
105
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I_c)l|| NAI_A at_d tile (onlraelor leel Ill,It: t|l_' llllttal I_,rovesst'_l I_rovJde
,_()II%l'I'_H{'I*IC_lll(_ehilnJc |hill[_ roy [Llllkwelds al_. sh¢)wll i,i
l.'i);ure26 .
3.B.I.2 Propulsion and Mechanical
System l)esi}_n
l'he External Tank propulsion/mechanlcal subsystem delivers LOX
and liquid hydrogen to the Orbiter interface from the external tank
aKe. The propulsion and mechanical subsystem is comprised of the liq.lid
oxygen feed system, liquid hydroKen Feed system, l,OX talg_ p, .'ssuri-
zatiol', and vent/relieF system, intertank and tank environ,.._nt control
systems. The separation system, normally ¢onsidereu a part of the
mechanical and/or structures' system, is discussed under a separate
section later in _his report. There at.-,three separate mechanisms
associated with Lhu }'xternal Tank propulsion subsystem: (]) int_rtank
lmlbilival discounect, (2) right al_t ET/Orbite_" umbilical LOX dis-
counect, and (3) left aft ET/Orbite1" umbilical liquid hydro_en dis-
connect. Only the, in|ertank d|svolnlect is discussed in this sectlon
s/flee the other two are a part of the in-fllght seporaLion system.
One' ol the more si)._niJ_lednl dl,si_%n leatttres of thL, exlcrual
Lank th_lt should I)rov[de for Kl.'eatel. hardware., r,.,lial)ilJ.ty aud 1.-(,-
dtlv,..'dmiss[Ol] l'ISk is _ldltal llan_',l's,_'a[with lhv capability ol
illotlJlor[Ll}',]vak_li'.ethrc.uF,h t|ic l_l'hllaL'y.';_'al. I_llS sl'a] is tlsed Ill
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all major :'tructnral tank connections. See Figure 27 .
The LOg pressur_zaLion line is supported by 29 sliding supports
and three I!ixed supports. These supports are bolted to floating
anchor ,mrs in brackets welded to structure on the LOX tank. A
phenolic insulation block is placed between the support and the tank
to reduce heat transfer. These same supports also serve the larger
anti-geyser line and the electrical tray. Seven flexible joints
accommodate thermal and dynamic deflections. Figure 28 shows not
only these lines but the LOX propellant feed-system as a whole.
The vent/teller assembly serves two functions: (i) tank vent-
ing during propellant loading, which controls the boil-off rate,
and (2) relief of the ullage pressure to protect the tank structure
in the event that it L'xceeds a presct value.
The liquid hydrogen iced system is similar to the LOX system.
The liquid hydro_,,cnpressuri,,.ation lint, assembly provides the means
for transmitting; adequate pressure and for the correct rate of flow
of Ill 2 to Ihc Orbiter main t, ngint, s. The I.H._ rccirculation line is
a 4-inch vacuum-jacketed line which provides a return path for the
hydrogen reclrculation flow that used to thernmlly precondition the
SSME prior to initiation of engine start. The vent/reliel assembly
serves the same two functions as the similar system in the. LOX feed
system.
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'['Ili' lillXk ¢+11Vi1"i+111111+tllill i'i+I11t';il llr ¢'i}1_dll |Li1'+hip; t4%tHtt'lll ll'+L'Ltldi,,,1
1,1)_t tiqtliJ |i+Ydr¢ll_i,11 +111J i11I¢'1_-tilllk llJ.lt'_¢ ' |llil'dWtlt'¢,. Pl'pp¢,lii1111 lilllk
|1_1.+111"d ,+l )',t, vHi, t'i11,+',. C_,yH_,I'i1"+,+ t |,_ lh_' 1"+t|i|J 11|+I_+_'|1|I'.+', _+1 l.c.+.'_ |ilItl
t|t_' t+tllk 1,11.|+I,+',_' ,11",,+1_ Illi,_ _'+111 _'_1118t" +I I'_I|+i_I t'i,t|_,1_I Li+t_ _ll t)tl, LI|_,_I}t¢ '
+lit11 |11 (|li' _',+l|ilp,'i_' _+i Illt' |.ti._ t:lli_,. |'h|,'i |_|ll,ni+llt¢,llilti hi1,q hl,e1'_ it+t111d t_1_
pl't,.It" lilI'}tl' I I_,lti|+,l 1"_,.'1_,_'1 ,.I _111_1ll¢',,'lit'_ Xi|ll'li il _:,'_tlillill'_ll Iv_,'Iv lilttli '.ll'lli'lll7
_'l",'_l_;l'ilil' Ihllll _'_litl,lillt'_l iil _1 |tll_' ill" Iilllk lll'!',ill:i Ill hi'ill IIl_ ,tilll
I_lillllll_ hll'lll _ll it I_l'll!_,l't_i.'ti\'¢'l'l' illl'l'l'il,'illllt I'_lll'. A,_ il |lltblli¢" Illilllll'l'_
It ill,.itlil.'t Ill I'l!il" I|ltllitltil till' Iilltll_l, iIIIl" t_l it_ I'l'lllll'l'il dl,tl_l|lV,
:\1 the' tillUl" I IIIll' Ilie liqtlld ll,.'ild I,l_l'_':l:_lil'_'_ llll till' I_lll_l_ll' i,,t t'lltl-
!ll,lllt iv lll'llli', t'l'_lllt'l',.l, :\:1 tll_' llllllll|l' til_'l','t';I Ul'_',,'iil'_.l It ,ll'l'i'|l'l'illt','i
,illd I_ll:illl'_ I I_lllt_l ,Ihl'il_l ill II, 17hl'il Illl' I,IIl_'l_h ' I'l'il_'hl'.'l till' lllllk I Ihl'
II,.llild ill'_ll_Ji ' tl I!i i.',,p_'ll_',l lilIWllld illl_+,ll<_th Ihl' Illlltld _Ilt'lill'l' Illl_l
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theopen tank area with great force. It is not unusual for this slug
of liquid to weigh several hundred pounds. Thus. in addition to the
possible tank pressure reduction, resulting Ill conditions conducive to
tank collapse, there is a danger of the slug itself hitting internal
structure and dan_ging the structure and any lines or instrumentation
therein, l_le return ,_f this liquid can also result in "water hammer"
effects.
!
The geysering action is shown schematically in Figure 30
Current Status
NASA/HSFC and Martin _trletta Corporation have baselined what
appears to be an acceptable antl-gcyserlng system and test progrst%
all of which must be completed before the initiation of the omln pro-
pulslou teat program at sSn. 're prevent geyserint, it is necessary
to agitate tile liquid colunm to prevent stratification or layering
dttring the grouud till sequence when lines and tank are relatlvcly
wan11. Current design plans are to lint'heliutn injection system as
shohnl scheraatlcaily in I:i_',ure 31 . Actual design of tile system is
still under study and analysis because tile initial design concept as
proposed was considered less than optimtun, I.ocation of the function
oi the 4-inch I,OX anli-_,eyser lint" with tile 17-inch T.OX nmin-feed-
llne ¢alt potentially ¢at,se ttnl_redlctable flow palLet'as as well as
uullify tile desired el[eel ot tile systetn. 'rilLs could happen it" there
is a ground helittnl supply lailnre lot any re_taon because list, [,OX vetlt
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w_Lves theu _uld close nnd he|lure injection for _tnllt-Rt, yserin R pro-
iet'tiotl would be ternILllilled. It i_ proposed that _l proper d¢,gree of
Yedtlnd_u1_'y hi, |II'ovidt_d _LI_ tile KrOttlld _vstel_ to _IssLtre tl ICll[ s/_lt _
,_rrllngemeut. A teat pl_tn approach h:,s beeu developed to support tht,
I,OX tU_tt-geyset'iu}A progrttm. The test phu_ Itselg is still ill work
_tloug with the type of Imrdware nnd test t[aeiltty to _t¢¢ompiish the
objectives el tilt, progr_tnl. Test. schedult` is:
II_trdwltt't, ou-site nt_d iustllllotion stllrt I:t,bt'ullry 1, 197t_
"L'ost st_lrt St, ptember 197b
'rest completion l'ktrch 197/
Proposed test ¢onligltrntiotl Ls sho_,n_ tu I.'L_;ttrq 12
:1.3.1. I Elt,¢tri¢_ll Subs_'stem
S.%'St t`tn I_.'s IBtl
I"Of lilt' desJ_|l t|t'Vt'|olMllctlt tt'St iltltl t`tl,t_.ttlt'Ot'illt _, }_ll_lSt' Of t|lt` Sprier"
Sh%tttle |_t'O_;V*tltt t the t`Xt¢ltlitl tatlk t'lt't'tI't¢_ll sttbS.vstotlt itl¢ludeS:
(I) opt'rlttiou_tl ittstt'luttt`t_t_ttiotl, (._ t'it'¢tl'|¢_tl distt'il_ltt|ott, /t) IiFtht"
|titt_X prelect |oil, _ttld (.:) dt'vt'loptnottt t [i_:ht ittst VtttSt't|l_ll toll tlS
_tpp I'O|_ t" t it t t' .
O|_t'l'*tl iotla] |tlStl'tttttOlllitl iot_ |tt¢|tlt|t's t)lost" cxtt, t'tl,ll t_lttk |till'It°
11tt't_ts t't`qttivt'd to tttott/tor _tt_t| ¢o1111"ol t,tllk-t't'l_tlt'd I1111¢I iott.q IYottt
tilt' _lltt't el pt'ol_t'[litttt h_lt|ltt_; Iht'olit'h t,ttlk st`|_tl'_ttiott. [:ilt'h itlstt'tt-
tltotlt is SliplMtSt'd {O bt' [tldfvidttltl I',' Ihtt'tlwit'¢d thVotlt;|l lilt" I,Ittk o|ot'-
t t'it',tl dtst I'|bttt Lot| c,|blt` ;Issctttblics to tilt' I'l'/Ol'btlt'l" Itttt|_il|t',tl
| IO
i
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Iconnectors. Amperage limiting protection ia provided by the Orbiter
for those circuits penetrating the _T tanks to preclude the generation
, of ignition sources. Since this Instruamntatlon consists only of
, aensors andc_bllng from them re the inter_ace, no circuit grounos are
r_de to the tank structure. All sensor leads are individually _e-
turned to the Orbiter for stn_,le point grounding. Cable shields are,
however, grounded to tank structure to satisgy elec_ronmgnetlc com-
i patibllity requirement a.
b Development flight instrumentation is, by definition, non-critical
for external tank operation and will be installed or the main pro-
pulsion test article at NSTL and on the £J rst six external tanks. The
principal requirement from a safety standpoint is that this lnstruulcn-
Cation shall not cause the failure of any critical exten_al tank func-
tion. The general design and construction of the development instru-
mentation is the same as previously described for the operational in-
strumentation. Electrical power for tile instruments:ion assemblies is
supplied throu_.h lhe Orbiter umbilical lutert'ace. _hcre are two, oper-
at tonal instrun_.ntation cable harnesses inside t'. l.OX ai.3 liquid hydro-
gen tanks. _le cables are _de oi teflon (FEP. _ insulated wire, and
the sensors are attached with lixed splGes, insulated and sealed with
heal-shrinkable TF}C lellon [ubtn), and an.liable FEP tellon. Each cable
is routt, d through a separale cryogenic feed-through connector mounted
la tile uoseplate ol the |.IIX lank and the lot'w_lrd dome ol tile liquid
111
hydrogen tank. The wire bundles |nshle the tanks are spot tied with
lacing tape and supported by corrosion resistant steel bands with
teflon cushions. The use of teflon (FEP) insulated wire in contact
with LOX has been identified as a potential hazard since it includes
both a fuel (teflon) and a potential ignition source (electrical
energy) interfacing with LOX,
The philosophy expressed in NASA's NHB 8060.IA, "l.'latmnability,
Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedures for _haterials
in Environments That Support Combustion," is that the design of LOX
systems should preclude any ignition sources interfacing with the
media. If this goal cannot be met, any material used in the proximity
of a source of electrical energy shall be evaluated in the proposed
configuration. Evaluation should be made using the worst-case elec-
trical and environmental conditions and by applying the techniques of
NHB 8060.1A, Test No. 4, "Electrical Wire Insolation and Accessory
Flammability Test." Resnlts el the Apollo 13 incident and subsequent
testing have sharer that teflon will not pass such a test in a cryogenic
high pressure oxygen environment. See Figure 33 MSFC has stated
that Saturn Launch Veh;.cle test experience with teflon (TFE) coated
wire shows that: (1) teflon coated wire insulation cannot be ignited
under IL)X by any electrical over-load, (2) te[lon coated wire tnsu-
httinn can be ignited in gaseous oxygen by approximately 800% elec-
trical overload and will propag_tte, and (3) in thc tnlltkely event el
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ignition under oper._nal conditions, fire will not propagate through
the feed-through-connector at the tank wall. Shuttle sensors are
similar to those used on the Saturn second stare , S-If. Analysis
and testing (similar to that which will be accomplished for Shuttle)
were conducted subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident for the S-ll sen-
sots and demonstrated that no safety problem existed. It was stated
that the temperature on the cable will be sufficiently below the sub-
llmation point of teflon to maintain a safe condition in the cabling.
The Panel pointed out that while the slzc of the wires was small and
the potential of applying in excess of the 800% overload appeared
- minimal there still could be some chance of a problem, and suggested
•_P further consideration.
D
i_' Current Status
'm
J bLSFC will conduct worst-case current overload testing and analysis
in the LOX envirotmlent using actual ET hardware and all circuit pro-
'p tection devices (in their worst-case credible consequences of their
failures). Testing would luchlde sensor shorts, opens, normal oper-
=-al
:h
alien and electronic failure modes. This issue will be considered
t resolved if tile above testing is successful. It was also suggested
} by the Panel that all other similar non-metallic materials' appli-
l cations be reviewed and appropriate disposition made.The Extertml Tm_k design incorporates features to protect the
-1 structure aod sub:;yslt, ms Iro_ll lilt' d[rcc[ lind indirect eiiectfl ot
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triggered atmospheric discharges during transportation I prelaunch,
launch and flight operations. Methods employed to provide lightning
protection are intended to assu:e that low resistance paths are pro-
vided on the External Tank surfaces to distribute lightning currents
i the and to guide around nonmetallicthrough
structure currents or over
areas. At this time lightning protection on the nose cap consists of
I a short nose rod and conductive aluminium strips cemented onto the
vehicle and electrically bonded to the structure. The LOX hydrogen and
! inter-tanks incorporate thin aluminum strips, adhesive-bonded to the
external insulation surface and electrically bonded to the LOX tank
skin. Further protection measures include the use of twisted wires
on all internal circuits and twisted shielded cables in exterior
cable tunnels.
The only significant problem noted by MSF, was the possibility
that the diverter strips could debood or melt ill ilighL and the re-
sultant debris could possibly damage tlleOrbiter in some manner.
1_lis problem is curreutly uudcr study to determine alternat= designs
and to further understand tile impact of strips melting or debonding.
3.3.1.4 Separation and Disposition
The External Tank interfaces with tile Orbiter and tilt' Solid
Rockt, t Boosters. [n tile mission events time-line, the Solid Rocket
Boosters are separated trom tile External Tank/Orbiter combination and
then the External Tank is separated lrom the orbiLer, l_le E'i'/SRI$
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attach configuration is shown in Figure 34 , and the aft and forward
attach configurations between tile External Tank and Lhe Orbiter are
shown in Figures 35 and 36 The separation hardware in both the
Orbiter and Solid Rocket Booster case are designed by their respective
contractors (Rockwell international and Thtokol) and not by the tank
contractor since the External Tank portions of separation interfaces
are passive. Martln-Marletta Corporation does support the Rockwel_
Internatlonal and _FC (SRB) efforts in defining, designing and test-
ing the separation hardware. Aspects of the ET/Orbiter separation
have been discussed under the Orbiter Section 3.1 and the same will
apply to the Solid Rocket Booster Section 3.4. Only those Orbiter
and SRB actions that can affect the External Tank's ability to sep-
ara_e safely and be disposed of during its return to earth are dis-
cussed here.
The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation from the External Tank
(ET) follows this sequence: (1) Orbiter receives separation cue from
the Solid Rocket Booster_ (2) Orbiter arms' separation system pyro-
technic initiator controllers on both of the SRB's 0.8 seconds after
the Orbiter cue is given_ (3) Orbiter issues fire conm_snds to
separation system "A" on both SRB's simultaneously 2.5 seconds after
the Orbiter cue, and (4) Orbiter issues fire commands to separation
system "B" on both SRB's simultaneously 40 milllseconds after the
system "A" flre commands.
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Actions to bc taken if lot some reason this separ._tlon does not
take plac¢_ are to be examined further by the Panel. All tile prim_
contractors and the NASA Canters are involved since this is an '.nter-
face problem.
The External Tank separation from the Orbiter follows this
sequence: (I) £otward Orbiter reaction control slstem deployment,
(2) fluid and electrical umbilical separation, (3) forward and aft
structural attachment release, and (4) orbiter maneuver aw_y from the
External Tank. Sequencing of ell separation operations a,,3 commands
are initiated and controlled by the Orbiter. AS a result of new
loads analyses for the ascent portion of the mission, the Externa_
Tank/Orbiter aft attach loads have itlcreased, requiring hardware raodl-
fications which do not appear to unduly affect the separation events
mentioned above. There arc some safety concerns that result from the
separation process _dlicll have been discussed with the Panel: (1) LH2
and LOX trapped between the feed-line closure valven and released as the
External Tank and Orbiter sepa:'atc pose a potential fire/exploslon hazard
and, (2) External Tank rccontact with tilt,Orbiter vehicle prinmrily
due to Orbiter hardware problc1:m.
External T_mk et_try and dispos_l _fter release from tilt, Orbiter h_s
been of gre,it interest to tilt' Panel. t;ronnd rules, c,_natralnts_ and
guidcline_ applicable to tilt, External Tank disposal i'roblem h.ve been
st_lled _IS:
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(a) No External Tank impact below 60° South parallel, based
on State I)_par_nt international agreement.
(b) External Tank impact locations shall be in ocean areas
with minimum ship traffic densities.
(c) External Tank impact locaLions shall be no closer than
200 nautical miles from land masses.
(d) External Tank impact location and dispersions are pre-
dictable,
(e) External Tank rupture for nominal missions shall not
occur above 240_000 feet altitude.
(f) External tank distruct from any cause shall not occur
within four (4) nautical miles of the Orbiter.
On normal missions the External Tank separates from the Orbiter
at almost orbital velocity. The impact site is therefore sensitive
to variations in the tank velocity and other conditions at separation.
The question then is whether the selected design can ensure that the
tank or the debris will always land in an acceptable ocean area.
Aborts and catastrophic situations during launch and ascent also must
be considered s and the added hazard of havi1_g large quantities of pro-
pellant and oxidizer under such situations must be taken inlo account.
A major consideration ill the proper disposal of the tank is the
point in the ascent at which time the Orbiter rm_in engines are cut-
off. The de[inition hi the FB_CO (_hin Engine Cut Off) is currently
117
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baselined as occurring at an altitude of 60 _, mi. fer nominal mission
and at 55 n. mi. for an "abort-once-around" mission. Based on these
altitudes_ the MECO conditions for |ilaunch fro_._KSC ar_ as follows:
(a) For a nominal mlssionp the altitude oL 60 n. mi. wlth a
velocity of 25_383 feet per second and an ankle of attack of 0.5 de-
Co) For an abort mission (AOA)_ with an altitude of 55 n.
grees.
ml. with a velocity of 25,317 feet per second and on angle of attack
I
of 0.75 degrees.
(c) For the return-to-the-landlng-slte (RTLS) abort mode s
the MECO target is at 230,000 feet (37.8 n. ml.) with a velocity on theorder of 6_500 FPS.
These D_CO conditions for a launch from KSC are valid for a wide
variety of launch inclinations and payload weights. Figure 37 is
typical of the tank disposal landing footprint for nominal and AOA
conditions.
There are two major challenges associated with the safe reentry
of the E_tcrnal Tank, The fir t is the premature breakup due to
LOX and hydrogen tank ruptures as well as determination of actual
breakup altitude and uuee_ta£nty of the dispersion Of the resultant
debris. The second is the inability to assure tank impact predict-
ability without th_ use of system that causes the tauk to tumble,
'[_tetumbling condition must be achiL,ved before the _ank has any chance
I18
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of "skipping" due to aerodynamic lift, as well as having a tumble rate
ills! prevenLs tileoccurreece of the "frishee" effect, which occurs at
tee high a tumble rate. Typical L.fllects of three dlfferunt nominal
entry conditions are shovel in Figure 38 'it%useasstm_e a tumble
rate of 30 degrees per second maximum anti + 1.3 degrees per second
as minimums. The frisbee etfect shown in Figure 39 becomes notice-
able at tumble rates in excess of 30 degrees per second. Premat_,_e
tumbling might also result in contact of the External Tank and the
Orbiter. As a result of current studies, the following two ground
rules have been established for an acceptable tumble system: (1) no
tumble action to be initiated prior Lo O0 seconds after separation
from the Orbiter, and (2) acceptable tumble rates are b'tween IO and 50
degrees per second. }_ tin Harletta Corporation curreutly is conduct-
ing studies to refine and detine all "optimum" system to satisfy the
ground rules noted above. 11_c systems being considered are:
(a) Blow down, using LOX vent valves
(b) Solid rocket thrusters
(c) I,OX and hydrogen tank "blow boles."
3.3.1.5 111ermal Protection Subsystem
in November 1974 the 111ermal Protection SubsysLem baseline was
changed due to a significant increase ill expected therrmtl heating
envirou_dnt and tO a L'eqn[rtrmcut to minilnt._e ice [OrllKItion aBd its
impact on tilt, Orbiter. lllis new bast, line data iltiected tile insulation
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iib3.terial used on I:ht_ three major St_¢ tJ.ollS Ol the tnuk: 1.(]× tank ll/-
t:].uding tht_ nose cone t the lnter-tallk t and t.he hydrogen t:ank.
Current dellt.gn thermal inputs to the External Tank segment s
based on analyse_ throul_h l)et'emher 1974 are:
(a) For the, LOX tank Iorwsrdogive section th_ induced tht_r-
real onvlronmenk can be as high as 10.5 btu/ft2-see, but t_ew hypersonic
wind tunnel data Ind/eatesa value that could be as hIsh as 1O btu/ft 2-
see. The LOX tank, inter-tank and hydro,;en tank thus are considered
to he subject to heatlnK values in excess of that normally acceptable
for the proposed new insulation material (UpJohn CPR-421 spray-on foam
insulation (SOFI). The CPR-421 is considered appropriate for heating
wtlues up to about 0 btu/[t2-se¢ but are unacceptable at valued around
IO-II btu/ft2-sec. _i¢ material used on structure subjected to very
higl* heat rates is an ablator material called SLA-Sbl with a silicone
sealant coat. These areas include thc Orbiter aft attach strut, for-
ward attach strut, liquid hydrogen leedline and crossbeam, and the l.OX
tank conduit.
In addition to preventing lee formzltlon and heat input to cryo
fluids, one ot tile major reasons for the insulation is to preclude the
air llqul[ication becanse liquid air is high In o×ygen conlent wht'n
boiling oil, and compatibility problems exist when it contacts hydro-
carbon n_tterials.
NASA and the prime coutractor are cnrrt,ntly conduct in); studies
r_
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and tests to establish an insulation configuration that will satisfy
known induced and natural environments with a capability for £uture
possible heating rate increases. They feel that neither trajectory
shaping or external tank configuration changes are practleal methods
of alleviating this problLm.
3.3.1.6 Ground Support and Logistics
The mode of tra-_sport_tion for the External Tanks to the launch!
| site has been settled. Barges will be used in a manner similar to
I that for the Saturn launch vehicle stage movement (S-IC and the S-ll).
!
The use of any carrier aircraft has been ruled out at this time because of
the modifications required, cost and safety implications.
To assure propellant and oxidizer cleanliness, the following re-
quirements have been levied on the External Tank system:
(a) The LOX and hydrogen tanks will be cleaned per MSFC -
Spec - 164A, with no particle larger than lO00 microns.
(b) At the exit of each tank, propellant screens will be
installed. For the hydrogen tal_ this will be a 400 micron "glass
bead rated" screen, and for the LOX tank an 800 micron "glass bead
rated" screen.
(c) All lines and components downstream of the filters
shall be cleaned to a nmximum particle size of 400 microns for the
liquid hydrogen and 800 microns for the LOX.
It was noted that the External Tank desi_n common fill and de-
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livery lines htsure that any contamination introduced into the system
during propellant loading will be delivered it) the main engines. There-
Iore D the ground systems and the Orbiter lines have to be cleaned to
at least the same levels as the External Tank lines which interface
with the Orbiter.
122
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3.4 _o__!lid Rocket Booster
P_or to llftoff the Orbiter Maln Engine| are ignited and
brought to full thrust and both Solid Rocket Motors are armed
and ignited from simultaneous ignition commands. _t approxl-
merely 150,000 foot altltude, the thrust of both Solid Rocket
Motors will have decayed to lees than 25% of nomlnal. At this
i time separation of both Solld Rocket _osters is initiated and
the Orbiter and External Tank continue toward orbit. Upon
successful separation of the Solid Rocket Boosters, a sequence
is initiated for individual recovery of the two booster units.
Parachutes are deployed along the trajectory of each unit to
provide for soft impact within a predeflned recovery zone. Each
booster is to be floated by entrapped air until the arrival of a
recovery ship o_ ships. The flight time, launch to splashdown, takes
about 7 minutes and 15 seconds.
The Solid Rocket Booster element of the Space Shuttle system
is made up o£ seven subsystems: (I) the solid rocket motor, (2) the
thrust vector controls_ (3) separation subsystem containing
mechanical and ordnance equipment, (4) the recovery subsystem
containing mechanical and parachute equipment, (5) avionics,
(6) structure, and (8) a destruct or range safety subsystem.
The Thiokol Corporation in Wasatch, Utah was selected as the
Solid Rocket Motor contractor. _hey have completed the design of
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most of the tooling for the fabrication of the motor cases and
procurement is underway. The contractural awards for the
structures, separation motors, recovery system, thrust vector
control, and avionics had not been completed at the time of the
Panel's review. However, since the Solld Rocket Booster Pre-
liminary Design Review was completed in November 1974, tile Panel
was able to review th.- detailed design of the booster components.
As mentioned in an earlier section on management, the overall
integration of the booster is being performed by the Marshall
Space Flight Center in Alabama. NASA plans to select a booster
assembly c,)ntrac_or in fiscal year 1977.
3.4.1 Solid Rocket Motor
System Design
The solid rocket rotatorincludes tilecase, propellant, igniter
and no::zle as shown illFigure 40. Flexibility in fabrication and
ease of transportation and handling are made possible by a
_eb_nented case design. The propellant grain is shaped to reduce
thrust approximately one-third some 55 seconds after liftoff to
prevent overstressing the vehich, during the period of maximum
dynamic pressure. 'rile grain is of conventional design, with a
star-shaped perforation in the lon¢ard casting segment and a
k'rnnc_lted cone perforation in each of [tie sehmmnts and the aft
t, lostlre. The eontotlr=_d nozzle expaoslon ratio is 7.1b:l. The
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rocket motor case is made up of ten separate segments with specific
Joints to meet the structural requirements and weight needs as
shown In Figure 41. The following is a performance su_ry of
the rocket motors under nominal conditions at 60°F,
(a) Vacuum delivered impulse, lb-sec 290.6 x l06 (T=I see.)
(b) Burn Time, seconds 122
_._ (c) Propellant burning rate, ln/sec 0.411 (at 1000 psi)(d) Specific Impulse, average, lb-sec 262.2 x 106
The Solid Rocket Motor ignition hardware consists of an igniter and
dual redundant standard man-rated initiators. These initiators are
separated by an independent electrically duel redundant (2 motors
and 1 shaft) electro-mechanical safe and arm device. Each initiator
is fired by an independent Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller (PIC)
upon coat, and. The safe and arm device is maintained in the safe
position by a mechanical safety pin until a given point in the
countdown at which time it is removed. The device remains in the
safe position untii the arm-command is given immediately prior to
the motor ignition.
The items associated with weight and _elght control are:
(a) Motor Ma_s Fraction 0,884
(b) Total Solid Rocket Motor, lbs. 1,254,210
(e) Solid Rocket Motor, lbs. 1,227,250
__ 125
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p Current Status
i There have been studies on alternate propellants to minimize
HC1 release above 65,000 feet (ozone layer) during the ascent
portion of the mission. To date the studies indicate that £t
is technically feasible to minimize (less than 3?. by weight) or
eliminate the release of HC] above 65,000 feet. However, t|mre
would be a probably payload loss of 2,000 to 7,000 pounds. These
studies will continue as one of NASA_s efforts to reduc_ the
atmospheric impact from the Space Shuttle operations.
NASA has noted that the Solid Rocket Motor and booster
components fabrication requirements are considered to be the
current state-of-the-art technolo_w which has been demonstrated
in systems such as tile Titan III rocket now in use.
Thrust mismatch of the two rocket motors is of grea_ concern
to the designers and the operation of the Shuttle system. As a
result of this concern, NASA and its contractors, continue to pay
a great deal of attention to having both the rocket motors ignite
and essentially tail-off simultaneously and an acceptablc thrust
mismatch during nornml ascent. rile reproducibility limits, based
on the latest analysis, are shown in Figure 42. Thus there will n_st
likely be a uet!d to match pairs of rockets. The specificatlon
requires that there not be a mismatch greater than 710,000 pounds
dtlrin_ _, tht! tail-of;" [fir.st pt,riod _it arotuld 11% seconds after
ignit ion.
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The POGO phenomenon is not expected to manifest itself in the
burning characteristics of the rocket motor. However, the potential
for chls motor to contribute to 13000 will be explored fully by the
program offices as a part of the overall POGO effort.
3,4.2 Thrust Vector Control
System Design
The Thrust Vector Control subsystem controls the angle of _he
nozzle of the rocket motor, in order to obtain the proper flight
trajectory. Each Solid Rocket Booster contains a Thrust Vector
Contro, assembly consisting of redundant hydraulic power units and
two actuators. If one of the hydraulic power units fails, a valve
in the actuators isolates the failed unit and this prevents any
loss of thrust vector capability. The servovalves for each actuator
are hardwired across the SRB/ET interface and accept steering
commands from the Orbiter guidance and control system to provide
motor deflection. The basic requirements for this control system are:
(a) Torque, inch-pounds 4,200_000
(b) Rate, degrees per second 5o
(c) Acceleration, radians per sec" 2
(d) Gimbal Angle, degrees 5
/_ (e) Redundancy Fail safe as minimum.
_1 Current Status
The current design is a fall operatlonal/fall safe design. The Thrust
l
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Vector Control has a nmximum gimbal capability of 7.1 degrees and
provides torques in excess o_ those required for known loadlngs.
Since the loads effort is a continuing activity the loads may
change upward but appear not to be & major problem at this time.
3.4.3 Separation Subsystem
SYstem Design
The Solid Rocket Booster separation subsystem consists of the
forward and aft separation motor assemblies, the forward attachment
unit and the aft attachment and umbilical pull-away unit, Figure 43.
The separation sequence for the booster Is:
(a) Orbiter receives separation cue from both boosters,
(b) Orbiter arms _wo sepratlon system pyrotechnic
initiator controls on both the A and B units in both boosters 0.8
seconds after the cue is given to the Orbiter,
(c) The Orbiter issues fire coTmands simultaneously to
the "A" unit on both the boosters at 2.5 seconds after the cue,
(d) Orbiter issues the fire command simultaneously te
"B" unit separation assemblies on both boosters some 40 milliseconds
after system "A" has been given the fire command.
The cue received by the Orbiter is in the form of a pressure signal
when the Solid Rocket Motor chamber pressure has reached 50_15 psia
on any two pressure sensors used for this purpose. The separation
system avionics is shown in Figure 44.
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The farwarJ and aft separation motor aaseblLas each consist of
four separation motors and ignition ordnance which are fired to
impart side thrust to the expended booster. There has been a
recent change in the motors to reduce, if not eliminate, the
impingement of the motor pluntes on the Orbiter Thermal Protection
Subsystem. These changes are noted here:
Befor_.__e Curren____
Thrust Level, lbs. 12,000 20,000
Burn Time, seconds 2 0.75
Propellant Restrictions none max. metal or stabilizing
additives - 2_o
burn rate additives - 1%
Igniter Case Haterial glass phenolic non-debris generating
Igniter Propellant no restriction same restrictions as main
propellant
Thrust Tail-Off Rate no restriction Tail-off to 50% chamber
pressure limited to
I00 milliseconds
Motor Location SRB forward back Nose frustum and aft skirt
of frustum and
eft skirt
The for_,ard attachment unit consists of an SRB fitting, called a
thrust post, supported by the SRB forward attachment structure which
mates with an External Tank fitting. This forward attachment pro-
vides longitudinal SRB/ET restraint and transmits thrust from the
SRB to the L_/Orbtter. The SRB and IN mating surfaces are held
!=
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together by a double-ended separation belt which is internally
redundant for the separation function. A standard manned spacecraft
initiator pressure cartridge is mounted on both ends of the double-
ended separation bolt. At separation, both of the separation
cartridges are fired and the resultant pressure buildup drives an
internal piston at each end of the separation bolt toward the
separation plane to effect holt fracture. Operation of either piston
will fractur, the bolt.
The aft SRB/ET attachments include a lower, upper, and diagonal
strut assembly which provide lateral and rotational restraint
between the SRB/ET. Each strut assembly consists of a SRB and ET
fitting hold together by a double ended separation bolt similar in
design and operation to the forward attachment separation bolt. The
"pull-away" connectors used at each SRB/_r interface carry the
electrical circuits as follows:
(a) Forward Attachment I
(b) Aft Strut (Diagonal) i
(c) _f't Strut (Upper) 5
(d) Aft Strut (Lower) 3
As a result of the latest Shuttle system loads analysls_ December
1974, there is an effort un¢lerway to redesign the forward thrust fiLtings
and aft attachment strtlts. This will result, most llkely, in some
weight increases. There is no expected change to the basic concept
of [h_ I-lt,parat hilt assembly dt, st'rlbt!d here.
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3.4.4 Recovery Subsystem
_ystem DesiKn
The booster recovery subsystem provideb the necessary hardware
to control the descent (velocity and attitude) after separation from
the External Tank. The recovery subsystem includes those items
used to separate, deploy, disconnect, control attitude t float, and
provide for location of the expended booster. Figure 45 shows the
booster recovery (separation to splashdown) events and associated
param2ters of performance at each stage. The booster recovery main
chutes, drogue and frustum, and booster itself are buoyant. The
recovery system is redundant except for the beacon and flashlng light.
Briefly the sequence of events is as follows. A command is
sent from the Orbiter to the Solid Rocket Booster just before
separation to apply battery power to the recovery logic network and
at the same time to arm the nose cap thruster for deploying the drogue,
the frusttm ring detonator for main deploy, and the main chutes
disconnect. Two barometric switches are set to close at h[_ altitude
(below 19,000 feet) and at low altitude (below I0,000 feet). At high
altitude the nose cap thruster fires, pushes the nose cap away from
the booster, and deploys the drogue chutes. At low altitude the
frustum ring detonator fires, the drogue chute pulls the frustum aw_y
from tilebooster, and deploys the .mln chutes. After a tlme delay
the,t_ozzle extension is Jettlsuut!d and thd impact switcht_s are armed.
A third barometric switch will close at a vt,ry h+w altltttde £o turn
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on thn impact recordnr Just prier to watar impact. At impact tilt:
impact switches clone and after a time ,I¢,.lay the nmln chutes are
disconnected and the beacon and ligllt are turned on. The nose
section of thn boostt:r, containing the n_Jority of tlle recovery
hardware, is shown in Figure 46,
_m
The maximum vertical velocity for the booster at water impact
has been set at i00 feet per second.
Corrent Status
The Panel's major in_.erest was directed toward questions
concerning the Inherent safety of a reusable Solid Rocket Booster.
The solid rocket case, the parachutes and the hardware for the
seperatlon of the booster from External Tank were of the greatest
interest. In this section tileparachutes and separation hardware
are discussed, while the motor case is discussed under the "Structures"
paragraph which fellows. The separation hardware includes the
forward and after separation motor assemblies, forward and aft strut
attachment units and the umbilical pull-away connector units. The
separation motors arc burned out after use and require replacement,
as doe__ the ignition ordnance, As notcd it.the reviews conducted
at b_SFC tilt" electriea: connectors and wiring are the major items
I_D requiring; retest and rehabilitation for reuse in the boostcr. Tim
attachment struts and fittings are a part of the ,.:tructureand are
cow, red in t-hat section. The replacement of used pyrotcchuic
cart rid_,,es and t'ctest of the ¢onlzet'lor_ aml wiring is the fmportatlt task.
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Refurbishment of the parachutt,s (drogue antlmain) Is new to NASA
experience in that NASA*s Current approach is to not reuse apace re-
covery parachutes, l_wever_ there is a great deal of IK)Dexperience
available with regard to reusing parachutes, e.g._ aircraft braking
chutes a cargo parachutes and personnel parachutes.
The material in Table X la indicative of the appreach used in
defining the ability tO reuse a drogue or main chute, More specifically,
the following data have been developed for cor_monly used materials such as
nylon and dacron:
(a) Prolonged ultraviolet explosure produces strength loss
of 50Z within seven days.
(b) High temperatures result in severe strength loss after
only lO hours of exposure at 350° F.
(e) Since these materials are hygroscopic (absorb water),
they show only a slight strength loss when subjected te high humidity.
(d) Radiation other than ultraviolet is very harmful and
thns chutes require shielding.
(e) Vacuum conditions do not appear to materially affect the
cute properties.
3.4.5. Avion_.___Ic_s
SysLems l)eslgll
The ]_ooster Avionics consists oi the [ollowing assemblies: elec-
trlcal, it_strtlmetHa_ien, control rely },,yro_recovery_ range safety_
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and f.ai.lure de[celt.on,
h significant portion of t|'te t, lectrical arid inntr.m_'ntaLion
assemblies are included in Lye line replact, l_blc untl.sj the forward slid
lift: lnteRrated electronics assemblieu. I_oth contain tile logic and
networks dlstrlhuelor_ multiplexcr-dcmnlcipluxerp signal conditiutlel_
antl tile forward two data buss couplers.
1_le electrical system consists of a 28 VIX:battery supplying power
for separation, deployment anti recovery functions through the logic and
network distributors. These distributors_ one forward and one aftj
also p¢ovide the 28 vdc power from the Orbiter to signs, conditioners
and associated measuring devices during the ground and flight period when
the boosters still are a part of thL, total Space Shuttle vehicle.
Th,"avionics associated with the recovery activities consists of
the following components: (1) Altltude/impact switch assembly, (2)
X-band radar transponder (beacon system)_ (3) X-band radar antenna (bea-
con system), and (4) two flashing lights.
Range safety subsystem, which is not yet defined, is to provide
the destruct capability for the boosters in case el: early termination
of the flight, 'lllissystem has been defined in tileLcvel II "Space
Shuttle Program Flight and Ground System Spt.ci[ication", ,1SC-07700
Vol. X_ ttpdatcd to tk_y 1975_ as "an add-on destruct system --- which
does not rcquire any action by tilt, crt_w prior to initiation el an
aborl. '['h_' liv:!Ii!m ftlllClioll _itlall bt" tIt,pt!ntlt'nt tin real-(ime Yllllgt,
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safety down-linked paranmters and/or tracking data for the period
after llftoff up to SRB/ET separation."
Current Statue
Based on the material provided to the Pane1_ the following is the
status of the range safety system:
The design concept and selection of system components are
complete except for conical shaped charge to be placed in the solid
rocket booster element. Currently the program is involved in an
effort to fully integrate the system design from the s_andpolnt of ground-
to-fllght vehicle and between the flight vehicle elements. Acceptance
of basic design concept by the Air Force Eastern Test Range is still
under discussion. Working interfaces have been established between
all organizations affected by the range safety system design, develop-
ment and utilization. Discussions between these groups_ reviews and
planning sessions are being established.
r
The failure detection setup for the booster provides the failure
detection capability during boost phase of the flight. This setup
had not been defined sufficiently for presentation to the Panel dur-
ing its early Spring review at _FC.
3.4.0 Structures and Reusability
The reusability aspects of the Solid Rocket Booster ate so closely
tlcd to the structural design capabilities that these two aspects of the
booster program are dlscuss_d together in this report. !_slcally
135
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the only nell-structural hardware but.lt [or reuse art, the electrical
alld itlstrltmelltatiotl eqitipnlellt t thrust vector t, ontrol aast, mbly arid
such recovery [rein8 as tile psrst'hutt'S, "[]it, Solid Rocket blotor case
alld attendant structure are all ¢OllSit[12l.'ed as a part of tile _ttructtlral
aasembl '_.
The current baseline for rouse el tile Booster components is:
Structures reuse ...... ............ . ........... 40 times
Solid Rocket tk>ior Case and Noz;:le ............ 20 times
'tllrust Vt_ctor tk_ntrol assembly ................ 20 times
Electrical and Instrumentatiotl reuses .... ..... 20 ti1_,_S
Recovery asst, lablies ........................... 10 times
Batteries ........ ............................. 1 time
Structut'al design tt'atul_es to support tilt' booster reusability
program ttlclud¢, such tllings as: (I) extertull prutt,¢tive coattngs_
(_) wt, ld-trt't' solid rot'kft Itltltt]l_ fast', (]) watt, r-light t'ompt|rttllPllts
it:tit W v/eldt'd allUltitlllm skhls_ (4) bl:l.kht'ads tot proit'cttotl el tilt'
IIVit)II_CS (e[t'ct I'll'ell _ltld inst rlUllellt_lt Loll liesls ill LIIC Iorw_t_d port _OII
Ot tilt' buustt't't (b) st it tt'llil W rin}'s _llOllt; tilt' ,lit quilrtt'r O[ tilt'
I_ooster ,qlrttcturt, tu ht,].p takt, tilt, Wtttt't" |lllpiIt'[ loitds t _|lld (t]) tile
tell' ot ,I smooth Sill I_lct' [ul" tilt" _lppI it';It loll O[ tht, rlll_ll ,_l'otectiull
Ilkllt'l'iilI ,ll'oIl|ld tilt' illt .qkit't which t'OVt'l'S tilt' IIo.','h'. "l'ht' Solid
I.',ockt. t bitter t'_lst" iN dt'!l[}_.llt'tl with tl.t)O9 illt'tltl thit'kllt'._s I_t,youd that
i't,qull'ed IoF Ilia:hi Io,hlt; 9 It',lt'lul't' Iltt't'h;tlllt'!; dlld w_ltt'r Iltlp_lt't. To
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_llow for wear due to "grlU' cleanlng during re[urblshr_,nt for
additional refilllngs. The 8oIid Rocket Motor ease Joints are de-
scribed in Figure 41.
t._rrent Status
An integral part ol the structural dt.slgll procedure includes a
"Fracture Control Piss" for the Solid Rocket Booster and motor, This
plan establishes the requirements for re.porting, non-destructive
testing (inspection), failure docutm!ntation, traceability, service llfe
recording, proof testing, and envirotmleutal control o[ all portions ot
the structures defined as susceptible to structural failure due to
|laws and cracks, lu line with this p_nn, trot,crisis are selected and
eharacteri,:ed for specific Solid Rocket Booster cmd motor onviro_mlents
and [abricat ion processes and rt, turbtshment requirement a. One of the
problems ill designin_ the booster/motor structures ts to account for
fracture under other than platte-strain conditions .rod to provide _l
t_ract ical means for predict Lug life under the complex t inx,-stress
historiesoccurrttlgduriug pad operatic,is, boost phase at the mission
slid recovery at tile booster.
Other quos(Ions open at tilt" titre, el tlR" }Mnel's review deal
tmlinly with the structural aspects el tilt, booster clerm,.t
'L'llt' sl_t't'{I led rcttse rcquiretllcltt s alld the designs to steel them
are depc|ldent ttpolt tilt, th'lil_tttotls el service tile, safety tatters and
their derivat Loll. Sam,, thong,his relative [o fettle h_lit'|l are pctt. tuvnt
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to assuring a sale and cast effective booster are: (l) what will wear
out or ba rendered uneervlceable after till, specilied number of reuses
that will not wear out or be unserviceable after a greater or lesser
number o£ reuses or cyclesj and (2) what i_ould be desigrmd differently
if the design were required to be _lde to net a hi_;her number of
_euses.
Noise (vibroacoustie effects) generated by the Solid Rocket Motors
and the _lain Engines on the pad and soon after li£toff may impose severe
requirements. The determination of these effects and the design con-
straints are still under study.
The booster design and expected attrition rates are highly de-
pendent upon the extent of damage due to water impact loads° These
stresses are dependt,nt upon booster velocity, angle of impact, tem-
perature of the structural t_zterial and surface conditions sucll as winds
and sea Stale° Computer analysis programs have been developed to an-
aly;:e (1) initial lmpact_ (2) cavity tom,ILion and collapse of the
water volume, (3) maximum booster pt,uetration into the water and at
rite same time water penetration into the throat at the rocket motor,
and (6) rebound attd slapdom_ on the w_tter sttrtace.
there are also those events associated with tilt' time when tile
boostcr ts in the water and the ships and int`n begin to retrieve the
boosters Item the water, llte de_trre that these operations impact Lhe
deslF',n OI the boostt'r has not beell tully explored by the Panel at
1'38
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this time.
From the time a solid propellant rocket grain is cast until it
has burned away in the performance of its mission D it is subjected
to an array of stress-inducing environments including gravity, pro-
I
pellant curing loads, handling shocks and vibrations, and the pressur-
izations and accelerations that accompany ignition, launch_ and flight.
The possibility of safety related problems resulting from any one or
combination of these environments will be examined in later reviews
by the Panel.
Lightning protection requirements for the Solid Rocket Booster
are similar to those for the Orbiter. Equipment requiring protection
include pyrotechnics, thrust voctor control sensors and switching
circuits, all exposed electrical cables, and the integrated electronic
assembly (data buss coupler_ signal conditioner, multiplexer-deplezer_
logic and network distributor.
Current lightning protection design measures include the follow
ing: (I) single point ground on power circuits, (2) use of twisted
wire pairs, (3) delays of 2_I millisecond in the 1_Iny switching
functions, aud (4) use of metallic cable tunnel to protect cable runs
forward and aft and the use of multi-grounded overall shields on all
ordnance _abling.
Electrical interfaces between the Orbiter, External Tank, and
the Solid Rocket Booster do not lully salisly the lightning design
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criteria. Interface design is being studied at this time to obtain
a reasonable solution to this problem. On the 5RB program several
tests are being planned to validate the lightning protection arrange-
ment: (1) cable core test on SR_ equipment as required, (2) full
scale lightning test on the External Tank/Booster attach struts with
ordnance iustalled, and (3) cable tunnel attenuation tests.
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3.5 _Launch and Landing Element
The launch and landing aspects of the Shuttle program are con-
sidered an element in the same manner as the Orbiter element, External
Tank element, SSME element and the Solid Rocket Booster element. The
Launch and Landing element is under the Jurisdiction of NASA's
Kennedy Space Center. There are other prime and secondary sites,
but the discussion here centers on the requlrsments, design, develop-
ment, validation, launch, and landing preparation plans at KSC.
The design and operation of the launch/landlng site is as much
a key to achieving a low cost Shuttle system with rapid turnaround
after a flight as any other element of the program. KSC's past roles
on the manned and unmanned programs, in which facilitles and know-how
have been developed for the receipt inspection assembly, checkout and
launch, plays a large part in their ability to meet their current and
projected role in the Space Shuttle program. More specifically the
Launch and Landing Project conducted at KSC covers the following
activities:
(a) Shuttle vehicle element receiving (including all that
goes with such activities, u.g., inspections), assembly of the Shuttle
vehicle including buildup from the elements to the total ready-to-fly
vehicle, checkout and launch.
(b) Rccovery/retrleval operations for the Orbiter and Solid
Rocket Booster.
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(c) Ground O,_eration taking into account the necessary
sustaining engineering, logistics, maintainability and the turnaround
operations.
(d) Facilities and Ground Support Equipment, such as the
Runway, Orbiter Processing Facility, Launch Control Cun_er, Flight
Test Control. A major innovation will be the Launch Processing
System to satisfy the requirements for an automated launch checkout.
With regard to payloads, KSC will prepare and install the
Spacelab delivered by the European consortium, the automated payloads,
the Air Force Interim Upper Stage Vehicle and the TUG vehicle and all
other payloads.
The KSC Interface with the NASA Flight Research Center at
Edwards, California, includes a major role in the Approach and Landing
Test program.
At Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, KSC will assist the
Air Force in planning and will provi0e export help in the area of
turnaround operations, faeillties, launch support equipmen_ and pay-
loads operations.
Recognizing that tilePanel has not had the opportunity to examine
the Shuttle program from tileKSC vie%¢polnt illally detail, thu focus
was on a Sltmll number of art,as of particular interest to the Panel
at this ttme: Solid Rocket Booster retrieval, landing facilities and
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landing controls, Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystems maintenance,
turnaround operations, and Launch Processing Subsystem. The Panel
dtdj however, receive an orientation briefing on the total KSC role,
responsibilities and plans to carry them out.
3.5.1 Solid Rocket Booster Retrieval
Systems Design
So we have noted, the Marshall Space Flight Center has
responsibility for the development of the Solid Rocket Boostert.
including the intact reentry of the booster into the ocean. KSC,
however, is responsible for developing the retrieval system for
returning the boosters to dry land for refurbishment and preparation
for reuse,
Retrieval of the boosters, parachutes, and other recoverable
objects will be accomplished using surface vessels. The retrieval
vessels will tow the boosters to KSC; other objects recovered will be
brought onboard the vessels themselves. Shuttle developmental
launches will, of course, be used to test and refine vehicle recovery/
retrieval systems. The boosters are expected to impact at a point
some 130 to 150 nautical miles downrange in an impact footprint
defined as a I0 x 33 nautical mile elltp_ . Once the boosters are
located and the vessels are near enough, divers are sent to plug the
nozzle.
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Then the booster is dewatered and it attains what is called a
"log" mode. Parachutes are coiled on reels and the nose cone frustum
is lifted on board the vessel and the boosters towed home.
Current Status
The retrieval system definition is in its early sta@es and will be
examined in more detail as the necessary design, Interlace and
operational details are workod out. Among the questions yet to be
answered are the number of tracks to have on the SRB impact recorderD
and the baseline for the "station set" used in the SRB retrieval and
disassembly
3.5.2 Landln K Facilities and LandlnK Control
Systems Design
These facilities and controls can be divided into the following
specific items: (i) Primary landing sites, KSC and VAFB used for
test and operational flights, (2) secondary landing sites with particu-
lar emphasis on Flight Research Center/Edwards AFB used for the
Approach and Landlnt, Test program L1sinB the carrier alrcraft_ and
(3) the blisslon Control Center at Johnson Space Center_ llouston,
Texas.
The Orbiter La_Idlng Facility at KSC is located approxlmately
1,5 tulles north and west of the Vebich, Assembly Building (VAB) and
extends 15,000 feet to [:henorthwest. It is composed of the following:
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(a) Airfield l_aV_,m_,nlsof ]_.000 fl x _00 fl: with 1000 l'l.
ov_,i-rL1|lson L'_icholldj _t two-w_Ly t:h_Lt i._ ]O,h[]O l'L. loll}',_Llldr_()l't.
whlL, h,ndhlg to th." OvhJt:*_v Proe_,s._I _:l:_u'i]Jty0 aml n parking: npron
_tISl Off Lh¢_ ll_lill ['L|I1W_L_ ° _Illd _'oJlwldellt_ll with the tw_,-way 490 t't0 x
")5(II't.
(b) A|rfJeld ]i_:lltin_:alon>', tlle ,_tat_dard apl)roach _ vum_ay
tO_luhdown and ¢¢_11_ee'lim_, al]d the VUllWay ed_;e
(c} A l_Indi11:,_lids cont,'o] buJldik_', _ll the so_l:heaste_:n
end o[" thc l'UllW_ly ¢ontll[ll]ll}_ h_IL'¢|_¢_II*_!|'oF fl|,_',llL _Ind ,_',L'O_illdeotltrol
illc hid itl_t I'he O,_'biter landit_, il_.qtL'u'll_'nt_l ioll sy_t_m wi tit S-b,lnd/I ]1_
COtl|lluntc_l [" 1011s } TACAN _ ,%_ic l*O_,'_t\'¢_ _CZIIIlI] I1__, }]L!;ltll l,and in._', ,qys tetlt (,I._ IU,,_
_11d r_'lzLtOd |ll_t_l] J_ltiotl._.
Tho ¢tll'l'Ottl _[_I['IIS OI []1¢ Ot*l_Jt¢_." ]_t|dltl}'. t'nci|iL"," ;it KSC |,'¢ ;I,_
(,_ ..{.0 l_(tlt_l _011 _t_'_il"_l._i hi]'CO bOOll lthlde IOl" I_h;I.ge 1 _|11t_ "IT
• llld [h_" l'_!¢lllil.%!tll_tlt,'i I'OL" I_h;i,'_e I',_. ;ll'_! ill [_t_' |_];llUk[ll_'..'4idiot,
(b_ Phns,.' [ COII,g[I'IIL'[7{Oll ,:,n the 1"lI11_¢*[%',_ [%¢0-_¢_[%'_ l',;_t'kitL_
_Lpl'Oll_ _Ll'il i,,hl ]i}',h( ira:, eh'ctric_{l power ;{lte| %¢,I(('F i;1_1[11,_1 1.S tO b_,
vottlp]_!lT_,d lit All!'.tl:-I[ ]_)7(',
(C] l_h:lS_ ' ] I ,.'oust I'tic[ iOlt oI_ l]|c I_{ll¢litt_', nid:_ COIILL'O] hill Idill}',
{itS[ I'llttlOlt_.l( iOll i,[C{_ it',', tll { lit i_'t; :_tll_l)_,t'l .ll|d c,lbl liD', S','at etns is
¢:-,pectod to be cot:lp]eL_,d i_ _L'ptel:tb_,l" Iq)'b.
14_
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(d) Phase Ill, TACAN, Conmu.dcat:Ion system_ (M_BLS, Comsat,
otc.), propellant and gase:, systems, high cherry aim point,
clnetlmodollte system, Orbiter ns_tln_,dt:vlce, and other landing
s.pport equlpmenC are all In planning and reqult'_m,_nt:s rcvlew st'ag,[:s.
(e) Test" planning includes the.utilization of tlm Shuttle
Training Aircraft to validate the _;round landing; aids and control
SyS t_I_S.
(f) Significant issues at Lhe time of tile Panel r,'vlcw
(March 1975) were: (I) Additional facllltles required for clne_heodolltes
and the high energy aim point, (2) Runway grooving spacing which is to
be between l" and 2", and (3) |4bile the microwave Scanning Beam
_-. Landing System has been selected to support the Orbiter landing, its
,_ location at the end of the r_mway is under discussion (i.e., on the
centcrllne or off the center llne).
The current program specifications call for the .Iohnson Space
Center's _[iSSiOllControl Center to retain voetrol of the Slnlttle
ehmmnts (vehicle and, particularly, the Orbiter) ttlvottghotlthe
mlssloll including entry_ lallding antl rolhmt to a stop oll the runway.
._ There is still some tlisctlssion :tS to the best location for control of
tim Orbiter durin,_: the Terminal Area ['_ler<,, }lan3}]t_lllt!nt portion o_7 the
udsst,m (from about 70,000 ft. altitude to roll-out ell the mmway).
The Panel will ['ollow this quest:ion tlntil its rt!soltltiell to alssnrc
}
-_ tha( crt'_¢ si{{ct%" lind S|lCCt_ssflll ",,ohich, retqrll t't_ce[%'e appropriate
---I dt[ t_ll[ loll.
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(e) lCxterna] Tank and Solid Rocket 1_)ostc_rproparJ_thm
(d) Shuttl_ V_:hJcl_ As,'_t!mh]y
(e) Pre-laUl_eh checkout :u*_d ]annch
(;urr_mt _tatus
During the,L_arly Puuel revlo_ws Ic wan evident that clu_ ].60ho,r
requirement is a m_Jor design driver. Therefore, Ch_ Pauel is Lut*!r-
eseod in assu_tn,, tlmt this reqtdrflmc:ntwill not adw_rsely a_feeC
ground or crew safety. KSC is trying to mueL £h18 tttrnaround
requirement and assttme a safe vehicle through the use of the eomptt_er-
izod Launch Processll_g System (LPS). 11_addition, ground operations
are being designed to use proven techniques and optimize the level
of inspection while reducing subsystem level checkout time as per-
refinance confidence is achieved. Evolution of the 160 l,our turnaround
is shown in Figure 47.
Two of ninny nmnagement aids in respect to turt_around are
mentioned here because of their significance. The Shuttle Turnaround
Analysis _rottp (STAr;)chaired by KSC_ has been established as the
t;overnment-contractor t,._amresponslblt_ for Shuttle System inEegrated
_rogram turnaround allo_'ations and assessments. 'rht_system Integratlon
contractor (Rockx_cll International, ,qpace Division) assists KSC in
the evaluation of the eltuuent-lt.w_l reports and itnaiysis reports,
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pOl','4OItlll'l lO zl_llUl" pvopqr ¢Oltt?.'o] ol .,4l_lck_n_ pvocedm'_,.r.
V_L_'(OI'.'4 bellt,e, ¢on.rid_,t'e..I 11o_¢ It1 (ho _|l,,.4_,_,lt o|- (h(" ittob(]o t_|tlnch..,l"
I_ ].]n_'ltto o._hl|lt,'4t t'oboltD_] back it|_ _11(o Iho A|)il_'t' vl_h|l'Io
Solid R_'k_'t I_oo,'lie,|' _'._l_llt_l.
(d'_ i'hl' t'_'_(llil't'll1011(,_ tot" P,ivlo,ld Ilttbi|i_'_l]s,
,lilt'el.'4 01 t_'- :_h_'dditly.
LI_ 01l'bit_'l" I'hl't_lt_l| I_t'O(_'¢l i011 ,g_lb_'¢.rt_'l!l til_, pl'Ol_'_'(iOtl.
c._'., Ih,, p_vh_._d _'J_'.illl'ooIll I,h'ililv.
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4.0 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, OIIAI.ITY
4.1 System Design
For our purposes reliability (probability of failure), quality
(excellence in producing hardware/software), safety (freedom from
injury or loss) are all a part of the so-called "Risk b_anagement
System" or "Space Shuttle Assurance Program." These are obviously
i interrelated activities and as such are not covered separately in
this document.
The Space Shuttle risk management system _s built on prior manned
i flight program experience and modified to meet Shuttle requirements.
Safety analysis process is showla schematically in Figure 48. Each
of the element contractors and each ot the participating NASA Centers
i conduct its owls salety, reliability and quality programs. In addition,
tile Rockwell International Space Division ill Dowaley, California, as
tile system contractor_ conducts ;Ill integrated safety analysis oper-
ation. 'rile total Shuttle program requirements including reliability,
safety and quality are delineated illtile Level II program requirements'
tlocttments .IS("07700, VohslleS I-XVI1 I. Compliance with these require-
men[s [s further addrt.ssed ill numt+rolls do_umt, nl8. ]:or instatlCCj tile
approach to reliability is addressed ill Volume [, "bklster Verilicatton
Pl_lll. t' Vohlmes ll thron)'h V hilve lilt' l'equirt'lllt'lllS lot tile element
vt't'[I ical iOII plains. Illt' elenlelll veril icat ion; plans de,,_cribe tile way
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the requirements are to be met_ e.g. D test, analysis_ and inspection.
The specific plans covering reliability, quality and sa£ety are sub=
mitted by the element contractors to the appropriate project elements
in NASA for review and approval.
4.2 _laJorReviews
The major risks and uncertainties determined by various assess-
mcnt teams and permanent organizations are reviewed by management as
a part of their review system. The Preliminary Design Review for
Orbiter No. 102 and the Shuttle System Preliminary Design Review are
examples ot such events. Figure 49 shows that at the time of the
Orbiter 102 Preliminary Design Review twenty (20) subsystem failure modes
and effects analysis documents have been issued. These documents
covered 947 components in terms o[ possible failure modes and their
impact on Lh,e crew and mission.
The Safety A1_alysis Report indicated 200 Orblcer hazards and the
corrective actions being takcn. '[11[sanalysis cow, rs such situations
as: (1) Illness/injury/loss o[ personnel, (2) collislon/impact/eroslon,
(3) fire/explosion/implosion, (4) loss o1 or unsafe cnvlronnmnt, (5)
crash land[ng/dltcbi11_,.,and (O) loss ot flight control.
Hazard analysis is perlormed a[ th." subsystcm level and, in cases
where Failure H de Et[ect Analysis have identilicd critical items for
the Critical ]terns l.lst, the analysis is pcrloVn_'d [o a lower level
ot de(ail.
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The Critical Items List contains the single failure points and
criticality 31 items identified by the F_fl_A. Criticality 31 _e all
those items not having a potential effect on loss of life or vehicle
or loss of mission. They also meet one or more of the following cri-
teria: (1) redundant elements are not capable of checkout during
normal ground turnaround_ (2) loss of a redundant element is not
readily detectable in flight, or (3) all redundant elements can be
lost by a single credible event or cause.
4.3 Safety Analysis Process
The safety analysis process for the Shuttle program is being
implemented in the following basic steps: (1) _dentification of safety
concerns, (2) analysis of safety concerns for credibility and critlcality,
(3) initiation of Shuttle ha;:ard analyses_ and (4) tracking and closing
out Shuttle hazard analyses. Each ot these steps is described below.
4.3.1 Identification el Safety Concerns
A system salety concern is any dL.si£j_ or operational issue that has
a potential impact on personnel or hardware. The concern nuly be identi-
fied by any person or or>:ani.:ation on the progrtLm and must be dispo-
sitioned. For instance, lht-NVNt_I|I con(raclor_s sa|ety office re-
views tiiL'olt_lllu'nlconl_ilc_ogl_ |l_l.:_IrdAn_[lyses ilnd }:_EAIs [.O detc_int _
il a possible salety prohh,m n_ly propa_,_ate across elements ot the Shuttle
from i|n idell_ i ll_'d h;|.'ill'd or I_|i_llL't" OII ilny onL" e_t_men[.
Thc systJ.,m contl'_l_'lol"._ N.%It'IV ollice also review,_ the planned
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operations of the Shuttle for potenLial safety problems. This is to
be done for each mission phase. In addition there is a continuing effort
by Rockwell International's Space Division engineering and other groups
to identify other issues which have a safety implication.
4.3.2 #malysis at_ Resolution of Safet_ Cqncerns
i
Every safety concern identified to the system contractor's safety
office will be analyzed for credibility and criticality. Credibility
!
i means that there is a real possibility that the event may happen.Criticality means that, if the concern occurs, there would be personnel
injury, loss of the vehicle, or major damage to ground facilities. If
the concern is both credible and critical, then action has to be taken
to preclude undesirable consequences or minimize possibility of occur-
rence, If the concern cannot be resolved, management must review and
decide upon the risk to be accepted. Experience has shown that the
great majority of the safety concerns identified can be shown to be
not credible or critical.
4.4 Shuttle System Safety Concerns
Safety concerns as presented to thL' Panel during its b_y inspection
trip to the Space Division of Rockwell International are shown in
Table Xl.
_Ic hazards resulting from fluids used throughout the Shuttle
mission, with porticular rcferellcc to the fire and toxicity problems,
arc outlined in TebJ.e Xll. Only two phases of the mission would appear
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to be essentially clear of problems, the ascent and orbit periods. A
partial resolution of this prohle_ was to separate incompatible ,ma-
terials and environments by compartmentizing or sealing off of the
Orbiter where practical so there were no hazardous fluids in the
pressurized crew compartment. In addition to sealing off compartments D
an active purge, such as dry nitrogen gas_ is used to dilute the con-
centration of hazardous gases. Warning devices have been developed
to alert the crew and ground control. Contingency procedures at
launch pad and during mission will be formalized. Figure 50 depicts
this approach schematically.
The Orbiter flight vent and purge system described in Section 3.1
"Orbiter Element" to minimize the hazardous gas problem _s augmented
by the ground hazardous gas detection system designed and developed
by the KSC organization. This ground system has been defined and
the remaining major development items are the sensors for the cryogenic
and hyperbolic portions ot the system. For the cryogenic subsystem,
thesc are _ss spectrometer, electrochemical sensors, and portable hy-
drogen sensor. For the hypergollc subsystem these arc tlleportable
hypergollc sensor and the air oxidatkon chemistry analyzer hardware.
The flight system operation depends upon defining what is a hazardous fluid
condition. For example, dissassociation of l_,aked fluids must be known
for detection and ba;_ard assessment (K2t_ in htm_ld atmosphere forms
nitric acid) as well as antogenous Ig1_itlon _empcrature at altitude
157
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i (low pressures) for Orbiter fluids. 'lhese data will be obtained in
the com%ng months through a series at inhouse and contract activities.
i Current Status
1_ Panel requested that the following safety concerns _e dis-
cussed during their visits to both NASA (:enters and Contractors. Each
I of these concerns is presented below along with the current status at
the time of our review.
Solid Rocket Booster lh_nition Overpressure - Large over-pressures
on Orbiter and External Tank structures and surfaces may be imposed by
the booster exhaust shock-wave at ignition. The over-pressure wave
is assumed to reflect asy_m_etrically from the pad flame deflector
and travel up the vehicle, applying pitch plane loads. Tests are to
be conducted on a Shuttle model at b_FC to acquire valid pressure dis-
tributions and intensities. Resolution has been targeted for November
1975.
Unscheduled SSb_ Shutdown Duri1_ Boost - SSb_ design provides
internal, automatic shutdown mechanisms to achieve safe engine shut-
do_ when critical per[or_mnce parameters are not within tolerance re-
quirements. Investigation has sho_ that the remaining two engines
are necessary to achieve intact abort, and that a two-engine-out con-
ditiou may well result in vehicle loss. _e approach being studied to
resolve this concern is to hav_ a siugle engine shutdown inhibit or dis-
ablt_ the internal shut dora mechanisms t or tile two remainin_ main engines.
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This inhibit capability would be accomplished by sutonmtie electrical
"loekup" of the engine control valves in their last posltionj and
by incorporating an inhl Jit roll on the emergency shutdown solonoid.
Crew Rescue From Orbit - If for any reason the vehicle is unable
to return to earth from orblt_ no rescue capability exists during the
early flight test program, but a "rescue orbiter" would be available
during the operational periods. Various ideas are being explored
to achieve a rescue capability during the early flight test portion
of the program.
Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Mismatch - Booster thrust mismatch
can occur at any time during the burning period. The periods of greatest
concern are at liftoffp maximum dynamic pressure and ot the end of burn-
ing period (tailoff). During llftoff_ the specification lot the
Shuttle system calls for a maximum mismatch of 300,000 pounds. This
value appears conservative based on results of Titan IIIC statistical
analysis of ignition transient. Ignition transient is still being
evaluated by bLSFC/Thiokol/Rockwell for betLer definition of the time
mismatch action. _ae impact of a mismatch at the maximum "q" condition
is to add an additional load on thL, flight control system elements in
the yaw direction. The ShuttlL, structure and flight control system
has the capability to adequately account for such additional loads.
The Booster tailoff thrust di[ferentlal indicates that a 710.O00
pound mismatch is controllablt, with normal co, trol capability. The
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710K value has been _,._l:ahlisiled:is art, qulrement whlci_ _curtl about
ll!i seconds after iynitiu11, llowever, Whet] Boo,Let nogz|e aeFuator
or SSNE engines fail the separations el tile lloo_ter from th,: _./.garnal
Talik is delayed for up to 4 .leeond.q t ts reduce the misnglteh thrust and
provide acceptable separation conditions. 'l_le extellt of tilt, control
capability that can be exerted during tailoff continues t,* be studied
to assure adequate flight control and separation ability.
6.5 Orbiter Safet_ Concerns
Orbiter Structural E_ements
Structural deformation may prevent emergency egress from crash
landings. Orbiter 102, to be used for £irst orbital flights, has
added overhead escape panels which are used in conJunetiou with
ejection seats_ but the panels will remain after ejection seats are
removed. There is a current study to ascertain tile value of usillg
the overhead hatches on all Orbitcl.',_. The ability to compartmentize
or isolate ha:ardous fluids is dLsc_tsscd in the fire/toxicity section
above, There must be con[illuotls control to assu_'e that hardware
assigned to the "structures" category does not illclude items similar
to the Skylab meteroid shicld.
t_oor ..___
'11%e major poilu is that durin!', entry all doors must be closed.
[1 the !_ilylodd doors do ilot c[o:_t, [hell the crew mtt.qt rise EVA arid
,qecut'e them. I_lerc dre t'on[ illnftl*., stttdit, s ell t, limtnat ion tit doors
v--
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and methods of ;l_surlng their propt*r positioning throughout tile
mlasioo.
Payload Retest ion
Payloads must be adequately constrained during nornml or abort
landings to avoid damage to tht, crew.
'thermal Protection S_stem
This has been covered in detail in Section 3.
Hydraulics
Loss of flight control due to failure el single actuators which
are used for eleven control was studied by Rockwell International and
NASA. They accepted the risk of being ix_volveg in relying upon a
single actuator.
Election Seats
The possibility el collision betwern the ejection seats following
ejection is under evaluation at this time.
Orbital Naneuverin_ Subsystem
Large quantities of OHS propellant requires that it be managed
to assure proper center of _;rnvity conditions during, nominal and abort
trajectories. Orbiter aerodynamics analysis and _lss properties
analysis are being, performed to tletcrmitw allowable residual pro-
pcllaot quantities _lllt] till' quantities to br dumped. 21sis work is
expected to continu,' through tht' nc×t Liscal year with resolution
at the t,l_tl ,Jl Ih,it t imc.
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Data Procesl_ln K Sysrera (Softwaro)
Gellorie !;ufl:wltre errors IIIlly IIt)l be (|el oel ed tn I lit' tlolll ware v{,ri-
fl¢'_|l ion prod, ram based on prior t,xp_.riollCe Jn Ihi!; area. h study t s
under way to delei'mine Ihe de!_ree ol degradation dne [u (.×peeled errors
alld poa,ible wt}rk-aronlldS to ln_l_n[a_n operal toual t'oll|rt*l.
Ilydro_en Fire I)urin_ Rrl.S Abort
During the return to land[n£ site abort a hydro|..en eoncenlration
is expected to exist iu the wake of tile Orbiter. '['lielocation of the
exhaust, vent, and dump locations are a safety concern.
Landing/Decelerat ion Subsystem
The Panel has questioned the ability of the landing gear gravity
deployment system to support the Orbiter l.anding trajectory (altitude,
time, distance). What is the basis Jot confidence iu the reliability
of the free-fall system that landing gear will be in the dovm and locked
position? When working properly [s there su[ticient timc to achieve the
down and locked position prior to t:ottehdo_? What contingency phms
are available if the landing )'.ear system dot, s not operate properly?
Becaust. of the Panel's interest in this area a briel description
ol the gear units aud doors and their operation during landing pro-
vided here Ior a better under.qtatldin!t ol the above three questions.
Figure:_ 51 and 52 show lilt! nose )_t'arlind main ),.ear tl_St;l[[atiol_.
The nose gear retracts forward and up in the forward fuselage,
and the main gear retracts forward slid up into tile Wing. The weight
]b2
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of the nose gear system is about 1300 pounds and the individual main
gear about 2500 pounds. Crew selection of landing gear "down," after
the arm switch has been selected, accomplishes two functions for the
nose gear. It energizes the landing gear selector valve_ porting
pressure to he down-side of the nose gear strut accuator and the
down-side of the uplock release actuator. In addition, a redundant
pyrotechnic backup system is sequenced to release the uplock, if the
primary hydraulic system fails to operate in a "short" period of time.
There is only one primary hydraulic power system configuration for
the nose gear operation. The gear then "free falls" from the wheel well,
there by driving the mechanically linked doors open. Aided by weight
and aerodynamic effects, the gear should reach the full down position
and be locked i_ position by _he action of a spring loaded bungee.
The motion of the gear before locking down will be damped by an oil
snubber to prevent any damage to the locking linkage. Down pressure
to the strut actuator aids in he extension eyelej but in the event hy-
draulic power should be lost, it is not required to extend or lock the
gear down. Gear do_loek and gear/door uplock switches provide cock-pit
indication of gear position. The extension cycle is designed to be
accomplished at all velocities up to and including 300 knots within
a time limit not to exceed 10 seconds.
The main landin_ gear extension cycle is identical to the nose
_ear with the iollowing exception, in place o[ the backup pyrotechnic
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rl'¢'].t'_ttlqHy_Li.qn s [wo _[dd|t io|lR]- _t,t't_Itd_tL'yhydL';l_.t_|c !ly:_L_,q1_,lt'_'l_Ftl-
V[d_'d It)t" lilt' Itl_ILltk L'_']¢'_t,_¢' ,le'ttt_tIOt'. '|'ht'v'oIOl'_'_ tFt'W ,_t'lottJoII OI
],_llt_.lJll}_)_J>_|t"HLIOWLIH |10t'(:_ ¢|J.)WIIi)l'_.'S:;tlt¢' it'otll tii_' }_).'itll;tL'yhydt'ztttlJJ.'_tLttil
It_ LIlt" _LYIII {ll'ltt_ttOL" _[lld ill I.|tL" up].O_'K t'L']._'_t_;_' ,l¢itt_t(Ol.'. II .'lhOtl].d b_'
Ill, it'd [h_l[ _ttly _HL¢' Lll tilt' i|l['l't _ .'4y._tt'lll,'4 [.'4 ,'4t|lil¢[t'it[ LO t'¢'lt'_l.'4t' l|l_'
itlld _lt't'Odyl_Zllltit" _'llt'_'l.'4 O11 Hl_.'L'O [_l[[ _ _,_'_lt" _11%' .'4tit LJ._'[t'llt lot" _.t'zl_
t'XIt'll.'_Jt)lt ill1{| |.Lit'kin}', VJ_l _1 ,'41_|'111}: LIL||t)_t,l, .
'l'ht,L't, i,_ ,111At|lOP,lilt| _y::It,_11tlILt'l't,lt't"_qilil iht" L,llltllll,S_ )_,¢'_lr,'{y,'_ll'nl
wili¢i1 h_t_ IIOI lit'i'll Ill[ly dt't illL'd _l,g _'t't. tl_)t'l'_ll io1| OI Lilt' _',q;IZ'. dttritl) _,
lht" |.|lIlt|hI)', O|_¢'t'_lliOIl_ i_ _|t'iLl_llt't[ ,1:_ I_ttL" _t_ ].4 _¢'_'Otlt|s b¢,lor_., IottcItdov/l|.
l'_|tttt_l| }_L'Lll" ¢'xtt't_,'iiotl _.'_ ,|L'illt'v_'d |)_¢ I|l{' pilot l]ll'O_ill_', cl }'L'_tl" c':'_lt'l_lio|l
.'-lwilci| _lil['_." ||_" se'_'.g ,t [i._',iti OIl Iht' disPl_ty l)_l||t'].. It i,_ cxp_'cl_'d Ltl
||it_ :\|llO_{|l|t|_'_IL_lll Ill,It L|It' _lUlO]._llld I|_|L'd|¢,tL't'WtlllJ.d _IL't'om]ILJsh thL _
._|lllt' _|t'L [t_ll .|l .|botli I||L" .S_HtIt" t iltlt'. '|'lit" pL'Ob]-t'|tl t|l_'lt iS obvious. _'/ILh
it I_l)_[|tlttlll Lit it'll ,'{t'C_l_d:_ _ll]_.'_'d tof Iht" )'.¢'ii1" It) _',_ il_io Ih_, do_411 illld
[tlt-k_,,t| |)O}Lil |tlll ,Itld lil_" .let 1Otl it|ii [.il[t'd ,gOlllt' I.'_ !{t'_'tl|ld,_ bt'lol't" LOtlci_"
11j_'ttl_'lll , I'ht't'e'it_l't'_ lilt' |'t'|i,|bililY ol lit' ,_b','_lt'ill Illtl,_l |)t"V¢'I'_' L'].O,_¢'
tO It}it I_'l't't'l_i dill'it|)'. I_l_ll I,I flt't'OIItl It) !_t't'tll_d pt't'lod pt'iof to
[OIl_'|ldt)Wl_ t)t" !_Otllt' .lilt'Ill,lit' _lt'liOl_ c,ll_dbilily tort.st b_' _Ul_pllt'd ,l_t)l|}_
|¢ilh ,I loll!'._'r p_'liod to ,l_'lli_'w' do|ell ,Itttj lot'k_'d }',1'_11"!_.
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4.t_ R_lnSe Slltety
Current requirements have established tilt, range ,aafety system as
an add-on unit only for tile desi_;n_ development, test and engineering
flights. The baseline system is shown in Figures 53 and 54. Thtu
system is still under discussion between NASA and the Air Force.
Ba,qically, tile range surety system ix required to provide for: (1)
safety el _tves and property, both on the _xround and in flight, (2)
External Tank propellant dispersion, and (3) proteet ioB against overt/co-
vert destruction of the vehicle and against "false ala_ls" due to electro-
r_lgnetic interf.ereu¢o or spurious si_Inals.
lssues under study at this time include the tollowint_:
(a) External Tank propellant dispersion lind their impact
on Orbiter OISFt'._.
(b) Crew election seal inhibit which inhibits ran_,,e salety
system operation. Adequat¢" ploet'dllr_ll s_lle_Xtlards and t_me delays
appc_tr ilceessary to s_tximl._t, _l.qtroltltu! surviwtl it tlt,$trtlet lit'lion
is required.
,_ (c) SbuttiB}: down el Ihc t)rbtter's tmlin ent',il_es upon re-
t't, lp[ o1 tilt, t'atl_',e S_llt, ty dt'slt'ti_'t svslcm at'nl SI_XtIal.
(d_ hllli_'ht sillill!,, el tht' _siltt' ,Ind _Irm't device by tilt'
ill'hi I t'l" _o I I l¢iil'e.
(t') el lilt' s_llt' ,IBtl dr'VIce
_kltli t O1"IllS" to prevent in-
,Ith't,l'lltltl ,_,lll. ll_', t_I lilt" I,IlD',t' ,';,lit'IV dt,:_!rtlt*l dt'vitt'.
lh5
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that they are required to assure _terials compatibility withi_ the
context of their use.
(d) ASTM test methods are applied as required.
(e) MIL Handbook No, 5, 17, 23.
Material selection lists are developed based on experience and
known material compatibility with specific environments. There are
also fracture control and material control plans. Each element con-
tractor has developed its own metals nonmetals processed which have been
reviewed by and approved by NASA.
The Space Division, Rockwell International Corporation, as the
Shuttle system contractor_ has developed a materials' tracking and con-
trol system called "_IATCO." While they do not control the us_ of
materials on the Shuttle elements_ they do bring material usage which
they feel £alls outside the set requirements to the attention of the
: NASA/JSC project office for further action. In addition 9 materials-
conscious personnel participate in the Panel antiworking; group activities
as well as in the reviews conducted on Shuttle elements and subsystems.
life Panel will continue to review this question of decision making on
materials' acceptauce during future reviews at various contractor andl
NA,_ sites.
The "HATCO" system _oted above coutains pertinent data on both
I" melals and non-metals, generates emterial sele¢lion lists, conlalns
! osa)_,e data on --- _¢hal materials are used, where uscd, quantily, re-
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su!ts of u_age evaluatlonj deviation status where there is a devlaLi.on
from accepted use, and finally the system generatos output reports to
permit certification of the acceptability [or a given configuration
usage.
The "_IATCO" system on the Orbiter has been implemented since the
first drawing release. Associate contractors for other elements of
the Shuttle program are currently encoding the data and it is
expected that element contractor data outputs may start about January
1976. Payload coverage is under discussion at this time.
4.8 }'allure _ode and Effects Analysis (FblEA)
Elements of the Shuttle system and the interfaces beteen elements
are sub._ected to detailed FblEA's. In addition to the F}_'_Adocuments
there are Critical Items Lists (CIL's_, llazards Lists, Shuttle Hazard
Analyses forms (SIIA's), and Safety Analysis Reports (SAR's). Taken
together they provide a systematic means of assuring nothing, in so far
as possible, "falls into the craek." 111ey provide lot early Identi-
ticat ion and resolution of potential problem areas, support design
revit.ws, provide manag_'ment visibility, and establishes a documented
baselim, to facilitate hazard/risk/safety problem resolution. In
additiou this work p ovidt.s a basis lot t.stablis!lln_% mandatory
tt'st and inspectiou poit_ts tmdt, r [bt, t,ktality Control Program and
provtdt.s vaLll,tl>h, input [or tilt mait_tainability pt'oFraul lot Shuttle.
Tilt, priority or levt'l ol t'rilit,llity uul|lher t_ysleltt is |.n use_
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as it has been in prior manned programs. The listing is provided for
information:
Criticality Category De_finiticn (Potential Effect)
1 Loss of life or vehicle, including loss
or injury to the public.
2 Loss of mission, including post-launch
abort and launch delay sufficient to
cause mission scrub.
3 All others (structural or TPS type
elements are not classified in any of
these above categories if they meet the
margin o[ safety requirements).
31 Criticality 3 items which meet one or
more of the following categories:
(a) Redundant elements are not cap-
able o[ checkout during normal turn-
around.
tb) Loss of a redundant element is
not readily detectable in llight.
(c) All rcdundaut elements cat_ be
lost by a single credible event or cause.
I
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5.O TEST PROGRAHS
5.1 Verification Plans
A Shuttle Master Verification Plan (JSC 07700-10-_VP-OI Rev. A)
establishes the requirements and plans to certify the Shuttle system
ready for operational use. Since much of the program's confidence
will be based on test requirements and resultsj the Panel has reviewed
tileevolution of the ground and flight test program Including the im-
pact on crew safety of changes in requirements.
5.2 Ground Tests
in most ot the preceding sections o[ this report there have been
discussions of test programs as they applied to tilespecific develop-
ment of subsystem components_ such as the tiles [or the Orbiter Thermal
Protection Subsystem. "_le ground tests discussed here are those termed
"nEIjor ground tests." Such t__,sts inw_lve a combination of system
elements aud complex facilities. "lqwmajor ground test programs are
outlined ill Figure 55.
The ground vibration test pr,wram verifies load. vibration,
Ilntter_ and flight control system aualysis. Vibration testing is
i_eVtOVll|t'd Oll ;! one-qoztrter scale ,;brittle nlodel _tnd on the liquid
OXy_;t'll tank portioll el tilt, External 'I'd|ilk, The lirst Orbiter will also
he suhiected to a hori.:ontal vibration (est at till' PiIhltdalt' Assembly
l:acility as a part ot the vehicle ,'heckonl. l_IrmaJ_,r lull scale
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Space Shuttle vertical vibration tests are planned to be carried out
at the Marshall Space Flight Center to study the vibration modes of
the total assembled Space Shuttle vehicle, Recent changes in the
ground vibration test (GVT or MGVT) include:
(a) Deletion of component ground vibration tests on the Orbiter
wing, Orbiter vertical fin, and other components.
(b) Delay of the quarter-scale model testing for slx-monchs,
(c) Compression of the mated vertical ground vibration tests
to a six months time period,
The vibro-acoustic test program verifies the predictions about
the dynamic response of the structure and internally mounted equip-
ment to engine noise and vibration, aerodynamic buffeting and aero-
dynamic noise. Wind tunnel tests of models have been used to de-
termlne the aerodynamic noise pressure levels. Scale model tests
of the total Shuttle stack are being used to predict the launch en-
vironment and its impact, Full scale tests of a major segment of
the Orbiter are to be conducted in the vibro-acoustle test facility at
JSC. Recent changes in this test program include the deletion of the
forward fuselage vibro-acoustie test.
The _k_in Propulshm System test program uses the three main
engines mounted on a simulated aft section of the Orbiter, together
with tlleExternal Tank, and includes all necessary plumbing and con-
trois. POGO suppression hardware will be supplied for installation as
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the te_ts progress to substantiate the technique used to suppress
the longitudinal vibrations peculiar to PO60. These propulsion tests
will also provide additional vibration and acoustics information.
Recent test program changes include the deletion of the vertical
firing attitude_ deletion of flight disconnects from the "T-O Umbilical"
and an increase in firings from 14 to 15.
The Orbiter avionics components and their related software and
l
| hardware interfaces will be tested at the Rockwell International
I Space Division's Avionics Development Laboratory. The Avionics
|
Development Laboratory is an engineering tool with emphasis on de-
velopment support, subsystem evaluation and initial hardware inte-
gration. Test results are aimed at:
(a) Demonstrating line replaceable unit [unctions for all
those pieces o[ hardware that fit that category.
(b) Developing the single-string data processing system
[tmct ions.
(c) Avionics compatibility with automatic ground checkout
equ ipreent.
(d) Progressive tcsti|lg and combining of subsybtems until
they simulate a [light control system with computer inputs and control
actuator outputs.
The ShuttLe Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIl,) established
a( ,ISC will contluct aviollics systems interpreted testie_ in support ot7
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the Approach and Landing Tests (ALT), Vertical Flight Tests (VFT),
and operational mission phases. Integrated testing includes both
open-loop and closed-loop testing. Open-loop testing will integrate
and verify the avionics system compatibility and redundancy manage-
ment techniques; closed-loop testing will integrate the avionics
hardware and software systems and verify that they are capable of
performing each flight phase of the mission. Thus the SAIL is a central
facility where the avionics and related hardware (or simulations of the
hardware), on-board ground support software, flight software, flight
procedures, and associat_l GSE will be fully integrated and verifi-
cation tested. Figure 56 shows the Shuttle avionics systems which are
to be tested on SAIL.
Another facility supporting the avionics test program is the Soft-
ware Development Laboratory (SDL). The purpose of this facility is to
accomplish flight software development and flight software independent
verification.
Static structural tests are plannea for major structures on all
Shuttle elements. A full-sized Orbiter airframe structural test
article (STA) will be tested at Palmdale to determine if it can with-
stand the design limit and ultlmate loads. In addition, it will be
subJec:ed to fatigue loeading up to 400 cycles to assure structural
integrity. An Orbiter crew module test article, which is the pressur-
[;_etl crew compartment segment el the Orbiter, will be tested in a
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manner similar to the _tatt.c test arllcle men[loncd ._bow,.
The External Tank structural program |nclnde_ a strt, etura|
test article consisting of flight:-t_pe liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen tanks and intertaak, Tests will be emlducted t.o verify
structural integrity at limit and ultin_lte loads and to detensiae
tht_ liquid oxygen tank model characteristics necessary to deter-
mining the all-up Shuttle vehicle structural characteristics.
Solid Rocket Booster and Solid Rocket Hotor structural tests
will be conducted, as will hot lirto_,s to verity their structural
integrityj support development of the rocket motor case and verJfy
ballistic per fermance.
Recent test program changes haw, delerred the crew module
structural test_ deferred tile airtrame structural test_ eliminated one
iotertank structural test article tt'om Lhe External Tank program_ de-
terred tile Solid Rockel Booster stru.-tural test and deleted the booster
lirst developme,t It.tin:,.
Tilt. Orbiter thermal vacuum test proprams on tile forward luselage_ aft
fuselage, and ONS/RCS p,,d have been deleted. "lilt" imp_lct of deleting the
major gl",)tlnd thermal vacnum It, st hits beelx subject to study by both ,ICS
_txtl Rockwell ll_ternation_tl ov¢'r tht' past lew months. "lllt' following
rt.su|ls stem Item these stutlLt, s bttt nuls[ b_. cot_s|dert.d i.i1 lig|ll of
,idditi.oo;tl illol't' det(li[t.d work now ill I_t'o_res._:
(I} I'hvrv i:; i|n obvions rt,qttlretl|_,lH Ior tli_',hl test da.a.
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(h) There will be no off-limit or off-nominal testing to any
degree.
(c) There will be no physlcal pre-flight data on temperater,,
effect of subsystem operation on tileintegrated vehicle.
(d) There will be some restructuring nf the certification/
validation program to include additional component and subsystem testing.
(e) Requlre_er:t:_ for additional develoralent flight and op-
erational Lllgh_ instrumentation requirements will have to be determined.
(f) Mission planning will have to pay more attention, in the
early flights, to beta angle variations, tlme required for temperature
stabillza_ion.
(g) Conservative attitude conscralnts will b_ necessary on
the early orbital flights.
Test article fidelity has always been a problem in extrapolating model
tests and full size ground tests up to the actual flight hardware and
how it operates in its real environment. Tile ability Co extrapolate
from ground test activities to flight operations depends upon the degree
to which the teat articles resemble the flight artic]es. A Flight
Readiness Firing test (FRF) will functionally verify the integrated
shuttle system vehicle, launch complex and operating procedures and titus
demonstrate the mat-rity and readiness of the shuttle syst_:m for first
manned vertical flight.
The Soltd Rocket Booster/l:xternal Tank separation system test end
the Orbiter/External Tank Sel>aratlt>ntests are two major tt,sts deft_rred
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itn fl.tght test program. The verif'Jeatitm logic In showll In figure 57.
The panel has madt, a point of repeal t,dly aN_.lllg if data wPre hying lost
from ground tests it,at would be llS¢'l+ttl tO OUr basir< t.,t COllfldenc+: Ill
crtPw +afet_ durl.nI4 _2ar].y flight'_.
The an,qwers given wt, rt,: "Nil tt,:_tt; are being conducted dltrtnkI tht,
Approach and Landing l'¢:at and Orb:l tel Flight Test programs which affect
crew satety that have no counterpart in the ground teat program. .
All elements and maneuvers of the flight test program have counterparts
in either ground tests, slmulatlons, or analysis."
5.3 _ Test Progra E
The flight test program has two umJor subdivisions: The Approach
and Landing Test Program (ALT) and the Orbital F.lJght Tests (OFT). These
flight tests complement tile ground test program described previously and
the ALT is planned to cormnence in mid-1917 using the Boeing 747 carrier
aircraft, and the OFT is planned to commence in mid-1979.
5.3.1 Approach and Landing Te2Lt_\am__
Tile Orbiter vehicle 101 (the first off the line) is Lilt, prtmaw
vehic',e planned for tile AI,T and is coniigured to include the equiprqent
necessary to evaluate vehJclt, approach, landing Slit! deceleration re-
quirements dictated by the terminal phase of the operational mission.
The design of Orbiter 101 is sm:h that minimum modifications are re-
quired to convert tt to the opt, ratJtmal conflgurattoll.
The A|,T program is designed to progre:m from test: conditions that
I 7h
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provide the greatest marglnA of safety to test conditions duplieatlng
those expected on the flrat Orbital Flight Test landing. The ALT pro-
gram is comprised of two flight test phases!
Phase i - Inert Orbiter/747 mated teats to verify satisfactory
airworthiness of mated vahlclea for supporting orbiter free flight tests.
Phase 2 - Manned Orbiter captive fllghts to develop Orbiter release
profile and Orbiter free flight and landing data.
Durlng ALT the Orbiter is flown without any propulsive power. With
the current capabilities of the Orbiter/747 combination, the maximum
attainable altitude appears to be somewhat less than 28,000 feet, and
with the loss in altitude which is said to occur during the release
period the Orbiter would appear to be in free-fllght starting at about
20,000 to 24,000 feet. TLese tests are to be conducted in the area
surrounding the Flight Research Center, Edwards, California.
The status of the two phase ALT test plan is:
PHASE I -
(a) The extent of the initial Taxi tests of the mated
Orbiter/747 at Palmdale ha_ not been fully defined as yet.
(b) The planning for ALT is being done by PRC, Rockwell and
Boeing. Th.'v will define the requirements under the review of the
Orbiter Project Office at JSC. These requirements will appear in the
Approach and Landin_ Test Requirements Document. The actual flight tests
ne_,ded to meet these requlrements wi]] then be developed by the same team.
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They will appear in the ALT Mission (}hJeettves Docom,nt.
(c) Tile actual test program will Is, constructed tn a manner
that will permit the achievement of objectives to get to the manned
Orbtter release point with it minims.., number of flights and flight hours.
(d) The ALT manager is from JSC and tile assistant manager is
from the FRC. Tile testa are conducted for the ALT manager hy the FRC
flight test team and during these operations the FRC flight test control
room will be utilized to control the flights.
(e) The )47 test instrumentation system is designed and
installed by the same team. It will be compatlble with the FRC test
control and data reduction facilities. Data reduction and analysis by
FRC is conducted with JSC support and the same tapes and other data are
forwarded to JSC for their independent analysis.
(f) It is expected that during tills phase of the program that
Fvrry configuration flight tests will be conducted io parallel on a
non-inter feren¢o [_;Isl[ S.
PIiASE 2 -
(a) Phase 2 hvgtns at the comph'tton of the inert Orbiter/747
testing. The curxent baseline com_tsts ol elew'n Orhtter free flights,
st arttng with pt lot-control led landing serics (5 fl lght _) ; autoland
landing demom;tratton ( _ fl lghts) ; and f inishlnt4 wtth weight/e.g.
e:,velope tnve_tigatlol_s (I |llghls). "l'he.'_e frvl.-flights are b_.tng
:;|lUCtoFl'd |O /l|lOW e;llly tt'l'_l[ll;ll [Oll o| the pl'O}_lilm or _o skip
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individual flights if testing shows the data are not required. DUring
tile initial portion of this phase, tile manned Orbiter captive flights
are held to a minimum necessary to develop the release (techniques).
(b) The flight test team is to be headed by a JSC test con-
ductor and co_Jrtsed prit,clpally of JSC and Rockwell flight control
personnel, The control of the flights will be from the JSC control
room with a teat liaison group stationed at FRC, It is expected that FRC
wlll supply _xperienced aerodynamic fllght controllers to the JSC control
center.
(c) The planning, including requirements and flight test
details, are established and developed by the NAgA/Rockwell team under
the auspices of the Orbiter Project Office at JSC. The free-flight teat
program is developed spcciflcally by the Flight Operation Division of
JSC and becomes a part of the ALT Mission Objectives Document.
The baseline fllght test program as provided to the Panel at the
time of its review and inspection visits shows 14 carrier/orblter inert
flights; 5 carrier orbiter active flights to refine separation techniques
and to do integrated ,',ystemstesting, and 11 orbiter free-fllghts.
Table Xlll is a furthez exphmation of the Orbiter Free Flight Program
at this time.
(;iven its special i_/ercs/ Ill the complex avionics system used on
[-_ the Oz'bi£cr the Panel asked a number of questions reKardlng flight con-
trol ilVJnllics support of I'll,' AI.T pro[:r;im. The .tony ground tests con-
t
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ducted prior to flight will 3ive a basis for confidence in the avionics
subsystems used on the ALT program. In addition, the orbiter wlll con-
tain an "all-up" fall operational/fall safe flight control avionics
subsystem wlth a dedicated backup flight control aubeyste_u and a backup
air data nose boom system. At the same time the ground support group
will have the support of Shuttle Avionics Integrated Laboratory,
Software Development Laboratory, and the Avionics Development Laboratory
available.
5.3°2 Shuttle Trainin_ Aircraft
The Shuttle Training Aircraft is a Grumman Gulfstream II turbojet
aircraft modified to provide an _nfllght simulation of Orbiter perfor-
mance and flying rharacteristics in the Terminal Area Energy Operations,
The purpose of this training program using the modified Gulfstream II
is for pilot training and the development and verification of procedures.
The simulation system consists of a specially constructed and progranm_ed
simulation computer and necessary inertial sensor systems. The displays_
controls, radio, navigation systems are essentially Orbiter Hardware.
The simulation capability is as follows:
(a) Altitude - 43,000 feet to simulated touchdown
(b) Airspeed maximum of 350 knots or Nach number of 6.8
(c) Payload of 5600 pounds
(d) Orbiter modes slmulatlon for nutomatlc landing systems/control
stick stei:rlng and backup systems
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(o) Turbulence and wind cond_tiona expected to apply to Orbitel
opt, rations
5.3.3 Orbital Flisht Tests
The culmination of tilt' flight test program occurs with tile manned
Orbital flight, a progrma currently encompassing a sequence of six manned
flights. The first orbital flight is designed to be short and benign
to demonstrate basic flight worthiness. A decision was reaclled by senior
NASA management to proceed with the design and development ot the manned
first flight only after prolonged and detailed study of tile manned versus
unmanned options. A review of tile decision will be conducted etghteeu
months prior to tile first: orbital flight. A surmnary of tile manned vs.
unmanned study provided to the Panel is _;iven below:
(a) Recovery of tile Orbiter on _very flight is required for
orderly continuation of tile flight test program.
(b) Flight expt,rtt, uce ._llow._ many cases _'llere tilt" prest-nce of
crew saved tile mission from failure.
(c) The crew role ill the shuttle t:_ identical to that ill
aircraft and spacecraft test operation_; howt'vert crew capability ill
some areas _f tilt. shuttle design conct, rns is vt.ry limited.
(d) blauned l_lndlngs can be rrulde at :lltcrnale sites tll the
event of dispersed t,ntry conditions or .utLolnatlc system f:ltlurl', t'apa"
bJltty of crew to deal with t'ont|ngeul'|e:: provhle_ gre;iter e;afl, ly lot
the population ill till' lantltllg ill'I'll=
I I,ql
, , i
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(e) The ground test program has been constructed to give
confidence that design concerns have been acceptably minimized prior to
th_ first orbital flight, manned or unmanned.
(f) Tailoring of the first vertical flights to improve safety
,J
margins will be accomplished as practical for either manned or unmanned
flight tests.
(g) Abort and ejection capabilities are consistent with
i
} aerospace testing precedents, that is they cover many but probably not
i all foreseeable failure possibilities.
|
(h) Comltment to unmanned flight implies a successful
Approach and Landing Test Autoland program as a prerequisite.
(i) Unmanned capability requirement can be reinstated later
if unforeseen circumstances demand.
The early development Orbital flights will be launched from the KSC
site and will land at Edwards Air Force Base. These flights are to be
under the control of the JSC Hission Control Center once 'Ift off is
achieved. Depending upon the progress achieved in the early flights,
there is a good chance that the fifth or sixth flight will both launch
and land at the KSC site.
The contingency planning and design for abort conditions during the
flight test program will continue to be of great interest to the Panel.
This is true for both the Orbital and ALT programs. The Panel, for
instance, is interested in plans to assure that requirements of abort
operations and system capabilltles are compatlhle.
182
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6.0 SYSTE_IS INTEGRATION
6.] General Ob|octlves
The management of the integration effort has been covered in
earlier sections of this report. This section is meant to identify
the technical challenges of integrating the elements at this point
in the Panelts review.
An example of the many technical areas that must be managed to
assure that the Shuttle elements work together are:
Flight Performance
Load and Structural Dynamics
Flight Control
Integrated Avionics
Integrated Propulsion/Flulds
Mechanical Systems
Ground Operations
Major Integrated Ground Tests
Computel Systems and Software
Systems Engineering
Safety, Reliability and Qeallty Assurance
Payload Accommodations
TileHaln Propulsion System i_ used here to illustrate the complexlty
of the relationships between components found in various elements which
form single end-to-end integrated systems. Other areas to be examined
by tilePanel include electrical system and avionics system.
183
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BID 6,2 S_stems lnt_l_ration Challenges
Some of the challenges the program must resolve ot_ the Space
lid
Shuttle System are:
Flight Performance Margins
i Induced Loads
Ice/Frost Shedding
SRB/ET/Orbiter SeparationP
i POGO SuppressionForebody drag
B
Many of these challenges have been discussed in the section of the
report on the various program elements.
6._ Operations
The Orbiter is designed to carry a crew of up to seven including
crew and scientific personnel. On a standard mission s the Orbiter can
remain in orbit for sevel_ days. t_ilc it is planned that an Orbiter
would bt. readied for another flight in fourteen calendar days, the
Shuttle can l>e readied for a rescut, mission launch from a standby
status within twenty-four hours alter notification. For emergency
rescue_ the cabin can accommodate as many as ten persons so that all
the occupants of a disabled Orbiter could be rescued.
Space Shuttle op,,rations consist ot IOtlr basic phases:
(a) Lilt-eli to orbit i._scrtion
(b) On-orbit operat ions
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(c) Ik,-orbit to landing
(d) (;round turnaround to prepare for the next flight
Operational constraints have been discussed in previous por-
tions of this report under each of the element.s of the Shuttle system
as well as in the reliability, quality and safety sections. The Pan-
el's interest continues to focus upon the ability of the nominally
designed hardware to meet the contingency situations which can occur
durtng flight test and operational phasee of the program. We will
monitor the evolution of the launch rules and the mission rules gov-
erning both test and operational [lights. We will also monitor such
safety challenges as (a) intact abort capability, (b) contingency
abort capability, (c) payload accolmuodatfons, (d) day and night oper-
ations, (e) mission control center requirements, (f) post landing
thermal conditioning, and (g) I'_VAoperations.
b.4 _kain Propulsion System
The Hain Propulsion System integraLes tile Space Shuttle Main
Engille (SS_E)_ E.'.itertlai Tank (ET), and the interconnecting plumbing
and controls wiLhin the body of tile Orbiter. The subsystems that
rake tip the rlg'tin propulsion symptom are:
(a) Propellant feed
(b) Propellant till and drain
(c_ I:ngin¢ prestart propellant conditioning
(d) !]l' pt't, ssttvi.:atfotl and preprvssuri,:atiolt
185
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(e) Helium ._Ior_ige and distri,,utlon
• (f) Propellant man_,em_:tlt
(K) SSME GN 2 purge usln), >:round supply
0l) PO(;O suppression
(i) Electrical instrumentation, controls, and displays
A schematic of this system is sho_ in Figure 58. The selected
pOGO suppressor system is shown in Figure 59 and the workings of the
POC,O Integration Panel are shown in Figure 60.
The _$ain Propulsion System has been desi_,ned to meet the fall-
safe criteria. 'flus, [or example, loss of one main engine during
ascent would still permit the crew to abort a Mission 3A as follows:
0-250 seconds .............. suborhltal powered return to
launch site
250-330 seconds ............ abort once around
330 - main engiue cutoll ... mission completion
Shutdown o[ two of tilt,main enf,iues will result in loss o[
the Orbiter for a ,Kljorily o| missiou phases during tile cscent.
I'revalves_ till valve.s, and disconnect valves are ;Ill designed
to remain iu the last actuated posit_on, in the event o! loss of
pnnt,matie pr,,ssure [o the valvL, ;k.luator_ or loss el plectrical
power to the controllin}, solenoid wdves. Pneunmtic pressure is
continuously applied to these va]ves dutin) t their critical function
period, to turtht, r nssul'e thvtr lemil[nin_,, in the desired pos|tion.
186
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I_. !) ._tstmaztr y..
Tilt, P_mt ,1- hat{ p.'_;inlitit, d .3 p_,l'tion (_1 lilt' t,l'loFtt4 +2ondticl:t,d ill
Ji|lt_I+,l_;tt[lly. ,h_' l_l,l] +_hltll].¢ .qyr;l_.nl durJlD t, the. pa_t l't.p¢_rtJll)., period.
With Ih_. COlnph, t i+m +)t tilt + PreLiminary lie, sign Rt, vl+e'.+.'+ It+r earh o+" Ih+,
¢'h!lntHll_ +llitl th," .';pat'e Shutth, Syst_Lm_ lilt' P;|ll+,l t+'/tIl b_t. lt, r undt, r-
l;|_ + ;I l.+¢'vit'xq Ol lht' [lllt'gl:+_Itt, d .'4y.++ltqll.+4W|li¢'h _+'t'O,'4,q t)Vt't" eleBl¢,ll[ [II-
It'l'l;l_'i.',q sltIch its tilt' t, lectrical syst_,m, ar.d thL, mt+ntiont, d l_lln Pro-
I)U ls i.tm Sysl_em.
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191)8 (P1, 9()-117_ 91)111 (iOIIl_l'_+H_ l _ l;lill, ll)_, ]/1)), Ill ;Id,lil hm, Ih_'
I)iiii1'1 |1/Ifl ))t'k'll l't!i'llil['[el'l_ll I>111"!it1_111I I_> ,q_'l'l [OII 1/t (b) ol tht' I't'_ll'l';l[
Advisory CollllllilLet, AI'L+ (H, 92-!*l_1_ Ih'lObvl" ()_ ]97)), 'lllt' ,11_1 lv,'l nl
1:he I)iI11_21 ilrl-' Sl!l lorth ill bolh kilt' 191)8 Act and ill _J_,_l_ N;lll;ll_t_lllk'lll
In,'_tru¢llon l15b.14A dated ,I;ll_tlary /H, 197_,: "Tht, Panel sh+l]l z'evJew
.'4-;ll'i,[_' 8LUlli_',_ _llltl I)l_'t'F_ll iol_, pJ+lm_ Fl'lt'Fl'l't] [o it ;111(I :+h;zl] IIl;Ikt' Vi!-
i>ort:@ tllltt'oll_ 8hall il_JvJ S_ I I Ill" Adlili zlJ sl riltOr wJ II1 ,Uc',ql)¢'cI I_O the h;I,!llZ'll,4
ill [)rl)pos¢#d oF I'XiSI[III _. l;l¢'ililJ_',_ ,lllll II1.'i)|loSz'd Ollc'l+;ll JOlt,q ;lll_,l will1 FI'"
_;_('('l [¢1 tll_" ;Id','qllA_." 5' Ol I_l.'ol'ro_;*'¢l (1t+ ¢'xJst ill!'. _;_ll_.'(_," !;(;tlld,lV_!,q_ /tlld
_h;111 perloL'm l'_ll('h Otlli't dUt it'5 .zPi l|lc" +%dlltJzlJs[l';lti>1" ltl(ly F++'iIU¢'+1 °"
Over t|l¢' yvars lh,. P+ult, l lh=: cv,'lved it.+ rolt. t<> i.zlcl.de l+l>z only
_;illt'ly _+t'l." SL'_ |lilt ]I_lS Jtlvhldt'd tt_+_:;i_m _tlt't't'l;fl +I.4 +I ('Oll,_itleZ+C1l Jt>ll t11+11
i( _hotttd Ill. _+'tltl_.'t't'Itt'kl l.'J(h s ,t_; x_t']) ,Ill ('I+t'_,4 ¢_t- l>ublic ,_;it_.{,. I% It,el
th_It rill+ ls1"oildt't ct+n+_iitlt, 1",t( iotl t_l tIlv t,l't+++F/ll+l.4 ;tl+d lhk'J1" l+Iclll+l+',¢.t+l¢.Pllt
+',ivt-_ ll_ ItlOl't' {'olllidt'llC_' lit lht' t11o1_' litttilt'd _ll't'+1 (}I ++;11t'tx + ,I_OlI('.
!
I ii
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7.2 PANI,'.I. _i"lVi'l_Ll:_
I;Inu;iry J')+ 107/+ NhAC_I'.;I:H Ro],, In !film I ](, Pm)p, ram HI)A(:,LI . I,)ul_)
(Irbil;l) _iitl('liVl'l'Jll_ _H|C'ILt
ll,'lm,I it.,, H, hpdlllp, gt;Hu:]
Ililo}'J'RI hilt ()l I'()d inli) (it'blll'l °
1{_!;Icl Joli (',(illi'llI !_yH| PlTI i(i+qil|l'('lll('lll!I
I"a'l)rlt, li'V ')(l_ ]')//t IJPo_,riilil [Sl;lihi)',t'l'_,_ Top _! I('_-, r ,J,q(',olh_il/41otl
TPH ]h'voiopiliPiH !{I;iliiH
,_V!_tplli:i till(,p,r;II hill M/III;I}',t+III(,ill
N;III- i n-'l'h,,- I,(iol_
I.',.rrv H_d,,
Pr,,1 iillill;iry Ih'!i i)'ll I((+V {t't,, I{,,,_tl] l,q
N, IV ]_}'14s ]-!)7_ rht, I.:xlt,l"ll:ll 'r;lilk I_f'o),,r;llll_ (Iv(!r_l)] Vit-,¢ I'lichmld A.q,rL.ml)lv
I':1' I_a,_t'l Jib' p]_II'II , IA
Ih,_ ip, n I)l'O}D,t'_llil
I IILPl" | _lt't',_
H;li_r i,ssne_ ;It)d (h(,(r p|'(ll)o_(!d
I'O,_0 I Ill it,ll.
I,i)',hlnin!,, Protot'l (Oll Do_),,ll
]'I"RIi_I_o£1111 JOll
,q(l'tlL'ltll+;l] T,,,gL Pro)',r_llll
R,'li;ll)ilitv, (hi;I]i_y A._.-hi_';ii|_'t' lind _aleiy
,_libL+Oli( r;i_'[of pro)',l'al_
M.¢,}.'(' _+l.tll/l_+t'lllt'll| t i]" I.h_' I]xLet'nal I'/It+tk Ilro))+rZllll
.]UtlO ')+()) 197!+ _."11: (ht,lrtt'plv l{t,'¢it+_,, ,_1,qFC,llttntmvil I_'
,g_'lJ" ('tllll I'O] 1_'1" d imt'tl:_,g +Oll,q
lulv I(+-I'1, tt)7'+ Hp;h'*' _h!lltlt" ,xl,lit_ I]nyii+e (:olltrtlJ|t'r }l(qlt'ywt'll, At'£o+
i'ror',r,i::_ Ovpr\'it'w .ql)_tt't' DiV., I'IA
R,'sp,msibilith,s_ Rolt', (+l+[u_;lTtiTntiOll
(!ollI rol It+r l'_,('|ltlit-;l| Dt'sct'ipt |on
(:Ol_Ipll[ t.r l)ro_++l-_lll! t_Vt!l-_.,i_!_+¢
Pl.ll,'d [_ril'_' P'I,'IIIOrv Ih_!Ol"¢
;"1,'111oI'v :41 rtlt J tll't' btli ]d-tlp
rt,t hnic,il R,,x. it,v.----ill th,l+th
I)t,_;ivll (]o1111"ol ,llld {ioll[j!'.tll+dtj(lll MIIII;I)',t!I1R'll(
l'l+Od!h'l i1111 .lilt] :+l'_Cllt+_.itll.lll
!;!IIIII!IiI|'V _l ;ll 1!'4
_'I_1"(" _1;111:11!_'111_'111 ol !;_;_l: ('_'ltt rOI Jl!r I+ro)+_r;lltl
At:,!ll!d ''- '_, Iq7 ', I'h*' I'!'+: I'ro:,r.+rl tl_.,r\,ipv,..:lid I.g(" ,'q)tl . A:+ll F;. ('A
Aim"; I _;11_11 t I,' I't'i II,'tl ll_*ll:l'dlll!i I lit'k]lt'l'(J_ ('A
,"tl_t'+!; I !!111,1 '.'r_,+[ll /'XpDl',_;lt'il ;llld i_ll) lt'lllt Iltdl itch
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P;IIII'I A('I:IvlI:Io_I ++'(llllillllll!ll:
(:Ul'l't'lll _111+1 i'l_il'( I+'d I_l('tlll lq'pI _lll_l Ihl'll'
:q_pllc,II IIm I._ the' rP!_
TIL+_ :l_'l+t_-illlln_ . i.iiJ,t-i_ ibl'_li,j';lltt
I)l,t illll ¸1oll (hi rP!; ;1_,1-1_-I1,,_1 ill)_ _.llvil-t_l|llll,lll
;lllll _)lhl, i _,llVll.llllltll,lll;lt I,ill.t.l_|.
I,hh'l,_ _ I I .+hll)4"(_ul i';ic,! I t_ I._t'kllt,_._l ;llld h(_..'
TJ J_' Pr(Igr_llli t I.ockht,l.(l
01"}_,,111l;_;11 iOll, pt,rs{_lltl(,l_ i-_.,_rlOll,SJbiJil Jc,_
'rii_, iI1_11t.l:i_l I!i ;llld pl.o_.t!_I{.51
Ti h' Pl'Odtlt'l loll
'l'J It _ (l'!tl _11_'.
'rilc R ai.d QA
(:tll-l_t!lll_ ._[.;It'hCl
(:tlPEt.'llt ._IJp.ll+Jli'i_.'_Itll I)I'OI)]t!IIIP4 +III'_] lht'ir
l+t'._O ] tll J o11+1,
_t+ptOlllllt+N ]()'tT_ 197++ RI ._y_tt+lll itllt'l;t_It Jotl (:Oltlr;lct+ol + Ro|t. Rl/l)Owl+It'y+ CA
ttOllmlon;t I i ty
_Vm t t+11l tR,+ft'( y
•_'Slt!ll[ Inl t'+;l';il ion ('h+l] lt!ltJ++t'.'r'i
Tour oi I"a_'ililit,m and ,Mt_ckul)S
(lt'ht I ol + I'ht+l'111_l ] PFott,ct iott ,_ys I L,Ill
S,_ibll: PI'O+',]';II!I tllld.ltc
] ,_ I"l_ I} 1+o_,1-;1111,_ I ;I |/I, _
l+!Otni++tl_tiOll tltl\,ict,._i ..-itnl+tl:+;
['tll'bolll_l_.'hin,,l"¢ llt,vit't,s .'.+ll_It-Stl.'_
I-:llgitlo ,'+;'Sit!IllS _llld COIII Eol_I ,_t_l_IIEl
('t_tltFo] ]t+t " ,_t;ll II_;
_h'tobt,r 15, 197,'+ OrbJt_,t + Apprt+,tch ,ilia I;llldJll}', I'I'Sl I+rop, r;llll .lSC/llOtl.+-lton
FoFrv OI)¢'INII iotlS
_I_lllllt!d \'S . I+nlll_llltlt!d
I':xtt'rll+ll I'tlllk disl+o;;,l] ,lift,i- I llght
Sp;lt't, _4htlt I It. 1"1 if.hi Ic_lt l'l.'9!;F;|tll
Abort /(_oII( ill),_,tll'_, ' (Ip_,l+_ll ]Oll._l Zllltl I h_'i 1+ ii_lll+t('t
i i11_1_11-%+(1, ]t)TI) ,_pllt't' _-;hlltl I,' +'l},l,ll,, +llld :;[_l|llS I{t,pt+l'l ;+;('/Ihmston
Apl_l'Otl_'}l *llltl l:ItlditlK lh'._t + PI)R rt,!;!lll!+
A'_'ioIlil':i ;llld t]l_']l" lll;lll*l)',t+lllt '111
+_._illl_l_'.Pllll'llI .llld ]li++_'{ I i011 OI _IV!;| t'lll!; III1 _,l,,r;ll itHi
M_FU _p,_t t. };hut I It, :;tll\t+_, • :ltltl ;'lJ ]'+1 + +k_lll;li',_'ll_t'ilt
,Itl,l r,,chttic.i] uh;ll l_ulgcs
N;I|II Int_,ill, ' , Ixl,,Yt+;lt I+lttk, ,gl{B, tll'l+Jl,'l +
|_l'_l!',[';llll l{_,'_'i!_i_,ll_i _llldt'l" _l('l {Vt" ('OIl,_]_lt'l.'tll iOil
{'tlrrI!llt F+l,ll tl!_
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March 3t 1975 KSC SpacQ Shuttle Planning KSC, Florida
KSC Roles and Responsibilities
- Operations, Maintenance,
Sustaining Engineering
KSC Organizational Relationships
- Overall Organization
- Intercenter Relationships
- Participation in Panels,
Working Groups, Task Teams
- Contracting Philosophy
- Manpower planning
Experience levels, skill retention,
skill mix.
Overview of Ground Operational Tasks
- 9hurtle
- Payloads (offline)
Documentation and Control
Facility and GSE OverView
Types and KSC effort/ResponsiblIty
- KSC facility baseline/current
status/ problems
Test Facilities Plans Schedules
Launch Preparation System
System Operation
Software Valldatlon/Test/Use of SAIL
KSC Operational Flow
Ground turnaround
Allocation vs. Assessment
STAG/Control
Payloads, online
Summary of KSC Shuttle operations
April 7-8, 1975 Space Shuttle Systems (MSFC Elements) MSFC, Alabama
POC_ Prevention Planning and
implementation
MSFC Integration Activities
HSFC Change Processing
MSFC Systems Tests
Single Failure Po_,t Designs
Solid Rocket Booster Project
Description and Status
Integration
Recovery/Retrieval
SRM
External Tank Project
Descriptlon/schedules/cost highlights
Top Problems/Sepclal Topics
Procurement and Hanufacturlng stltus and problems
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Ovary |o.w
Tntt,}_ratt,d System Test Bed (ISTB) Plan/Status
Cent re I h-,r status
Hydraulic Fluid Status
= Fabrication Learning
Heat Exchanger
Gt'ound Operations Plnun_ng
NSFC Summary
Nay 5-b_ 1975 Shuttle Assessment of Technical m_d ttanagement RI/CA
challenges
Thermal Protection Systma Rovlew
Hazard Analysis and Risk Aaso*sment
Hechanica} ilingos, Gear" Boxt_a, and Doors
System Hazards associated with asymmetrical
thrust of SRB's
Procedures/Ground Rules to Alleviate System I:at_uros
llaZr,ldous Gas Detection System
Level II InterfaCes
Haterial Ilsagt_ and Control
Range Safety
t_round and FltghL Test Ih'ograma
[_O(_()Provelltion
lAghtoiag Design and Protect Los
SAIl,
J92
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7.3 RESPONSE TO PANEL'S 1974 ANNUAL RBPOI_T
A%(P l,
," " NAIIOt,At AERONAIIIh _; AND SPA('[ ADMINISTRATION
,.,_ ,,, MAY_1 1_114
A11.0_ MQ
MEMORANDUM
TO : AA/Associate Administrator
FROM: M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
SUBJECT: Allnual ]{eport of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel (ASAP)
The Annual Report of tlle Aerospace Safety Adviso1:y Panel
has been distributed to each of tile MSF Cel_tel's and P['ogr,_l_l
Dit'ectors for their careful review. The Program Directors
have each coordinated responses to theJ]" pe]:iineut it:eros
in the report and these detailed responses are attached.
:]ignificant responses from the ASTP of[ice relate to
VollllUe [[ o[ the repoct, paqes R-9, items 1 throuqh I].
They (|eSCl, Jbe ,1 C'.lll[illLIJn'.l sti'Ollg I'_ro,.11Allll llhlllaqemellt C(",ll-
_,'t'|lt: t_'Jt;h q.'lll|]]|;IsJ._;011 t_ll]h-lnt-L, nlellt (]_ per.qo]llle] nlotivatioll
,tltd [Y,tillJlt_l. 'l'hc' l"J,_lltel;s coll_'e]*ll over the lleed for forl|lill
reviews i:: beJllq InL,I by monthly j,.int v_,vi_,ws and bi-wL.,_,kly
telecolls b_,twL,en t|IL_ tl..*_,and Soviet Technical Directors
:llld theJl" sial:f:;. [hl,ilifieatiol_ test data reviews are
beillq eolll illtlOll:;ly held t:o ,IS_'illl_e d Feddy-to-go statllS.
I,,llllltld_Je l l',lillilhl ill ]ll'O,||'l'Sl;illt| _'/e]] (_II bo_h sides and a
l?t_('t_llt Cl'eW Ll',lillillq _.,:{el'C|;_e ill ]|Oil;trOll a_.'oolllplJ.shed a
COlnpL_,te tr,lnsltu in both ];llqli_lJl illld ]hlSSldn. FMI;A's
h,_ve been COmlLle[_,,l for ,111 s_':_tems of the CSM ,lnd DH/
doekiuq sySleln. 'rh_, His:;ios ('earl'el Celltel" ]lltl'rdc[iOll
I'Id11 JS ill exeel lelll shal_e ,llld both COlll1|l'i(',_1 |,Lall ,_ [edlll
of exl_el't,'lill eden othol"S conil'oJ 1",10111l.O ,IS_J,_II edeh
l.'|Jqhl llil;_,ClOl'. _.li:_:_i_llsiln_ll,ztiou:; _II'_,l.'C.llt.JllLlillqwith
both ll.,q. ,lll_l ,_;oviel Clt,wl: lhll't icip, lt Jllzl ill _'ach other':_
lacilitio:_, l;ll_l't i!_ _'_III illllillq OlI |l'dckJllq fdJlllre;l OL"
ilhldVel'l_'llt oI_el',Iti_lll_ which couhl ,ll l'_'ct the o|h_'l' el_,W
O1" :_IldCI'CI',IIt . I t i :i I_I,lllll_,tl !.O illlI_lOV_" l'_Hllll111l_il2,1|JOllS by
If!filial AT,q-I,' bill lh, COII|ill_ICIh'_' ,:i_.'tion i'll l,],lllllt'd iF it i_
llol ,iV,li l,ll,I_,, ;'l,hI,lll l,rovi,h,:; Ibm, I_l'ilihll'_l' _'Of_lllllllli.(',l|J.t)ll:i
COV_'l',l_le ,llhl ex_'e_,d:; the" llliliillllllllI'_'_IHiII'IIII'IIIR ft)l." A_{']']_.
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l"iIl,llI}'t ill l'o_p_l. _' l_ tho l',111t'l1:I _llli,i;I i,m t_ll :Hlo.ll:.
_'il'_'t_Jl ,Illd I,ulll i'IIl'l'Oll,,lll,l)'_',;oi;e ll|_'::_,,Ill' boil'L,l
,IcL'olup| i:_l}t'_l oil bol h t ]11., (,':i_| ,llld I}l"|/do_'kjllq _IY:;i_.'m.
'l'h_' p,lltol oXpl'oi}:;od ,l .'i( I'Oll,I I'O_'Ollll:lOIId.lt ion I hdt I ho
:;I,x.'l,ll_ oxi,ol'ioil_'l, I_l, Lit i l i;t_,,I Io Iho Ill,Ixillllllll ,h',ll"OO
I,O::::iblo Oil L'lll'lL'lll pl'Oq}',llll_;. :ilxX.'l,|l_ 11,111 ,lllllOlll _'Olll-
I,It't_'d II_' pl!blit',lt ion of ,I :;_'rio:; ol "l.o:t_;Olt_: i,..',ll'llOt! u
iIOL'Lltllt'll :I. IXly o1[ i_'i.,, ol1 _'l,ll,'h 1._s IqT,1, Iox'iod ,Ill |
,l_'t iOl} 10111 Ol1 l,,ll'l| I'lO,l|',llll ill I iL'O ILl I'L'\'iOW I h_.'._II.' do_'ll-
_1IllOIItl; ,llld I'l.'pOl't bdCk to lilt' oil .illll_lOIllOItl,|l IL'.ll L'.l tho_;O" Io.'_;Ott:_ I ",11 I0_.. u | Wi I I Ill.lko tho.';o 1)_.'_.IpOlll;oll ,IVdi.ldblo|0 tho P,III_."L Ill"Oll the, it ro_,oipt.
;liqllilik',llll L'O,';I,Olllioi; II'olll Ih_' ;',p,l_'o _lhlltl 1o Oll.i_'t, I'O],ll_ _
to Voltlllb.' I_ IS,l,l.':l I.! (hl'Ollqh ll_# ,ll}_l VoltutlL' II, |_,lq.,':; |_}_
I_ f '.l :1 ,llld .I % t hl'otlqh .I 7 . I tl I IIO dl'O,I t',l t 11_' I',ltlo t _ :;
_'on_'Ol'll ,Ibollt illtO,ll',ll ioII ,it'l ivil i(,:i OI RoolCwol I _ ,I';C h,l:;
,tiVOli ,I I,l:;l¢. to tilt' _'ollt I',lt'tOl" It.-' Iooh ,ll :'i('l_,ll'_l[ illq thoir
itl|oqr,lt io;' tuner ioll l l'Olll tho Ol'l_itt,r t,l_:k (dUo Ixl,l'_' Ill. _.
It I t il_.• ,llO,I ol ;;lll_.'otl[ |',1_'101' "x'Oll_lol" _'Olll I'o1 _ I_.Ll_'kW_&l 1 ill I
IOwlit inq thoil I'l'OL'lll'OillOlll _l.lll,l,lt'lllL'lll PI,III Will_ ,I IlO,_t It,llll,h,l:l i :I 011 _,'OllllllOl},l | i t x!.' IlI, Ill,l,h'l!l','llt (t'Xl_.'_,'t od b_, ,lllllO I CI']'I _
III I'O:;l'oll:;O IO t ho o..'.ll_'l'l'll wi t h woidht L'ollt I'OI _ ,I t'Otlll._[ll--
,ll iOII t'l Iol't ol _:t ri,'l woi,ml _'olll 1"o1 IllO,l:llll't':;_ ,I llI'O_.'i lic
Orbilt'l" woi,Hll rt,du_'t ion ,icl iviiv, ,ind ,I :;t,l'io_; ol ,_v_,r,ll.l
ivoiqhl .111,1 I_'l'tOl'lll.lllL'O [ I',l_l_" ,_t I_: .ll'_" b_'ill,l pill':ill,'t{. III
Ih_" ,II'_',l ol ,tirOl I I't'_ttlil'OIIIt'tll::_ ,'Olll illllilld ,ll IOllI iOtl ill
!,cin,I I,,li,l to d,'tt'l'millo ,Ihorl ,'._p,d_ilitic:: Iol lho \',llioU:_
IIli:;!;iOII I'h,l:;o:; I,"l" till' dO::i,lll x,'hich i_; O\'ol\'illq I t'OIII the'
dl'iVilld I'O_ltlilt'lll_';lltl OI O]'L'l,ll iOll,ll I1_;_':;. 'l'ht, I',|llt'l
_'x;l'l'_.':::;_',l _'Oll_'t'l'll ill lilt, ' :\vitmi,'_: ,ll'O,I I_O',',lll;It' Ih_,"} ' Iolt
Ih,ll till. ` ._ix!'!;It'llll; Ix'Ol'O Oil lib" It'.ldill,l t'_l,l¢' ol Iho _lt.llO"ol-
Iho AFt. 'l'h_" I_':q'Oll:lt' in,li_'.lto:; lit,it lilt' plodl'.ll:l h,I;; ,I
h.ltldlo oil t h_" _[_,:ii,lll ::oIIll it_ll!;. ,_lt_l,_" i t it',ll 1'_', _,'NI't'l ie'tlx'_"
oil I'olh !l,ll'_ll',',ll't" ,llld _;OIIW, III' !1_1" ,| I'!.'l'lOIlll,lll_'t' .xkmilOlinq
::\'!;lOll1 h,l!l I_*'*'11 ,l,lill_',l ,It Ih_' ,'xli:;:;io_l L'Ollll'01 k'_'lllt'l ,
_:,'O,I ilI,l,l_';l_t'tl| :; I'.l:;_',l 01; Iho:;_' _'Xp_'l'it'tl_'L'!; V,'i I 1 lt_ • t'N_'I" "
,'i:;_',l t_, Loc i, l_',!llilOIHt'll|:; "Llll.l,lO,li'lt'. :;imil.lrlx.', Iht,
_lll_,_l,ll},l };_':;[I'IH i:; I_t'ill,I VI'IV _',ll't'lllll_" ,iO:ii,lll_',] tl_;ill,1
tin" II, IIII!'OW,'I_',I .Itllolll,ll it' ,ll'!'l,_.l_'h_ ''; .Itl, I I,Iltdilld:; v:ilh
I ]1_' L'V q'lll .l:; ,111 _'Xl','t i,'tl,',' ]_,1:.,', .\[ :;0 I't'] I1,1 II:;,',l i:;
::1','11_' R.III, I wilh Ih_'il CV ,I,_1 it':;i t'l,'*ll,tl'! I'Xl','l ion,'o.
I','tlh I_',l,ll,I:; (0 ill,' Ill,Ill ill |}It" I,'_!' V,'I:;IIt; ,llllol!'.lt_'d
:;\".l('l'l_;, ,Ill .l['l'l,_.h'h _.l II:;ill,l .llll,_l:l. ll {," IIIll_'l ]Oll_; [01"
dt'_'i:;ioll:; .110 lOqllil'_'d ill I'*'illd lolls,wed. 'l'lli:l i_; bOl'llO
I_.'_
i
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Olll I_"I' '1.1"7 ,lil'¢'l'.ll I tl:_O C.I- Atil_ll,_lli| |_o1" I'Oll_IHlOIl| low ".1 u
|_tlld]-I_l:1 II1 ,ill Wo,llhe'l". ']'Ulll,ll'Ol|tld I i1111' i:I tll t]l_,,ll _'oll-
c'Ol'll_lll_| i,i I'Ol'oivll_q J'tl] I ,tt lOilti_l_ ,,.if ,I I_111o] WOl'k]l_ll
witll lnte,lt ,lo:_i,ln, ioqJ,_tiO and luaint,lin,lbility il_lOl'lH_l- .
Ill I1 ,q_ i I' bOOOllIOl{ ,Iv,It I ,lhlo. 'J_llO OOllOOl'll ,IboliL _11l'-w_',lt h,'l"
c,tp,fl_il ity J,'_ |_L']lltl _'Ol'kOk[ holh with l't'q,ll'tl:1 tO ('1 [oL'l:k Oil
:hll'l'JllJ_'O :_OIIIO all-WO,IthOl" _-']l,ll"_tOl_'l'J.gt]o:_ /'OL" thOt'lll,tl
_'h,|l*,ll'(Ol']:_[ 102_ 011 I[ hO '|'Jt,_. (11_L"1",1( JOIl_l'J ,-t_ (Ol'll,ltO.g ..11'0
_tv,lil,lblo :].illt'O t'Jl,llIOO,'i O1! I_,ld _,/O,l|hOl." _1_ both i_1"]1110 ,11ttJ
_'01|(.L11¢1011¢,'_ ],llldJll_l :litO'.i i:; VOl'Y 10_¢. In ,Id<|jt].OII, ,ll.|to-
m,it']o _,111dJllq ,_111d O\'Ol'l'Lllt oqilJ.|miollt _'._ bO]ll_| il_'.iL,II]O_| t,,', I
bot. t'Oi." )l,lnd.lo ,111 wt',itllo_: |_l'o}__|oli]._. Oil Lilt' ,g,gl_ll-: k'olll]'o|]ol'_ i
t llo I',tllO_ had tlltO,_,l ionod t|lo Yo_l_iOllB _'o17 11o( OOl_tildol"ill_1 _1
11t,lqlkOt.ie OOZ'e nlt_nlol"y. 'l'ho 1"(,s11_111:_o _J!_t_ (1 _Ol'ket_ o!- I
I"O,I:iOIIB 1¢_1" 110| tt,'_]tl,1 thO OO1"O :1p|_1;o,lo|1 |_tit ,11.go illdXt',liok4 J
th,lt_ 11111q,',l"C oomilt] t tt't' ]B Yovio_'itl,1 tli_ .wholo ootlt ro| 1o1." }
dOV_._]O]_illOllt |_1'O]._!.O111with ,I l"t'poH to ,ISL dlto o1_ ,_l,l_' 22, 1'17,1.
'l'ho P,inol tel L t }1,it t o_1_ o1(|_111] :1_lt 'JOtl,',_ ,It I_ook',s'O] 1 _s'ol'o l_Ol
yOf l'iZ'llily o;H,Ibii:_hod. 'I'hi.s .if'on h,l.g .qi.llt'o bOOll i._i_lllll'_i-
O,I11t1%' .]ltl|_l'Ok*otJ ,.It1,.| ._1[Al'l"od, ]llOl_t,J[tl_J _lOVOl"llltlOllt, 1"010l_ ,Ind
l'_'_llloIIl_Jllil{I JO_ Iof liiO.'_l t_l Iho Io:It .':itl,_. (111 t_.ho '{'Pll
lho I',II_O] oi._l'l'Oi.'| Iy pointed otll l,h,l I. lll,liof tlo._iqn in.qtlo.'i
ill_'lllllt" ;it l'<lillt i.';ol,lt it'll, ,lll)ll':li%'t'.'l, iOilll.';_, 'l'l_;;/I-IIt'l
OOilip,ll ibi 1 i1_', dyil,llllio ;_o,11_ ,llld do','t, lo|_illonl o1" ,I ]00-
IIIi_.'ii011 I i Io t'O,ll i11,1. Ill I'Olil_Oll.'lO , ,Ill IIl_--lO--_|,llO !lL,li_llll
of dt'vt, lol_nlont toni itl<l on t',il'h ill IJlt'_:O dl'._;],lll i._l._Itit', *t i[I
In'O','id_'d ill Iho ,lll,ich_'d dt, l,lilo, l ,ill.'_t_'l,lll. fill iho ,'_;:$11'.,111o
oh,lllqO Io Hi I-II-II I.',g:'_ hydl',llil l_" Itllid t',ltl_it'_l l;Olllt" illlO.'It].Oll.'_
tln I,O:;;;iilI,, Illl'lllt)i" t'v,Illl,l| iOll l't,_lLtilt,d. Ill l't':iJ_OilI_l" #
lli,llt, l'i,ll:_ in ooill,lol _,_'ilh Ihl, I luid ,ll'l" lll, iilq ldOlllitiod
,ind ili,ilol i,11:_ <'ollll,.ll ihilil_; ill hoiil,1 I't,viot_'l,d (iilt-hi,linq
Drill It':It ill<l ,lll_t :;t,l"ci_'o O._.l_Ol'i_'tlt'O) . 111 ,1,l,lit ion, ,111
,ICOt't_l,lilO0 ,lll,J _lt'Iti_lil ','t'l'il it',ll loll l_lO_ll',ll!l i:i bt, illq
illil i,ll_'d Io It':il ,q,':_ll' OOlllt,iHll'lll.'_ ,iild _y.':lt'ili,_ wilh ;1i I--ll.-
11t.!112 fluid. 'l'h_" l',lnt, I ,ll_io qtionl ioil_,d v.'holhol' thl, ,g,gtll:
I Io× l illo ln,llol i,il t¢,i_: t'ollll_,il ihlo I¢il li llx%'<loli ,In<l Ilol ;iilb-
it','I to II_',lto,lon _,ull,lilllomt,lli. 'l'h]:: i_ ,i v:_,ll--i'o_'o<lni:_t,d
I_l'ol_lolli .ill,I lhl, ili.il_,iJ.ll:_ ]l.l,,.o bol,il :il,lt,,,ll,_l ,lo_'oidill,il_.'o
'l'ho l_,ltlt'l l,,_intt,,I olll lho ,Ill ll,l't,lll I't,_lliii'oillt,lll;_ ll_l" lilt,
,_',gl_ll_', t'l_llil_ll:_l ion _,h,lillhol" ,i:_ t'ollll_,llt,,I Io lilt, ,I.-. _ oil,lillt,,
'l'llo i'o_q_oil::_, indi_',ll_,:i Ih.ll lllo _,li'lo_+' ill<it_,ii,il ,.¢,i_ :h,lo_'l<,,I
Io I_t,:tl iilool Ihl' liili,lli<" l_'_lllii_'i_l_'lll:_ OI hi,lh lh_'iill,II _'oll--
,hi<'l i\'i1_'_ hiqh f,Ivoll,llh ,ill<l ,hiol ilil'l', hi,ih lllOl,lllil,li_',l|
::l,il,ilil'l' ,Ind lilo _-h,ll,l_,l_,! l_il i<':i, ;%llhotiqll Ihl' I',lnt'l
il_'NI l_oiillt'_l _tll Ih,iI Ih_, oI,I ill!tim I_,,'hili_ltl_, lot i_,l,lll iy
h,l.'i llOi l_l't'll dol illl'd_ IIIo ll'_:l_Oll:;_' illdi_',lto_ lh,ll lllll_'h
195
• ,, , |
00000003-TSA06
,|
wind tuum,1 dat,_, ('liqht ,'i].nutl,lLJ_ulS, aerotl_el'm,l] d_,namie;]
l.J_n;k,e_c. which is in i>l:O,lrt,:;:;m;ly o;}u:i4_reallyc})ill)gt::_and
lhe tL'(;hlliqLll_ mdy well haw-_ Lo b_, deX, e]Ol*ed I'l'Olll Ol>el-a-
t. iOl't;ll phase experience. 'l'he )'allelalso questionud
d(|O(lUilc Y of controls for qu,lliflcat]on of "of f.-the-shelf" I
ll;irdwal"e. A special I,eve] 117 DJl'ective Wa:i deemed |
necessary to insure adequate cont_:o]s and Lt is in the I
i:h]a] ['ov]ew/al_pl'ova] cycle. Finally, the PiH1o]'s concern
]OF O[]'ective tllOil:ILll'O:_ to ]_l'evenl" stlTe:_s c(%171"osJon _.lal_
I'ocogllizo.d eaYiy by thu Shlltt]e Proql'alll and is contl3o].]ed
I)y a NA.,A ,l,_tt_l'Jills illld pYocoss sl_ocl[ic_tlon I inc]ll(lln.]
a contractor m;li:erials control and verification plan,
lchieh illcorporates mnterial sign-off elf drav,inqs and
records of all deviations with _'ationale for each.
]n conclusion, ] wou]t_ like to (lldlll[tile Panel fol; its
thoKouL h and excellent 17eport and assure them that thei["
thouqhtl't_l (lUeStJons a['e conLinLtiuq to l_['ovide an excellent
checklist for our program malla<lement function.
/ • /
,. : _l • ' /'J / ._e //
." John F. Yardley
/
At t,lchmellts
,l:_._ita ted
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7,4 KSC/MSFC Hl_O OF tINDb:RSTANBIN(_ KrdI lo58.7/'sp
O_tnber 10, 1.q7;i
Eflacliv* Date
JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, NASA
MANAGEMENT INSTRUCTION
SUBJECT KSC/MSFC MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR
SHUTTLE EXTERNAL TANK (ET)AND SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER (SRB)SUPPORT EQUIPMENT "--
L ,
I. PURPOSE
This InstructionincorporatesintotheKSC IssuanceSystem a
Memorandum ofUnderstandingbetweentheJohn F. Kennedy Space
Center,NASA (KSC)and theGeorge C. MarshallSpace Flight
Center (MSFC) forShuttleExternalTank (ET) and SolidRocket
Booster(SRB) supportequipment. This Memorandum _stablishes
thoseitemsofsupportequipmentfortheShuttleExternalTank
and SolidRocketBoosterwhich willbe theresponsibilityofKSC
and thoseitemswhichwillbe the responsibilityofMSFC.
R. C. Hock
ActingDirectorofExecutiveStaff
Attachment:
A. Memorandum ofUnderstanding
Dist ribut ion :
STDL-P
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ATTACIIMENT A to
KMI 1058,7/SP
ET_al_.d SR__BSUPIK)_RT_EQUIPMENT
MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING
7/It} 7"|
I. Supportequipmenthas been definedinthreecategories:
Ground SupportEquipment (GSE):
GSE consistsofthatequipment:rodassociatedsoftwarewhichis
requiredtocheckout,service,ha .lle,provideaccessto,maintain
and safetileExternalTank, and SolidRocket Booster,theirsub--
assembliesor othersystem elementsattilelaunchaltdlandingsites
only. Includessuch itemsas:
o Fixedfacilityaccessstands,horizontaland vertical
o Facilitysup|xwtand storagestands
o Purgeand pressurantgas suppliesand consoles
o Ground ECS
o Launch processing system ;tied assot.iated software
o Laut_ch site electrical slid I_wch;lllica[ BME
o Standard test equipment
o Standard tx>wer supplies and battery GSE
o Ground tr:tnst_ortatton l}t'inle l|tOvel"
o Facility leak detectors
Sl)t'cii_t ! Test Eouipnlenl (STI'3:
STE t'onsls|S o[ that equipment and :tssociated software which is
required to SUlll)ort checkout, develt_lmxenl, :|nd qu:dtficatien te_ttng
of the External Ta_k. aml Solid t_ock_,t I_ooster, their subassemblies
or other e|elnenls durlllg m;|nuf:tcltlrilw_ huihhll_ and development.
1q8
ii
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ATTACHMENT A Icl
KMI I{)58.7/SP
Includessuch items as:
o Internalaccess platforms
o Specialtestcablekitsand boxes
o Other equipmentwithan intimatedesigninterfacewith
theflighthardware
Transportationand SupportEquipment (TSE):
TSE consistsofthathardware which isrequiredtotransport,
handle,and maintaintheExternalTank and SolidRocketBooster,
theirsystem elementstoand from thecont_'actor'sfacilitiesother
governmentfacilities,and toand from thelaunchsiteand landing
sltes(s)exclusiveoftoolint_used withinthefactoryand commercial
conveyanceequipment. Includessuch itemsas:
o Transporter
o LRU handling slings and doilies
2. The selectedcontractorwillfurnishallmaterialsand services
todesigndevelop,test,qualify,manufacture,assemble, checkout,
and maintaintheSTE and TSE. Checkoutand maintenanceatthe
launchsiteisexcluded,
3. The contractorwillidentifythoseitems of,and conceptsfor,
ET or SRB supportequipmentrecomnlendedforuse atthelaunchsite,
4. The contractorwillanalyzespecifiedand potentialaunchsite
requirementsinthedesignofSTE and TSE fronta program cost
effectivenessviewpointinorder tomaximize commonality, This
analysisshallshow thedesign/costsavingsor impactofcommonality.
5. The contractor's incorporation of unique launch site requirements
in STE and TSE shall be :tpprovcd by the NASA Project Office for
accomplishmentunderan existingET or SRM procuren_entor shall
be accomplishedthrougha supplenlentalcontractarrangement
negotiatedand managed i):/thelaunchsit(,on a case-by case basis.
199
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rt ATTACIIMENT h t()
KMI I 01i8.7/.qP
h. 'File Hole('iic)n tlf t,¢inlnlczn e(itilptH¢'llt and the identlflcati,¢n ()f launch
sitt, rt,quh'eni,,nts will be the reHp(m.ii)iliLy ,d" K_G. The, design and
(h,vel,q)nlent of t!iitl ¢'ollllqlOll ¢'¢lttipl'llent will I)e contr¢_ih,d hy a co-
chalrnlanshi l) of one KSC Support Equipn_ent M;lllager al|d ()Ill" MS]"(;
Manal.ler appointed by tilt, g'l' or .'-igB Ih'o_ect M,tnager. Neither (ffthe co-chairm¢,n wmdd have nnilat¢,ral authority to proce¢,¢l with in{h, pen-
dent (h_veloplllent or make _2hallges to Lhls . Olllnlon support ¢'¢luipnlent;
howt, ver. generally tilt. M:;FC Manager will be the leading element with
tilt, KSC Manager concurring in planned direction ov changes. Both
Managers will have ready access to the contractor for day-to-day
technical discussions and problem resolutlon;how¢'ver, tile MSFC Manager
will initiate all formal direction of the contractor. If a disagreement
develops between the co-,:hairmen that could impede tile progress of
tile common equipment development° tilt, matter will be immediately
brought to the attention of the approl)riate Project or Projects Office
Managers at MSFC and KSC.
7. Tile design and develol)rtlent of S']'I!_. 'I'SE, and conllllon support
e(luipment is ineludt'd in the prt, st, nt 1_'1 ' iliad SRlkl l)rocurellleat; however.
the specific units of this ..(luipmt'nl that ,eel, r¢,quired for sole use at tile
launch site will bt, funded I)y KSC.
8. The design/procuren_enl/fdhricali_m ,if (iSF: is excluded from the
present l_]'l' _,nd SRM i)rocllrenlt'nts ilntl will lit, covt, red under a separate
t_rocuren_t.nt action t._ be negotiatt,¢l, l_aanaged, ,ind funded by the
I dunt'h site.
q. If, during the dr. sign or devt, lopnlt'nt of comm(m u.sage support
eqtlipnlt, nt. an it¢'m evt}lw.s to the point Iha! it is n,_ IOllger el)st effective
for the l)l'ogrillll to lllaintain CO|lllllon II,_,lgl ' . lllt'll ,_t'p;tl'ate design/
dt.'¢elopnlenl actions will I)e initialed. From this point, tilt" equipment
would I)e cla,ssified its STE, thert'l)y placing it und_'r sole MSF'C nlanage-
lllent ,¢nd I)utlg_'l t'onlrol; o1' _1_ (._,_]':, lht, l'elly plat-illg it tlndt'r soil, KSC
lllanal2,elllent ,llld bu¢lgt't t'otltl'ol°
Milnager. Shuffle l'i'oi¢,cl._ Ofl'ict, M.inag_'r. Shullh' Projects Office
I(.S( : M,% I.'t :
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7,h SPACI ,] :{llUT'I'I,E SYS'I'I.:M PI__I.:I._!bl.INAR_Y Illl,.,Lij,_N - itt,:Vll,._'
OILlet_ Iw'_;
'l'_le I_lllt']iO_lt ' Iil |he' _{2_'PDR j._ Io ct)lhlllV( _lll l'lh[ Io-elld _ v_It,v/ to
il_i._ill['e IhRI (he Splice SIlutt]o :{s':_iL'lll h'vel reqilit't'lm'lll_ _i].[ be s_ilj.._-
lied I)y t'_ll'l'L'l|l h0t'dw_llu'_, _11_(I _oilw_ll'¢' dt'!_igll illld P]_llll_h|_, '/'ht! systeln
[_'w'] _lspecL._i el Ihe elelllellt I_rob'r_mls wj_l ])_! t'X_|lll[lledP jA1CiLld3[nj t, t|tk,
O_'bjlel.'l I'_xl_,l'll_ll '['_lllk_ Solid Rocket Booster_ Sp,ll-t! Shuttle l'taj.n I"n-
)[ille, Payload Acconmlodations and t;round Systems. The obJ_ctiv,s t,_
be accomplished during the PIeR are to:
(a) Review tht' total[ Space Shuttle System des_gr, inelu_l-
ill_; _lS requiretl, indJ, vidtt_ll I'h_lllt'ntsl p_lylozld _lt't'o|t_lOd,lti,_llS _lnd tile
._rott_ld syatenls to _lssul_e compliance with Space Shill _ le System require-
lilt _II[ _' o
(b) .\t'vit'w cttrr,.'tH h;ll'dw;irt, ;illd sol tware design ;,lltl pre-
d ic ted capabili.ty as coniparu, d wi Iil misSiOl_ requtrenlent s.
(c) Revit, w culcl?el_t dt.si_,ils Lllltl platlS il_;_l[llSl quality, re-
liability, maintainability and salety requirements.
Rt, view Items
At tilt' PI)R_ tile pat'ticJ_pal_t,g wi 11 be t'xl)t,t'tt, tl to revit-'w vat'tous
d,lt_l whi¢|l dt..,;t't'il)e [:lie system tle.qigll. Tht, se d_lt_l will Jllt'lutlc' (1)
dOt'|llllelllz4 (pl_lns)_ (._ dt'_lwillt.,.,i _llhl gt'llt,m_ll it':_t (_} ll_tl|LIl_lt't,lL'Jll_ ,lilt]
It!st l_lyOIII (lilt[ l_Ow_i, ,llhl (,'I} olih't" h.hk-.dl_ d_lt,I.
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Review Operations
Review Teams. The reviews will be accomplished by teams that
have th¢_ responsibility for reviewing assigned areas. A team cap-
i rain has bec-n assigned to each of the major technical areas to be
reviewed. Each team captain will be respcnsible to the review chair-
man [or nominating the members of the team necessary to accomplish
an adequate review of his assigned area. Each review team should in-
clude the NASA technical area manager and support personnel, flight
i and ground operations personnel, project element representatives as
appropriate_ and contractor representatives as required.
In accomplishing the review obJectivesj each team prepares Re-
I view Item Dispositions (RID's) to describe significant discrepancies
and inconsistencies. Each team captain reviews all RIDrs generated
by his team to eliminate redundancies and duplicate RID's. The team
captain submits the team findings and recommended RID dispositions to
the review coordinator in the form of a team review packaging con-
sisting of (I) a set of team minutes, and (2) all RID's written by the
team. The team captain has the overall responsibility for all activity
of his team and assure that all review ground rules and schedules are
met. lte prepares _he appropriate response to each RID and recomends
the disposition to be taken.
Review Item Disposition (RID's)
RID's shall be submitted to _he review control station as soon
1 20
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n_ they nre wrltte11 to _111ow _i._imlch time _IH po#slble tar processing.
F:very attempt will be 11_tdeto ve.olve problems vin the review Leama
tlurillg the team meetings.
3¢raenln K Groupi Pre-Boitrd nnd Board Operntions
Sert,etlinj_, Group. The sel'eel|in_ grtlop will sere|in till R[II's sub-
mitted to avoid redundancy, duplication, or other progrnmm_ltie problems
' H|lint nmy be },euerilted. iqtt, group will review the disposition of _lll
RIDts lind elttegori;:e them for t:eviow by tilt, pre-board.
Pre-Bonr_l. lql,, pre-bollrd will be responsible for reviewing nil
Rll)'s, witit primary qmpllasi$ on tltose items requiring further de-
liberation or reHOltltitlll. After tilt, pre-bonrd review, R[I)'8 of ran]or
lmport+ltlt'e will be Iol'le;lrded to the bo+lrd I,>r lillitl review alld diS-
pos l t Lee.
BOilrd. '['ht' boat'd ls tilt' tilml dtspositiooio}_ ,mlhority. All
I{IDts el roll.lot" impeltittle|, to |iLl" pl'OgFilm will be d isposit loned at
Ihi,_ level. IIo_trd i_t't,Hetltil[ ious will coustst el pro.lecl 8IUSP_IL'Ies
b_' e,Icll I_l'O.ll'l'[ milll¢l_t, eL " _|tltl Jtld{vIdlt_|l ,_UllUl_ll'te8 by till' It,ellS lt,llderfl
OI I'eViOW ¢let'olltl_li,_]|lm'lltS t pl'ol_h'tllS, n_ltlt'VN OI NJ_lllJlit'_llll lmpor-
flint'|' /LILt] R|II t H.
2o5
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.h_(..'s_,'s ll,l,t._ [N'LI,_..RAI'' ION IIt.'l.'il'l,_ FllNl_'ri(IN. e,
I'R I HI,_
ASCI'_N'L',% I.',NTdYIH.'.RFOR_iANCI.'. HATI'RIAI.:{& PROCI.]SSI._S
I,,OAI'_S & S'I'RUC'I'tlRA|, IWNA['.I|CS *.;RlllINl'S SYS'I'I._HS lN'rl-t_l_A'l'loN
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t_OHPLt'I'I._R,c,¥S'I'[.'.[_ISANI) Oi:'L'WAI_,I': HANUVAC'L'LIRINC
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'rAffLE I [
PANELS AND WORKING GROUPS
HA.NAt:EN'NTPERFORNANCE MANAt;EMENT PANEL
CONFI(_URATION MANAGEMENT SYSTENS PANEL
MIL: INTEGRATION PANEL
[NFOF_T[ON NANAGEP_NT SYSTEMS PANEL
INTEGRATED LL_;ISTICS WORRING CROUP
COST PER FLIGHT tX'JbiMITTEE
SCNEDIJLE/LLW [C INTEGRATION NORKING GROLIP
'rECHNI CAl.
.'-IY._TI-:H[NTERFAL:E.'4 PANEL
FI.IGHT PERFORt4AN¢'E PANEl.
I.OAL)_/STRUCTURAL nYNAHICS PANEl.
[NTEGRATEI) PROPUL.'-IION & I.'LUII)S PANEL
FLU.;IIT CONTROL SYSTEH PANEL
ORP,IT _, ENTRY Ft'S SIIBPANEL
GuIr',ANCE NAVIGATI.ON & CONTROL SYSTEH.q $OBPANEL
ASt'[.'NT Ft;_/STRI]t:TI]RES sIIBPANE].
IN_Et;I_V[I:I'J AVI.ONICS PANI.'L
_IECILAN_CAI.SYS'[I'MS PANFI,
,_,I'AL_I':CRAFTSYS I':HS SUI_I'ANEI.
ALRCRAI.'L' ,s_srEtlS 5llBl ANI..L
('ROLINI_ SYSTF:P_ IN'L'E¢;RATION PANFL
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TAIII,I._ I I I
ROCli.III-'.LL LtITI,'.I_m\TLOIIAL'S S;'S'I'I:.4S ItlTI.'.GTw_'I.'IOII 'i'ASllS
SIIII'I'I.'I,I." PROIIRAM I'JF.FlttlTION ANll RI.:t,_IIIREblI.:I¢|'S
S%.'S'I.'I.:I,I IN'I.'I.;RFACE CtlNTRtII,
HA ,'.It,l PIII.II'E I,ITI I.]_
FI.ltIIIT SY,'-ITI.:bl liES I(;N PERFORblANt:E
tlROIIbll_ OI>I".RA'I'ION_ ANAI,'I'SI S
COS'I' PL':R I:LLc,ILL'
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S_'_l:l:;i'_' _\NI_ RI'I.IAIlil.117"
Pltl:Pl.ltlll'l" ANII FI.ICIIT i'l.;s'r Sill, pOl'['
I N I'1._RI:_'_t'l.." 'i'tlil I. I Nil
SYSTITM,'4 MATI2RIAI,'4 AND I'Rtit'I:_S t'ONTItII.
I';'cl'|.t)Al) |i,l |'|(RI:_'_t_E
H ISTItIN PI.ANNINt;
I_I._I'III.'SI:Nr_vI' I VI'S A I" F I.F MI:._ I' CON I'IIA(" 1'OI4S
SY,'41'I-'t,I I,I:VI-I, I*/OI_KINC Cl_.lllll_._
RI.'I'IlI:SI'NI'AI'|VE_ AT NAS'_ t'I:NTFR.'4
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._(I14
!
O0000003-TSB05

TAItI,I.: V
ORBITER OPERA'rlt)NAL HODES
Hitnua 1. Direct
The crew manually controls the vehicle. No feed-back _tgnals
tram vehicle-motion sensors are used for stabilization and control.
Tile crew's command signal iS applied to the appropriate i"_rce offer-
tar via the GNSC computer. Required compensation and logic for
of fetter selection are accomplished within tile tIN&C computer. Ve-
hicle-motion signals are displayed as required for crew operation.
Automatic tISN call,ands are inhibited.
Manual t_onmiand AtthmienCaC£on
The crew manually controls the vehicle as t_1 manual direct. How-
ever', :he crew's command is augraented by feedback signals from vehicle-
mot[oil seIISOrS to improve respon;le oz" ,lilt:lilt, lit stability, or both. Re-
quired compeilsation and logic fo': el feeLer selection are accomplished
within the GN&C.computer, Vehlc.h,-nlotton signals nre displayed as re-
quired for the crew. Automatic LI&N ten,ands are inhibited.
Iloid
"File coutroiled vellicl¢ parameter is held ill the value existiilg
x_it.iI tile hold Itinctiou is eng_lged. +[_liS reference signal is not alter-
:lblo by the _lnLomdtic guidauce system except by disengagcmelit and rc-
clll'Jigt,iucilt el tilt, hold ltulction. "lilt" old ItltlctioI1 may be manually dis-
_,lll',_ll'_ed by laoviug tilt, associated tltnnttal hand controller from Lilt" detent
posit loll. Reongagettivilt is ilccomplisht'd by returning tilL' halld controller
to tile detent position.
.4ol,,ct
"iqio COil[ i+Oilcd vehicle Ililrilillcter converges to and holds the value
sclocit'd or prost.lt'c'ted by the crew.
AiII tllll,I I i C
I'llt' );tlidilllte Iluit'l ion provides ;illlOlS_lt it' coulro] el tilt" vt, htcle.
_'l,lllilill t'Olllmidnd stgll_lls art" lllhibiled _ind cilnuol _lct to sum wilh or ovt.r-
i'ido tilt, .uilulllill it. t'Olilll_inds 117onl Iht' ltuidilut'e system. Vehicle Illottoils
:;i)'.ll.il_ _ll'o displ_lvt'd Io llt'riil ¢l'eW illonllorllll; ill tht _ tI&N Inllt't[Oll.
I'bt' ct'i,w has tilt' omit itlil el millniilliy t'nl_ill_lhl! • tit" dist, lll;ilgtll I, Iho OUtO-
lil, II it" ILIIWI |till,
2lo
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TABLE VI
ATMOSPHERIC REVITALIZATION SUBSYSTEM
FUNCTIONS
CARBON DIOXIDE, ODOR, AND WATER VAPOR CONTROL IN PRESSURIZED CABIN
CABIN PRESSURE MAINTENANCE AND CONTROL
CABIN ATMOSPHERE THERMAL CONTROL
CABIN AND AFT SECTION AVIONICS THERMAL CONTROL
ATMOSPHERIC REVITALIZATION FOR HABITABLE PAYLOADS (WHEN REQUIRED)
DESIGN/PERFORMANCE RE(_UIKEHENTS
MISSION
NOMINAL: 42 I_N-DAYS
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY: 3 TWO-MAN PERIODS
CONTINCENCIES: 16-1_L_N DAYS OR 1 CABIN REPRESSURIZAT|ON
OR MAINTAIN PRESSURE WITH CABIN LEAK
PERSONNEL (CI_W/PASSENGERS)
:DESICN OPERATION, 3 t.o IO
CABIN :NORMAL, 3 to 7
:RESCUE, 0 tO 10
CABIN PRESSURE: I0].t354 N/m _ (14.7 psl.a)
.)
ATMOSPHERIC COMPOSITION: 21_74 N/m _ (3.1 PSIA_ OXYCEN:
2
79_980 N/m (ll.f"PSIA) NITROGEN
211
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TABLE VIII
TYPICAL CONTROLLER ELECTRONICS CARl) FAILURE RATES
Failure R,_ce Percent of Controller
Nomenclature _ (7JtO00 hr.) Falture _ate
Output electronics I 0.597 1.7
Power supply 1 0.455 1.3
Input electronics 1 0.310 0.88
Computer interface
electronics 2 0.208 0.59
213
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TABLE IX
CON.TROLLER RELIABILITY _JRE|)ICTION
Failure Rate
Z per lO00 hrs.
Input Electronics 3.9b
Interface Electronics 2,87
Ou=put Electronics 3.32
Power Supply and Chassis 2.30
DCtl 2I.I...__8
Controller 33.63
3,000 hours DrrFF
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EXTERNAL TANK
TYPICAL MECHANICAL JOINT
SECONDARY SEAL /DUAL SEAL
/ /
RING I / LEAK DETECTION PORTFLOATING FLANGE
__ __ATTACilMENT BOLT HOLE
/
\
DUAL PRIMARY SEAL
Figure 27
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